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Abstract
Electronic limit order markets account for a large and increasing percentage of
global financial trading. Understanding the complex interaction between traders’
limit order submission strategies and the state of the market, and their consequent
effects on market quality becomes increasingly important for investors, as well as
to those who regulate and design automated markets.
In four essays, this thesis examines the aforementioned interaction by econo-
metric analysis of the market impact of limit order, the properties of order flow
and traders’ (hidden) order submission decisions.
Chapter 1 looks at the market impact of limit orders. Quantifying short-
term and long-term effects of limit order submissions on quotes in Euronext, we
show that limit orders have significant information content, and how strongly limit
orders signal the market depends on both their characteritics (price and size) and
the state of limit order books (LOBs).
Chapter 2 provides new empirical evidence on order submission activities and
market impacts of limit orders at NASDAQ. We find that traders dominantly sub-
mit small size limit orders and cancell most of them immediately after submission.
Based on the estimated market impact of orders, we propose a method to predict
the optimal size of a limit order conditional on its position in the LOB and a given
fixed level of expected impact.
Chapter 3 analyzes traders’ decisions on using undisclosed orders in opaque
markets. Employing Totalview message data at NASDAQ, we show that market
conditions affect traders’ order submission strategies and thus the location of hid-
den liqudity is predictable given observable market characteristics. Out evidence
also suggests that traders balance their hidden order placements to compete for
the provision of liquidity and protect themselves against picking-off risk.
Chapter 4 presents a program framework for reconstructing LOBs as well as
extracting order flow information from message stream data. We design the basic
modules of the system in an abstract layer based on common order events in
limit order markets, so that it can be easily adapted to data at any limit order
markets. The underlying data structure is highly optimized and the programs in





Transaktionen auf vollständig elektronischen, Limit-Order -getriebenen Märkten
machen einen großen und wachsenden Teil aller weltweiten Finanzmarkttransak-
tionen aus. Es ist deshalb von herausragender Bedeutung für Investoren und
Regulatoren dieser Märkte, die komplexen Interaktionen zwischen dem Zustand
des Marktes und den Limit-Ordern der Marktteilnehmer zu verstehen.
Das Kapitel 1 befasst sich mit den Auswirkungen von Limit-Ordern der Mark-
tteilnehmer auf den Zustand des Marktes und die Marktqualität. In der Analyse
quantifizieren wir die kurz- und langfristigen Effekte der Limit-Order Platzierung
auf Preisquotierungen. Am Beispiel des Börsenplatzes Euronext zeigen wir, dass
eine Limit-Order signifikante Informationen für Preisquotierungen enthält und il-
lustrieren inwieweit der Markt von den Charakteristika der Limit-Order (Preis und
Volumen) und dem Zustand des Orderbuchs abhängt.
Das Kapitel 2 enthält neue empirische Resultate über die Limit-Order Ak-
tivität und den Markteinfluss von Limit-Ordern an der New Yorker NASDAQ
Börse. Wir dokumentieren, dass Marktteilnehmer hauptsächlich die Platzierung
von Limit-Ordern mit kleinen Volumina präferieren, diese aber häufig sofort nach
ihrem Einsatz wieder löschen. Basierend auf der geschätzten Marktauswirkung
einer individuellen Limit-Order schlagen wir eine Methode zur Prognose des opti-
malen Volumens einer Limit-Order vor. Die optimalen Eigenschaften der Limit-
Order hängen dabei von der Position im Orderbuch sowie der vorab spezifizierten
erwarteten bzw. präferierten Marktauswirkung ab.
Im Kapitel 3 werden die Limit-Order-Strategien von Marktteilnehmern in
intransparenten Märkten untersucht. Unter Benutzung des Totalview message
Datensatzes des NASDAQ Börsenplatzes zeigen wir, dass die Position der soge-
nannten versteckten Liquidität im Orderbuch von diversen Variablen abhängt, die
den Zustand des Marktes beschreiben. Insbesondere zeigen wir, dass die Posi-
tion der versteckten Liquidität prognostizierbar ist. Die Daten suggerieren zudem,
dass Händler die Platzierung sogenannter Hidden-Orders im Hinblick auf günstige
Liquidität am Markt und dem ”‘Picking-Off”’-Risiko ausbalancieren.
Im letzten Kapitel 4 präsentieren wir ein Softwaresystem zur Rekonstruktion
von Orderbüchern und zur Extrahierung von Orderflussinformationen aus message
stream Daten für Limit-Orders. Die Basismodule des Systems beruhen auf allge-
meinen Orderbuch-Ereignissen. Sie sind abstrakt gehalten und können so einfach
auf beliebige Märkte mit elektronischen Orderbüchern angewendet werden. Die
grundlegende Struktur ist im Hinblick auf Anwendbarkeit optimiert und gründlich
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Introduction
Electronic limit order markets, which collect traders’ orders and automatically
match them on the basis of specified priority rules, become increasingly popular
in financial markets around the world. Nowadays most equity and derivative ex-
changes are either pure electronic limit order markets, e.g. NYSE Arca, BATS,
Euronext, Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and Direct Edge, or at least allow for
customer limit orders in addition to on-exchange market making, e.g. NASDAQ,
NYSE and the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Consequently, understanding the
mutual effects between electronic limit order market design features and traders’
order submission strategies, and their consequent impact on market quality, are
becoming increasingly important to investors, exchanges and regulators.
A limit order is an instrument to trade up to a given amount of a security
at the best price available, but no worse than the specified limit price. Hence,
it is an ex ante pre-commitment made by the submitter and is in force until the
order is completely filled or cancelled. Limit orders are executed when traders on
the other side of the market submit market orders or marketable limit orders. In
particular, a market order is an instruction to trade a given amount of a security
at the best price currently available in the market and a marketable limit order is a
limit order with such an aggressive limit price that it can be immediately (possibly
partially) executed when the trader submits it. Unlike Walrasian markets which
apply a uniform market-clearing price to all periodical aggregated orders, limit
order markets execute orders discriminatorily, i.e. each limit order executed in a
transaction (by a market order) is filled at its respective limit price.
Limit order markets maintain the open limit orders by using a central limit or-
der book (LOB). It typically matches traders’ orders on a price and time priority
basis. Price priority means that the limit orders offering better limit prices, i.e.
limit buys at higher prices and limit sells at lower prices, are executed before limit
orders at worse prices. Time priority means that, at each price, older limit orders
are executed ahead of more recent limit orders. Based on these order precedence
rules, market order traders can trade directly with limit orders supplied by other
traders. This direct interaction implies a public supply of liquidity and distin-
guishes limit order book markets from dynamic dealer markets in which liquidity
2
is only supplied by registered market makers administering each transaction.
Apart from non-execution risk, i.e. prices moving away from their order after
the submission, and adverse selection (picking-off) risk, i.e. prices moving against
their newly established position after the execution, large buy-side traders in gen-
eral face an additional exposure risk. When they show their trading intention in
the market, defensive traders may refrain from trading with them and parasitic
traders may exploit the option value of large limit orders by front-running them.
Consequently, the non-execution risk increases. Moreover, due to new incoming in-
formation, previously submitted limit orders may become mis-priced. Fast traders
may pick off these orders quickly before submitters can cancel them. This results
in a significant increase of picking-off risk.
In order to encourage large traders to actively supply the liquidity in markets,
many electronic stock exchanges choose to reduce the pre-trade transparency by
allowing traders to hide a proportion of their order sizes. Correspondingly, they
typically impose a secondary order precedence rule: exposed orders or exposed
parts of undisclosed orders gain time priority over the hidden part of undisclosed
orders.
In this thesis, we look at empirical evidence of the complex interaction be-
tween traders’ limit order submission strategies and the state of the LOB, as well
as the underlying economic reasoning. In particular, employing high-frequency
order data, we conduct econometric analysis of the market impact of limit orders,
characteristics of order flow, and traders’ undisclosed order submission decisions
conditional on observable market conditions.
Chapter 1 is joint work with my supervisor, Nikolaus Hautsch, and is published
in the Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control. In this chapter, we quantify the
short-run and long-run price effect of posting a limit order in a limit order market
by proposing a high-frequency cointegrated VAR model for quotes and order book
depths. Estimating impulse response functions based on data from 30 stocks traded
at Euronext Amsterdam we show that limit orders have significant market impacts.
The strength and direction of quote responses depend on the incoming orders’
aggressiveness, their sizes and the state of the book. The effects are qualitatively
stable across the market. Cross-sectional variations in the magnitudes of price
impacts are well explained by the underlying trading frequency and relative tick
size.
In chapter 2, we provide new empirical evidence on order submission activity
and price impacts of limit orders at NASDAQ. Employing NASDAQ TotalView-
ITCH data, we find that market participants dominantly submit limit orders with
sizes equal to a round lot. Most limit orders are cancelled almost immediately
after submission if not getting executed. Moreover, only very few market orders
walk through the book, i.e. directly move the best ask or bid quote. Estimates of
3
impulse-response functions on the basis of a cointegrated VAR model for quotes
and market depths allow us to quantify the market impact of incoming limit orders.
We propose a method to predict the optimal size of a limit order conditional on
its position in the book and a given fixed level of expected market impact. This
chapter is joint work with Nikolaus Hautsch and is published on the conference
proceeding of “Market Microstructure, Confronting Many Viewpoints”.
Trading under limited pre-trade transparency becomes increasingly popular
on financial markets. In Chapter 3, we provide first evidence on traders’ use of
(completely) undisclosed orders in electronic trading. Employing TotalView-ITCH
data on order messages at NASDAQ, we propose a simple method to conduct sta-
tistical inference on the location of hidden depth given the state of the market.
We show that market conditions reflected by the bid-ask spread, (visible) depth,
recent price movements and trading signals affect traders’ decisions where to post
hidden orders. Our evidence suggests that traders optimize their hidden order
placements to (i) compete for the provision of (hidden) liquidity and (ii) protect
themselves against adverse selection, front-running as well as “hidden order de-
tection strategies” used by high-frequency traders. Overall, our results show that
hidden liquidity is predictable given observable market characteristics and is a key
element in modern trading and execution strategies. This chapter is joint work
with Nikolaus Hautsch.
The rise of algorithmic trading in electronic limit order markets creates consid-
erable challenges for researchers, who have to cope with extremely large amounts
of trading data produced daily by exchanges. In chapter 4, we present a pro-
gram framework for reconstructing LOBs as well as extracting order flow infor-
mation from message stream data. The system is modularized based on common
order events in the generalized order-processing of limit order markets, so that
it can be easily adapted to data from any limit order markets. Moreover, the
underlying data structures in the basic modules are highly optimized and algo-
rithms are exhaustively tested to guarantee the reliability of the output data and
the efficiency of the entire system. This chapter is joint work with my colleague
Tomas Polak, and a software treating the NASDAQ TotalView-ITCH data is im-




Market Impact of a Limit Order
This chapter is based on Hautsch and Huang (2012b).
1.1 Introduction
It is well known that the revelation of trading intention adversely affects asset prices.
As also confirmed by theoretical studies1, passive order placement through limit orders
incurs significant market impact even if the order is not been executed. In financial
practice, the risk to ‘scare’ and to ultimately shift the market by limit order placements
is well-known and is taken into account in trading strategies. As a consequence, liquidity
provision through hidden orders, which allow traders to partly (or entirely) conceal
order volume, has gained popularity. However, despite the importance of limit order
strategies in modern trading, the actual impact of an incoming (visible) limit order on
the subsequent price process is still hardly explored and quantified. In fact, while the
analysis of the price impact resulting from a trade is a classical topic in traditional market
microstructure research (see, e.g., Dufour and Engle, 2000; Engle and Patton, 2004;
Hasbrouck, 1991), empirical evidence on the market impact of limit order placements is
addressed by only few recent studies as Eisler, Bouchaud, and Kockelkoren (2011) and
Cont, Kukanov, and Stoikov (2011).
This chapter aims at filling this gap in the literature and addresses the following
empirical research questions: (i) How strong is the short-run and long-run impact of an
incoming limit order in dependence of its position in the book, its size and the state of the
book? (ii) Are ask and bid quote responses to incoming limit orders widely symmetric
or is there evidence for an asymmetric re-balancing of the book? (iii) How different is
the market impact of a limit order compared to that caused by a trade of similar size?
(iv) How stable are these effects across the market and do they depend on stock-specific
characteristics, such as the underlying trading intensity, minimum tick size and average
trade size?
1See, e.g., Parlour and Seppi (2008), Boulatov and George (2008) and Rosu (2010).
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We propose modelling the processes of ask and bid quotes as well as several levels of
depth volume on both sides of the market in terms of a cointegrated vector autoregressive
(VAR) model. This framework allows us to study the price impact of limit orders
by means of impulse response functions. Each limit order is represented by a shock
disturbing the multivariate system of quotes and depths and influencing it dynamically
over time. Designing the shock vectors in a specific way allows us to characterize the
type of the limit order represented by its size and its position in the order queue as well
as the current state of the book.
The motivation for using a cointegrating system stems from the fact that ask and bid
quotes are naturally integrated and tend to move in locksteps. Cointegration analysis
reveals a stationary linear combination of bid and ask quotes which closely resembles the
bid-ask spread. The idea of jointly modelling ask and bid quote dynamics in terms of a
cointegrated system originates from Engle and Patton (2004) based on the work of Has-
brouck (1991) and has been used in other approaches, such as Hansen and Lunde (2006)
and Escribano and Pascual (2006). Our setting extends and modifies this approach in
two major directions: Firstly, we model quotes and depth simultaneously. This yields a
novel type of order book model capturing not only quote and depth dynamics but im-
plicitly also dynamics of midquotes, midquote returns, spreads, spread changes as well
as order book imbalances. Secondly, we model the system not only on a trade-to-trade
basis but exploit the complete order arrival process. Therefore, the model captures all
relevant trading characteristics in a limit order book market and thus provides a com-
plete description of the order book in a range close to the best quotes. Hence, the model
is particularly useful for liquid assets where most of the market activity is concentrated
at the best quote levels. In this sense, the approach complements dynamic models for
order book curves such as proposed by Härdle, Hautsch, and Mihoci (2009) and Russell
and Kim (2010).
The proposed quote and depth model is estimated by Johansen’s (1991) full informa-
tion maximum likelihood estimator using high-frequency order book data for 30 stocks
traded on Euronext Amsterdam covering a sample period over two months in 2008.
We find strong evidence for the existence of common stochastic components in quotes
and corresponding depths resulting in cointegration relations which significantly deviate
from the bid-ask spread. In this sense, our results shed some light on the strength of
co-movements in ask and bid prices depending on the underlying depth. Indeed, it turns
out that order book inventory is highly persistent and reveals high-frequency dynamics
resembling (near-)unit-root behavior. We show that incoming limit orders have signif-
icant impacts on subsequent ask and bid processes. It turns out that the magnitude
and direction of quote adjustments strongly depend on the order’s aggressiveness, its
(relative) size and the prevailing depth in the book. In particular, we show the following
results: (i) Quote adjustments are the stronger and the faster, the closer the incoming
order is posted to the market. Most significant effects are reported for orders posted
on up to two levels behind the market. For less aggressive orders, virtually no effects
can be quantified. (ii) Limit orders temporarily narrow the spread. Converse effects are
shown for market orders. In the long-run, these effects are reverted back in an asym-
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metric way. (iii) Large limit orders posted inside of the spread induce severe long-run
effects pushing the market in the intended trading direction. In contrast, small limit
orders posted inside of the spread tend to be picked up quickly inducing adverse price
reactions. (iv) The long run market impact of aggressive market orders walking through
the book is the higher the smaller the prevailing depth behind the market. (v) The ef-
fects are qualitatively stable across the market, where the absolute magnitudes of price
impacts differ in dependence of underlying stock-specific characteristics. It turns out
that approximately 60%-80% of the cross-sectional variation in market impacts can be
explained by the trading frequency and the minimum tick size.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we describe
the trading structure of Euronext Amsterdam and provide descriptive statistics. The
econometric approach is explained in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 gives the estimation results
and Section 1.5 provides the quantified price impacts of different types of limit orders.
Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data and Market Environment
Euronext is a purely electric limit order book market with price and time order prece-
dence. During the continuous trading period between 9:00 and 17:30 CET, limit orders
are submitted to a centralized computer system where they are matched to prevailing
standing limit orders on the opposite side. If there is no match or the matched volume
in the system is insufficient to exhaust the incoming order, the remaining order volume
is placed in the order book. Euronext supports various order types like pure market
orders (immediate order execution without a price limit), stop orders (automatic issuing
of limit orders or market orders when a given price is reached), fill-or-kill (FOK) orders
or iceberg orders.
Our dataset comprises limit order book (LOB) data of the 30 most frequently traded
stocks at Euronext Amsterdam between August 1st and September 30th, 2008. Since on
September 1st, Euronext changed the minimum tick size for some stocks, we analyze the
two months August and September separately. This allows us to study the robustness
of our findings under changing market conditions. Since these two months represent a
generally turbulent market period, we further robustify our findings by replicating our
analysis for a period which is less volatile. As we obtain quantitatively similar results,
our findings can be seen as representative for different market conditions.2
The data contains information on the prevailing market depth (in terms of the num-
ber of shares) for the five best quotes on both sides of the market. Every trade and
change of the order book are recorded in milliseconds. Preliminary analyzes (which are
also supported by the findings given in Section 1.5) show that aggressive limit orders
placed close to the best ask and bid have the highest market impact while induced price
effects significantly decline with the distance to the spread. Accordingly, we focus only
2These results are not shown in this chapter but are available on our web appendix or upon
request.
7
on the best three price levels in the book. Unlike the trade data which is well filtered
by built-in filters in the database3, the order book data is completely raw. We remove
observations where (i) the spread is zero or negative, and (ii) ask or bid quotes change
by more than 2%.4 Moreover, to remove effects due to the opening and closing of the
market, we discard data of the first five and last five minutes of the continuous trading
period.
Matching of trade and LOB data is achieved by a matching algorithm which is
described in details in Appendix A.1. This algorithm matches a trade with the corre-
sponding LOB observation by comparing its price and volume with the resulting changes
of quotes and depths in the book within an adaptively chosen time window. It minimizes
the probability of misclassifications and as a by-product provides an estimate of the time
asynchronicity between trade and LOB records.5 To classify the initiation type of trades,
we use a hybrid procedure according to Lee and Ready (1991). Firstly, we determine
the type of trades which are located in more than one second time distance to previous
trades using the mid-quote method. I.e., if a trade occurs with a price greater (less) than
the most current mid-quote, it is classified as a buy (sell). If the trade price equals the
mid-quote, it is marked as ‘undetermined’. Secondly, ‘undetermined’ trades and trades
which follow previous trades in less than one second time distance are classified by the
tick-test method. Accordingly, if the trade price is higher (lower) than the previous one,
it is identified as a buy (sell). If it does not change the price, it is categorized as the
same type as the previous one. Finally, we identify sub-trades arising from the execution
of a big market order against several (smaller) limit orders if they occur in less than one
second after the previous trade and have the same initiation types. All corresponding
sub-trades are consolidated to a single trade.
Table 1.1 gives descriptive statistics of the resulting August data used in this chap-
ter.6 We observe significantly more limit order activities than market orders. The
average bid-ask spread is decreasing with the liquidity of the underlying stock. On aver-
age, second level market depth is higher than first level depth while it is approximately
equal to the depth on the third level.
3Besides recording errors, block trades and trades in auction periods are excluded.
4In order to limit the volatility, Euronext NSC suspends continuous trading if prices change
by more than 2%. This is not exactly the same rule as that implemented here, but it is reasonably
mimicked.
5Due to technological progress in the last decades, the time delay between trade and quote
records is nowadays hardly greater than one second. Consequently, the ‘five-second’ rule accord-
ing to Lee and Ready (1991), which has been commonly used in empirical market microstructure
literature, is not appropriate anymore for more recent datasets.
6Due to the aforementioned change in the minimum tick size, it is not appropriate to present
joint summary statistics for both months. However, as the descriptive statistics for September
are very similar to that for August, we do not present them here.
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Table 1.1
Summary of synchronized trade and order book data.
The sample consists of the 30 most frequently traded stocks on Euronext Amsterdam. Market depth is measured in
thousand shares. L1-L3 denote the order book level one to three. The period is from 1st to 31st August 2008.
stocks #trades #LO activ. Ask Bid Mean of ask depth Mean of bid depth
per day per day min mean max min mean max L1 L2 L3 L1 L2 L3
ING 1606.8 66569.1 20.255 21.518 23.290 20.250 21.507 23.275 3.64 3.94 4.12 3.45 3.90 4.14
FOR 1304.6 27574.0 8.770 9.351 10.160 8.760 9.338 10.150 16.78 25.76 25.03 16.35 26.25 24.20
RDSa 1166.2 48630.6 21.900 22.991 23.935 21.890 22.981 23.930 4.30 5.21 5.80 4.00 5.06 5.59
UNc 1152.1 46023.7 17.110 18.635 19.670 17.100 18.625 19.660 4.76 5.24 6.44 4.52 5.33 6.49
AHLN 1119.4 18730.3 7.540 8.510 8.970 7.530 8.502 8.960 7.89 9.80 10.23 8.18 10.64 10.59
PHG 1108.3 34722.0 20.875 22.381 23.465 20.870 22.368 23.450 2.18 2.36 2.70 1.95 2.19 2.59
AEGN 982.5 43270.2 7.290 7.909 8.400 7.280 7.902 8.395 5.12 4.99 4.86 4.98 4.98 4.79
AKZO 960.0 20061.2 35.460 39.571 41.920 35.400 39.541 41.910 0.89 0.96 1.00 0.78 0.90 0.98
KPN 954.0 20733.8 10.915 11.274 11.680 10.905 11.266 11.670 9.61 12.10 12.77 8.79 10.57 11.57
TNT 949.7 20412.7 22.040 24.598 27.000 22.030 24.566 26.970 1.57 1.91 2.15 1.51 1.96 2.24
HEIN 927.2 19782.1 29.540 31.796 33.660 29.520 31.767 33.600 0.98 1.10 1.13 0.92 1.00 1.04
ISPA 903.1 35708.2 49.990 52.694 56.440 49.910 52.661 56.420 1.85 2.76 3.66 1.97 3.08 3.84
ASML 853.8 26249.5 14.290 15.964 17.400 14.280 15.949 17.390 3.80 5.86 6.50 3.48 5.21 6.01
DSMN 826.7 21574.5 36.050 37.919 40.000 36.020 37.886 39.990 0.77 0.87 0.99 0.77 0.88 0.99
SBMO 603.7 18676.3 13.530 14.934 16.700 13.520 14.911 16.680 1.84 2.63 2.99 1.76 2.51 2.79
TOM2 505.3 16822.0 14.340 16.017 17.550 14.300 15.987 17.540 1.31 1.71 2.06 1.25 1.69 1.75
FUGRc 505.0 8846.5 43.620 47.701 53.200 43.610 47.631 53.180 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.47
WLSNc 548.8 16003.6 14.610 15.973 17.020 14.550 15.950 17.000 1.92 1.88 1.96 1.94 1.83 1.89
RAND 543.4 17265.2 17.710 19.432 21.430 17.690 19.397 21.400 1.09 1.56 1.75 1.07 1.47 1.47
ELSN 488.5 29702.2 10.390 11.049 11.510 10.350 11.035 11.500 7.27 11.57 11.96 6.81 11.34 12.44
BOSN 419.6 8013.0 32.320 36.323 41.900 32.250 36.247 41.890 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.53 0.51 0.47
BAMN 416.8 6334.1 9.900 10.736 12.220 9.860 10.714 12.200 2.06 2.35 2.38 1.99 2.25 2.19
SR 347.5 6396.6 10.370 11.588 13.200 10.360 11.563 13.180 1.70 1.80 1.76 1.72 1.71 1.48
CSMNc 340.2 7478.4 17.910 20.395 24.260 17.890 20.361 24.240 0.81 0.88 0.92 0.84 0.90 0.91
COR 327.1 12103.2 47.090 49.273 51.210 47.010 49.175 51.140 0.43 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.34
IMUN 292.7 5735.9 14.300 16.178 17.710 14.280 16.148 17.700 0.92 1.17 1.24 0.85 0.91 0.88
SMTNc 272.4 7648.8 43.920 52.282 60.440 43.840 52.112 60.300 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.26
NUTR 256.6 8043.2 41.160 43.275 44.900 41.120 43.192 44.890 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.37 0.38 0.38
USGP 248.5 6342.3 9.670 11.198 12.630 9.650 11.168 12.600 1.47 1.51 1.41 1.59 1.39 1.19




Events include limit order submissions, executions and cancellations. The market
depth refers to the pending volume at the ordered available price levels in the LOB.
Variable Description
pat logarithm of the best ask after the t-th event.
pbt logarithm of the best bid after the t-th event.
va,lt logarithm of market depth at the l-th best ask after the t-th event.
vb,lt logarithm of market depth at the l-th best bid after the t-th event.
BUYt dummy equal to one if the t-th event is a buyer-initiated trade.
SELLt dummy equal to one if the t-th event is a seller-initiated trade.
1.3 Econometric Modelling
1.3.1 A Cointegrated VAR Model for Quotes and Depths
Denote t as a (business) time index, indicating all order book activities, i.e., incoming
limit or market orders as well as limit order cancellations. Then, pat and p
b
t denote the
best log ask and bid quotes instantaneously after the t-th order activity and va,jt and
vb,jt for j = 1, . . . , k, define the log depth on the j-th best observed quote level on the
ask and bid side, respectively. Furthermore, we introduce two dummy variables, BUYt
and SELLt indicating the occurrence of buy and sell trades, respectively. The inclusion
of these two variables is necessary to distinguish between the effects caused by a market
order and that induced by a cancellation. Both events remove volume from the book,
however, presumably have quite different long run market impacts. Table 1.2 gives a
detailed description of the variables.
To capture the high-frequency dynamics in quotes and depths we define a K =







t , . . . , v
a,k
t , v
b,1, . . . , vb,kt , BUYt, SELLt]
′.
Note that the quote levels associated with va,jt and v
b,j
t are not observed on a fixed grid
at and behind the best quotes. Hence, their price distance to pat and p
b
t is not necessarily
exactly j − 1 ticks but might be higher if there are no limit orders on all possible
intermediate price levels behind the market. To capture such ’gaps’ in the order book,
we could also include the limit prices associated with each order level posted behind
the market and thus correspondingly extend the vector yt. However, we decided to
disregard this information because of two reasons. Firstly, Hautsch and Huang (2012a)
show that trades “walking through the book”, i.e., trades absorbing more than one
price level in the limit order book occur extremely rarely for liquid stocks. Secondly,
in liquid markets, the tick levels close to the best quotes are indeed mostly filled such
that limit prices are on a fixed grid with constant distance to the corresponding best
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quotes. Consequently, we expect that the inclusion of all individual limit prices does
not provide any additional information but just increases the dimension of the system.
Finally, modelling log volumes instead of plain volumes is a common practice in many
empirical studies to reduce the impact of extraordinarily large volumes. This is also
suggested by Potters and Bouchaud (2003) studying the statistical properties of market
impacts of trades. Moreover, using logs implies that changes in market depth can be
interpreted as relative changes with respect to the current depth level.
Hence, we model log quotes, log depths and trading indicators as a restricted coin-
tegrated vector autoregressive model of the order p (VAR(p)) with the vector error
correction (VEC) form




Γi∆yt−i + ut, (1.1)
where ut is white noise with covariance matrix Σu, µ is a constant, Γi with i = 1, . . . , p−1
is a K × K parameter matrix, α and β denote the K × r loading and cointegrating
matrices with r < K. As we can safely assume that the trading indicators BUYt and
SELLt are stationary, we restrict the two first columns of β as β1 = [0, . . . , 0, 1, 0]
′ and
β2 = [0, . . . , 0, 0, 1]
′.
For the impulse-response analysis below, it turns out to be more convenient to work




Aiyt−i + ut, (1.2)
where A1 := IK + αβ
′ + Γ1 with IK denoting a K ×K identity matrix, Ai := Γi − Γi−1
with 1 < i < p and Ap := −Γp−1.
We estimate the model (1.1) by the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
estimator proposed by Johansen (1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). Then, fol-
lowing Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992), we transform these estimates to representation
(1.2). The corresponding procedure is shown in Appendix A.2 and A.3. By imposing
the stationarity restrictions β1 and β2, all elements in the other cointegrating vectors
associated with BUYt and SELLt are automatically set to zero. This is guaranteed by
the orthogonality among the estimated cointegrating vectors implied by FIML.
Note that market depth enters the vector yt in levels and thus is treated as a possi-
bly non-stationary variable. Though this is counter-intuitive for the behavior of depth
over longer horizons, it is a reasonable assumption if depth is observed on very high
frequencies. Moreover, modelling both quotes and depth in terms of a cointegration
system guarantees consistency of parameter estimates irrespective of the possible (non-
)stationarity of order book depth. Even if depth is truly stationary (and thus just
corresponds to a (spurious) cointegration relation for itself), FIML estimates are consis-
tent (though obviously not efficient).7 Since we employ a high number of observations,
7See, for instance, Example 3.1 in Johansen (1995) for an illustration of this argument.
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the possible loss of efficiency due to the neglect of a (stationarity) restriction is not
very harmful in our context. If, however, we impose stationarity of depth and corre-
spondingly restrict the cointegration vectors, we run the risk of producing inconsistent
estimates if the restriction does not hold. Indeed, unit root tests applied in Section 1.4.1
indicate that the assumption of a unit root in depth observed on high frequencies cannot
be rejected for many stocks. These arguments support the usefulness of a more robust
statistical inference in form of an unrestricted cointegration system.
Model (1.2) can be further rotated in order to represent dynamics in spreads, relative
spread changes, midquotes, midquote returns as well as (ask-bid) depth imbalances.
Hence, the model is sufficiently flexible to capture the high-frequency dynamics of all
relevant trading variables.8
Finally, in models involving only quote dynamics (e.g. Engle and Patton, 2004) or
spread dynamics (e.g. Lo and Sapp, 2006), the error correction term β′yt is typically
assumed to be equal to the spread implying a linear restriction R′β = 0 with R′ =
[1, 1, 0, . . . , 0]. However, given the potential non-stationarity of order book depth, we do
not impose this assumption here. As depth might contain information on the equilibrium
(long run) state of the order book as well, we expect the existence of cointegration
relations differing from spreads and involving both quotes and depths. As shown in the
remainder of this chapter, this notion is actually supported by the data.
1.3.2 Limit Orders as Shocks to the System
In this section, we illustrate how to represent incoming orders as shocks to the system
specified in equation (1.2). Whenever an order enters the order book, it (i) will change
the depth in the book, (ii) may change the best quotes depending on which position in
the queue it is placed, and (iii) will change the trading indicator dummy in case of a






with δv being a 2k × 1 vector associated with shocks to the depths, δp denoting a 2× 1
vector consisting of shocks to the quotes and δd being a 2× 1 vector representing shocks
to the trading indicator dummy.
We design impulse response vectors associated with five scenarios commonly faced
by market participants. As graphically illustrated by Figures 1.1 to 1.4, a three-level
order book is initialized by the best ask pat = 1002, best bid p
b
t = 1000, second best ask
1003, second best bid 999, and levels of depths on the bid side V b,1t = 1, V
b,2
t = 1.5,
V b,3t = V
b,4
t = 1.4. The following scenarios are considered:
9
Scenario 1a (normal limit order): Arrival of a buy limit order with price 1000 and
size 0.5 to be placed at the market. As shown in Figure 1.1, this order will be
8Note that we do not impose an explicit constraint ensuring the positiveness of bid-ask spreads.
As shown on the companion website, this restriction is implicitly satisfied by our estimates in
virtually all cases.
9For sake of brevity, the scenarios are only characterized for buy orders. For sell orders, the

























Figure 1.1 (Scenario 1a (normal limit order)): An incoming buy limit order with
price 1000 and size 0.5. It affects only the depth at the best bid without changing the























Figure 1.2 (Scenario 2 (aggressive limit order)): An incoming buy limit order
with price 1001 and size 0.5 improving the best bid and changing all depth levels on the

























Figure 1.3 (Scenario 3 (normal market order)): An incoming buy market order





















Figure 1.4 (Scenario 4 (aggressive market order)): An incoming buy market
order with price 1003 and size 1.2 ‘walking through’ the order book and simultaneously
changing all depth levels on the ask side.
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consolidated at the best bid without changing the prevailing quotes. Because the
initial depth on the first level is 1.0, the change of the log depth is ln(1.5) ≈ 0.4.
Correspondingly, the shock vectors are given by δv = [0, 0, 0, 0.4, 0, 0]
′, δp = δd =
[0, 0]′.
Scenario 1b (passive limit order): Arrival of a buy limit order with price 999 and
size 0.5 to be posted behind the market. As in the scenario above, it does not
change the prevailing quotes and only affects the depth at the second best bid.
We have δv = [0, 0, 0, 0, ln(2)− ln(1.5) ≈ 0.29, 0]′, δp = δd = [0, 0]′.
Scenario 2 (aggressive limit order): Arrival of a buy limit order with price 1001
and size 0.5 to be posted inside of the current spread. Figure 1.2 shows that it im-
proves the best bid by 0.1% and accordingly shifts all depth levels on the bid side.
The resulting shock vector is given by δv = [0, 0, 0, (ln(0.5) ≈ −0.69), (ln(1/1.5) ≈
−0.4), (ln(1.5/1.4) ≈ 0.07)]′, δp = [0, 0.001]′ and δd = [0, 0]′.
Scenario 3 (normal market order): Arrival of a buy order with price 1002 and size
0.5. This order will be executed immediately against standing limit orders at the
best ask. Because it absorbs liquidity from the book, it shocks the corresponding
depth levels negatively. Figure 1.3 depicts the corresponding changes of the order
book as represented by δv = [ln(0.5) ≈ −0.69, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]′, δp = [0, 0]′ and δd =
[1, 0]′.
Scenario 4 (aggressive market order): Arrival of a buy order with price 1003 and
size 1.2. It ‘walks up’ the order book. As shown in Figure 1.4, the best ask
quote and all depth levels are simultaneously shifted resulting in the shock vector
δv = [(ln(1.3) ≈ 0.26), (ln(1.4/1.5) ≈ −0.07), 0, 0, 0, 0]′, δp = [(1/1002) ≈ 0.001, 0]′
and δd = [1, 0]
′.
Table 1.3 summarizes the shock vectors implied by the illustrated scenarios.
1.3.3 Measuring the Market Impact
We quantify the market impact of limit orders as the implied expected short-run and
long-run shifts of the ask and bid after their submissions. This reaction is captured by
the impulse response function,
f(h; δy) = E[yt+h|yt + δy, yt−1, · · · ]− E[yt+h|yt, yt−1, · · · ], (1.3)








and h is the number of periods (measured in ‘order event time’).
Note that we do not have to orthogonalize the impulse since contemporaneous rela-
tionships between quotes and depths are captured by construction of the shock vector.
Moreover, our data is based on the arrival time of orders avoiding time aggregation as
another source of mutual dependence in high-frequency order book data.
15
Table 1.3
Shock vectors implied by the underlying five scenarios
Initial order book: best ask pat = 1002, best bid p
b
t = 1000, second best ask = 1003,
second best bid = 999. Volumes on the ask/bid side: V
a/b,1
t = 1 at the best bid,
V
a/b,2




t = 1.4 at the third and fourth
best bids, respectively. Notation: δv denotes shocks on market depths; δp denotes shocks
on the best bid and best ask; δd denotes shocks on trading indicator variables.






‘normal limit order’ (Bid,1000, 0.5) [0, 0, 0, 0.4, 0, 0] [0, 0] [0, 0]
‘passive limit order’ (Bid,999, 0.5) [0, 0, 0, 0, 0.29, 0] [0, 0] [0, 0]
‘aggressive limit order’ (Bid,1001, 0.5) [0, 0, 0,−0.69,−0.4, 0.07] [0, 0.001] [0, 0]
‘normal market order’ (Bid,1002, 0.5) [−0.69, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] [0, 0] [1, 0]
‘aggressive market order’ (Bid,1003, 1.2) [0.26,−0.07, 0, 0, 0, 0] [0.001, 0] [1, 0]
Using impulse-response analysis to retrieve the market impact has two major advan-
tages. First, in contrast to an analysis of estimated VEC coefficients which only reveals
the immediate impact, it enables us to examine both long-run and short-run effects. Sec-
ond, it allows us to straightforwardly quantify the joint effect induced by simultaneous
changes of several variables given a certain state of other variables.
We consider two moving average (MA) representations of the cointegrated VAR
model. The first one is based on the reduced form given by equation (1.2). This repre-
sentation allows us to compute the path of the response function over time. The second
one is the Granger representation based on the VECM form in equation (1.1) which
enables us to explicitly compute the permanent (long-run) response.
We start our discussion with the first MA representation. The companion VAR(1)
form of the VAR(p) model in equation (1.2) is given by



















































Successively substituting Y yields








iµ consists of terms of an initial value and a deterministic
trend, which are irrelevant for the impulse-response analysis. Let J := [IK : 0 : · · · : 0]
be a K × Kp selection matrix with JYt = yt. Pre-multiplying J on both sides of
equation (1.5) and using Ut = J
′ut gives




Then, the linear impulse-response function according to equation (1.3) can be written
as
f(h; δy) = JA
hJ ′δy. (1.7)
Given the consistent estimator â for a := vec(A1, . . . , Ap) in equation (1.2),
√
T (â− a) d→ N (0,Σâ),
Lütkepohl (1990) shows that the asymptotic distribution of the impulse-response func-
tion is given by √
T (f̂ − f) d→ N (0, GhΣâG′h), (1.8)









In order to compute the long-run effect, we apply Granger’s Representation Theorem



















Here, L is the lag operator and the power series C1(z) is convergent for |z| < 1 + ξ for
some ξ > 0. V depends on initial values, such that β′V = 0. The Granger representation
decomposes the cointegrated process into a random walk term (C term), a stationary
process (C1 term) and a deterministic term (V ). Because of the convergence of the series
C1(z), the response implied by this sub-process will be zero in the long run. Moreover,
the deterministic term V is irrelevant for the impulse response. Therefore, the permanent
response of the system is completely determined by the first term. Note that the shock
δy causes this term changing by Cδy. Thus, we can express the permanent response as
f̄(δy) := lim
h→∞
f(h; δy) = Cδy. (1.12)
Note that given α and β, α⊥ and β⊥ are not uniquely identified. However, the
right hand side of equation (1.11) is invariant with respect to the choice of these bases.
Therefore, f̄(δy) is unique given the parameters and the shock vector in model (1.1).
In practice, estimated responses and their covariances are obtained by replacing the
unknown parameters in equation (1.7), (1.8) and (1.12) by their estimates.
1.4 Estimation Results
The underlying order book data contains bid and ask quotes as well as five levels of depth.
Preliminary analyzes show that the depths on the fourth and fifth levels do not have
significant effects on bid and ask quotes. Therefore, in our empirical study, we only use
market depths up to the third level. In order to keep the analysis tractable, we reduce
the computational burden induced by the high number of observations by separately
estimating the model for each of the 43 trading days. This strategy allows us also
to address possible structural changes, e.g., due to stock specific news announcements
or overnight effects. The market impact is then computed as the monthly average of
individual (daily) impulse responses. Likewise, confidence intervals are computed based
on daily averages. To account for a structural break due to the change of the tick size
for some stocks on September 1, 2008, we treat the two months August and September
separately.
For sake of brevity we refrain from presenting all individual results for the 30
analyzed stocks in this chapter. We rather illustrate the analyzed effects for the
stock Fortis (FOR in Table 1.1) in August 2008. Fortis is one of the most actively
traded stocks and is representative for a major part of the market. The results for
the remaining stocks and the remaining periods are provided in a web appendix on
http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~huangrui/project/impact_of_orders. As shown
in the web appendix and discussed in more detail in Section 1.5.5, the effects are quali-
tatively remarkably similar across the market though the magnitudes of market impacts
differ in dependence of underlying stock-specific characteristics.
The empirical analysis employs a VAR(15) specification which is selected based on
residual diagnostics and information criteria. Testing for serial correlation using the
Ljung-Box test according to Ljung and Box (1978) reveals almost no remaining serial
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Figure 1.5: Time series plot of log market depths (measured in thousand share units).
Trading of Fortis, Euronext, Amsterdam, August 1st, 2008.
correlation in the residuals for all regressions based on a 1% level using ten lags. The
corresponding statistics are also recorded in the web appendix.
1.4.1 Statistical Properties of Market Depth
Figure 1.5 provides time series plots of depths on the best ask and third best ask level
of the order book for a single (though representative) trading day for Fortis. A general
finding is that the depth behind the market is typically greater than that at the market.
Furthermore, there is evidence for co-movements between the individual depth levels,
partially because of the ‘shift’ effect induced by aggressive orders, e.g., limit orders
posted inside of spreads or market orders completely absorbing the best price levels.
Figure 1.6 depicts the unconditional distributions and autocorrelation functions of log
market depth. We observe that the distribution of depth behind the market is similar,
though they are quite different from those at the market. The same pattern is also
observed for the autocorrelation functions. These empirical peculiarities are due to the
fact that there is obviously more order activity at the market than behind the market.
Consequently, market depth is more frequently changed at the best level inducing a
lower persistence than at higher levels. This might also explain why the unconditional
distribution of depth is more dispersed than that of depth behind the market.
Table 1.4 shows the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and KPSS tests for
quotes and market depth. While the quote series are obviously integrated, we obtain
conflictive findings for the depth series. The ADF tests reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root in first level depth in 83% of all cases (across stocks and days), whereas the
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Figure 1.6: Left: Kernel density estimates of (log) market depths. Right: Auto-
correlation functions of (log) market depths. Trading of Fortis, Euronext, Amsterdam,
August 1st, 2008.
Table 1.4
Stationarity tests on quotes and market depths
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and KPSS tests for the 30 selected stocks on
each of the 43 trading days, i.e., 1290 time series for each variable. The chosen lag length
is 50. The reported numbers are the sum of rejections at the 1%-level. In the ADF test,
the null hypothesis is that there is an unit root in the process. In the KPSS test, the
null hypothesis is that there is no unit root in the process.
Variables pa pb va,1 va,2 va,3 vb,1 vb,2 vb,3
ADF 8 4 1072 975 933 1087 975 949
(%) (0.62) (0.31) (83.1) (75.58) (72.32) (84.26) (75.58) (73.56)
KPSS 1284 1283 871 905 982 846 896 979
(%) (99.53) (99.45) (67.51) (70.15) (76.12) (65.58) (69.45) (75.89)
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Table 1.5
Representative estimates of cointegrating vectors
The vectors are sorted according to their corresponding eigenvalues in Johansen’s ML
approach. The first two vectors are fixed to β1 = [0, . . . , 0, 1, 0] and β2 = [0, . . . , 0, 0, 1]
representing stationary process of trading indicators. Correspondingly, all entries in β̂3
to β̂9 associated with the trading indicator variables, BUY and SELL, are set to zero
and are omitted. Trading of Fortis at Euronext, Amesterdam on August 1, 2008.
Variable β̂3 β̂4 β̂5 β̂6 β̂7 β̂8 β̂9
pa -0.9987 -1.0000 1.0000 -0.9989 1.0000 -1.0000 0.9399
pb 1.0000 0.9853 -0.9968 1.0000 -0.9767 0.7048 -1.0000
va,1 -0.0173 0.1629 -0.0416 0.0222 -0.0803 0.0919 -0.1039
va,2 0.0070 -0.0486 0.0322 -0.0839 -0.1915 0.5869 -0.6605
va,3 -0.0070 0.0140 -0.0212 0.0108 0.2980 0.6104 -0.5413
vb,1 -0.0081 -0.1412 -0.0398 0.0827 -0.0442 -0.0807 -0.0933
vb,2 0.0003 0.0527 0.0430 0.2321 0.0167 -0.8162 -0.4652
vb,3 -0.0002 -0.0342 -0.0212 -0.2988 0.0796 -0.9414 -0.3337
KPSS tests reject the stationarity in 67% of all cases. For higher level depth, the evidence
against stationarity in depth is even higher. As discussed in Section 1.3.1, we explain
these findings by the fact that order book depth is an inventory variable which over short
horizons is strongly autocorrelated and tend to behave like an I(1) process. On the other
hand, aggressive trading and limit order arrival create fluctuations in depth which are
less predictable and reduce the strong persistence over longer intervals. Extreme changes
arise, for instance, whenever first level depth is absorbed by an incoming order or, al-
ternatively, is undercut by an incoming aggressive limit order, and thus the entire order
book is shifted. Hence, from this discussion and the empirical findings we can conclude
that depth might naturally contain stationary and non-stationary components where the
latter tend to dominate over very short horizons. Given these results, it is in any case
recommended to model depth as a non-stationary variable within a cointegrated VAR
framework. As discussed in Section 1.3.1, this proceeding ensures consistency of param-
eter estimates even if depth might be stationary and, e.g., is fractionally cointegrated
(see Johansen and Nielsen, 2010).
1.4.2 Estimated Cointegration Relations
For sake of brevity, we refrain from showing the individual estimates of A and B. Nev-
ertheless, it is interesting to highlight the estimated cointegration relations. According
to Johansen’s trace statistics we identify seven cointegration relations among quotes and
depths. Table 1.5 shows the estimated cointegrating vectors for a representative trading
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Table 1.6
Representative estimates of the loading matrix

















pat 0.0818 -0.0104 -0.0084 0.0042 0.0022 -0.0004 0.0002
( 18.45) (-2.34) ( -50.11) ( 18.42) ( 8.50) (-2.65) ( 0.89)
pbt -0.0691 -0.0133 0.0026 0.0041 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0000
(-15.91) (-3.07) ( 15.58) ( 18.33) ( 2.77) (-2.59) (-0.07)
va,1t 2.1666 -0.4160 0.5319 0.0108 0.1228 0.0013 0.0052
( 18.25) (-3.50) ( 118.70) ( 1.76) ( 17.52) ( 0.31) ( 0.75)
va,2t -0.2935 0.0512 -0.1776 0.0423 0.0995 -0.0074 0.0114
( -7.44) ( 1.29) (-119.21) ( 20.65) ( 42.68) (-5.52) ( 5.01)
va,3t 0.0589 -0.0117 0.1293 -0.0176 -0.1314 -0.0072 0.0079
( 1.58) (-0.31) ( 92.30) ( -9.14) (-59.94) (-5.72) ( 3.71)
vb,1t 1.5157 0.4704 0.7016 -0.1435 0.0596 0.0017 0.0025
( 12.75) ( 3.96) ( 156.39) (-23.26) ( 8.49) ( 0.42) ( 0.37)
vb,2t -0.2284 -0.0607 -0.2373 -0.1053 -0.0036 0.0087 0.0074
( -5.99) (-1.59) (-165.07) (-53.26) ( -1.58) ( 6.72) ( 3.40)
vb,3t -0.0492 0.0060 0.1322 0.1253 -0.0176 0.0119 0.0034
( -1.39) ( 0.17) ( 99.52) ( 68.59) ( -8.44) (10.01) ( 1.66)
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day, where we omit the two known cointegrating vectors associated with the (station-
ary) trading indicators. Likewise we also omit the corresponding entries in the remaining
cointegrating vectors as they are zero by construction. The resulting vectors are ordered
according to their corresponding eigenvalues reflecting their likelihood contributions.
Table 1.6 shows the estimated loading matrix, α̂, and corresponding t−statistics. We
observe that not quotes but also depth variables have a significant loading on most of
the six cointegration relations.
Figure 1.7 depicts the time series of the estimated cointegration relations. The series
are quite different from that of the bid-ask spread (i.e., the difference between ask and
bid quotes) which would be expected if depth does not belong to the cointegration vector
and is also depicted in the figure. Compared to the spread which reflects a very discrete
behavior, the cointegration relations are much more smooth. Nevertheless, as any linear
combination of these vectors results into a further cointegration relation, it is required to
formally test whether the estimated cointegration relations are indeed different from the
bid-ask spread. The corresponding likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis R′β = 0
with R = [1, 1, 0, . . . , 0]′ rejects at a 1% significance level for all regressions (except one)
for Fortis. Hence, we obtain significant evidence for depth being part of the cointegration
relations influencing long-term equilibria of quotes and depth.10
Interpreting the estimated cointegrating vectors, we can derive several implications.
The first five cointegration relations are mostly linear combinations of spreads and
depths. Specifically, the first one is quite similar to the bid-ask spread as the coeffi-
cients for the depth variables are comparably small. The second cointegration relation
seems to involve the balance of at-the-market depth since the coefficients of va,1 and vb,1
are similar in magnitude and opposite in sign. The most interesting relationships are
implied by the last two cointegrating vectors revealing relatively large (and different)
coefficients associated with depth. This indicates that depth has a significant impact
on the long-term relationship between quotes. Intuitively, the connection between ask
and bid quotes becomes weaker (and thus deviates from the spread) if the depth is less
balanced between both sides of the market. Hence, depth has a significant impact on
quote dynamics and should be explicitly taken into account in a model for quotes. These
findings support the idea of a cointegration model for both quotes and depth.
1.5 Estimated Market Impact
1.5.1 Limit Orders Placed At or Behind the Market
Consider the impact of an incoming at-the-market limit order as described in Scenario
1 in Section 1.3.2. Figure 1.8 shows the impulse responses induced by buy and sell limit
10It is well known that likelihood ratio tests on cointegration vectors tend to be biased towards
rejecting the null hypothesis too often in finite samples, see, e.g., Gredenhoff and Jacobson (2001)
and Haug (2002). However, given the high number of observations used in our study, these effects
should not be too strong.
23






























































Figure 1.7: Time series of estimated cointegration relations. The corresponding coin-
tegrating vectors are documented in Table 1.5. We suppress the two cointegrating re-
lationships associated with the trading indicator series. Trading of Fortis at Euronext,
Amsterdam, on August 1st, 2008.
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Buy LO → Ask
Buy LO → Bid
Sell LO → Ask
Sell LO → Bid
95% confidence interval
Permanent Impact
Figure 1.8: Changes of ask and bid quotes induced by buy/sell limit orders placed at
the market (level one) with a size equal to the half of the depth on the first level. The
marked number on the vertical axes indicates the magnitude of the permanent impact.
The blue dotted lines indicate the corresponding 95%-confidence intervals. Trading of
Fortis at Euronext, Amsterdam in August 2008. LO: limit order.
orders with a size equal to half of the depth at the best quotes.11 The impulse response
function starts at zero since such a limit order does not directly change the ask and bid.
As expected, both ask and bid tend to significantly increase (decrease) after the arrival
of a buy (sell) limit order. Induced by the cointegration setting, quotes converge to a
(new) permanent level at which the information content of the incoming limit order is
completely incorporated. The confidence intervals reflect that the shift is statistically
highly significant.
We observe that quotes adjust relatively quickly reaching the new level after approx-
imately 20 lags. Recall that time is measured in terms of limit order book activities.
Hence, the adjustment speed measured in physical time ultimately depends on the un-
derlying frequency of order activities and differs across the market. However, the fact
that the speed of stock-specific quote adjustments (in terms of a ‘limit order clock’) is
widely stable across the market, indicates that such a business time scale is appropriate
for market-wide comparisons across stocks.
An interesting fact is that after the arrival of a buy limit order, the bid tends to
increase more quickly than the ask. A reverse effect is observed after the arrival of
a sell limit order. This asymmetry introduces a one-sided and temporary decrease of
the bid-ask spread. We explain this phenomenon by the fact that traders observing
11In all figures illustrating impulse responses, the legend ‘A → B’ is interpreted to reflect ‘the
impact on B induced by A’.
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an incoming limit order on the same side of the market tend to compete for provided
liquidity by undercutting quotes. Moreover, the higher depth at the bid generates a
(delayed) liquidity demand on the ask side shifting upward the ask as well. We thus
refer this phenomenon to be a liquidity-motivated effect.
Our findings can be interpreted in terms of pure market mechanisms. The market
equilibrium is perturbed by a limit order in two ways. On one hand, the limit order
indicates an investor’s willingness to buy or sell and thus increases the supply or de-
mand of the underlying asset. The market price changes to incorporate this temporary
imbalance of supply and demand. One the other hand, an incoming limit order increases
the supply of liquidity in the market. A narrowing of the spread reduces transaction
costs and causes a re-balancing of supply and demand of liquidity. See, e.g., the simu-
lation study by Yamamoto (2011) on the effects of the state of the limit order book on
investors’ strategies.
The significant permanent impact induced by an incoming limit order indicates that
it contributes to price discovery. Thus, market participants perceive that limit orders
carry private information which is in contrast to the common assumption in theoretical
literature that informed traders only take liquidity but do not provide it. On the other
hand, it is supported by the experiment by Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005) showing
that informed traders use order strategies involving both market orders and limit orders
to optimally capitalize their informational advantage and in line with Mike and Farmer
(2008) and Chiarella, Iori, and Perelló (2009) suggesting that there is a link between the
properties of order flow and those of prices.
Given the setting of the book we observe that a limit order increasing first level
depth by 50% shifts quotes by 0.5 to 0.6 basis points. Though this effect is generally
rather small, it is economically significant if the tick size is small. Moreover, note that
the magnitude of the market impact is log-linear in the order size. In practice, a big
limit order posted on a thin order book might affect the market much more strongly
than in our scenarios.
In order to explore the role of the order’s position in the book, Figure 1.9 depicts
the bid prices’ reactions induced by buy limit orders placed at the market (level one)
and behind the market (level two and three). We observe a negative correlation between
the magnitude of quote reactions and the orders’ distance from the spread. The at-
the-market limit order induces significantly faster market reactions than the behind-the-
market limit order. Nonetheless, the long-term impact of level one and level two limit
orders is only approximately 20% smaller. Hence, it turns out that behind-the-market
orders can significantly shift the market though the quote adjustment is slower.12 This
result holds for level two orders and (to a weaker extent) for level three orders. However,
for orders posted deeper in the book virtually no market impacts can be identified.
Eom, Lee, and Park (2009) find evidence that traders could have made extra profits
using microstructure-based manipulations on the Korean Exchange (KRX) during a
period between 2001 and 2002. In this period, KRX disclosed the total quantity on each
12In order to improve the graphical illustrations, we refrain from showing the corresponding
confidence intervals. They are quite similar to those shown in Figure 1.8.
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L1 buy LO → Bid
L2 buy LO → Bid
L3 buy LO → bid
Permanent Impact
Figure 1.9: Changes of bid quotes induced by buy limit orders placed at the market
(level one) and behind the market (level two and three). The order size equals to half of
that at the best bid. The initial order book equals the corresponding monthly average
shown in Table 1.1. The marked number on the vertical axes indicates the magnitude
of the permanent impact. Trading of Fortis at Euronext, Amsterdam in August, 2008.
L1: level one. L2: level two. L3: level three. LO: limit order.
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Buy LO → Ask
Buy LO → Bid
Permanent Impact































Small buy LO → Bid
 Mid buy LO → Bid
Big buy LO → Bid
Permanent Impact
Figure 1.10: Left: Changes of quotes induced by buy limit orders placed inside of the
spread with a size equal to the depth at the bid. Right: Changes of bid induced by
buy limit orders placed inside of the spread with different sizes. The initial order book
equals to the corresponding monthly average shown in Table 1.1. Small size: depth at
the bid. Mid size: 7 times of the depth at the bid. Big size: 15 times of the depth at
the bid. Trading of Fortis at Euronext, Amsterdam in August, 2008. LO: limit order.
side of LOB without fully disclosing the prices at which these orders have been placed.
The manipulation strategy resulted in placing huge numbers of behind-the-market limit
orders on the opposite side of the market inducing price moves in the favorite direction
without having these orders executed. Our finding shows that this kind of manipulation
is indeed possible. However, whether it is economically profitable in Euronext ultimately
depends on (relative) order sizes. In order to move quotes in her favorite direction, the
trader has to submit rather big limit orders close to the market. Then, she faces the risk
that these orders may be picked up.
1.5.2 Limit Orders Placed Inside Of the Spread
Limit orders placed inside of the bid-ask spread perturb the LOB dynamics in a more
complex way. Apart from providing liquidity to the order book, they directly improve
the ask or bid. This quote adjustment induces a reduction of the spread, establishes a
new best quote level and correspondingly shifts all depth levels on the corresponding side
of the book upward (or downward, respectively). The system seeks the new equilibrium
on a path recovering from the immediate quote change and simultaneously re-balancing
liquidity. Given our setting, we assume that a buy limit order inside of the spread induces
a 5 basis points increase of the bid. However, as shown in the left plot of Figure 1.10,
the long-run price impact is just 1.8 basis points. The immediate quote movement is
reverted back by approximately 65%. This is induced either by sell trades picking up
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Buy MO → Ask
Buy MO → Bid
Sell MO → Ask
Sell MO → Bid
95% confindence interval
Permanent Impact
Figure 1.11: Changes of quotes induced by buy/sell market orders (buyer-/seller-
initiated trades) with a size equal to half of the depth on their corresponding first levels.
The marked number on the vertical axes indicates the magnitude of the permanent
impact. Trading of Fortis at Euronext, Amsterdam in August, 2008. MO: Market order.
the posted volume or by cancellations on the bid side. Similarly, liquidity demand on
the ask side shifts the ask upward by 1.8 basis points. Hence, overall we observe an
asymmetric re-balancing of quotes and a corresponding re-widening of the spread.
The right plot of Figure 1.10 compares the effects of buy limit orders of different
sizes but with same limit price posted inside of the bid-ask spread and thus improving
bid quotes again by 5 basis points. We observe quite different impulse response patterns
in dependence of the order size. In case of a comparably small order, the posted volume
is quickly picked up, shifting back the bid quote. In contrast, large volumes overbidding
the prevailing quote cause a long-term upward movement of the bid. Relative to the
initial shift of the bid we observe a further approximately 20% price increase. Hence,
extraordinary large orders are not likely to be picked up and induce a rather strong
buy pressure moving the market upwards. For smaller (though still comparably large)
orders, adverse selection and signaling effects seem to counterbalance each other. As
a consequence, the bid quote is hardly changed and the long run effect is close to the
immediate price improvement.
1.5.3 Market Impact of Trades
Figure 1.11 shows the market impacts induced by buy and sell market orders. We
assume that the trade sizes correspond to 50% of the prevailing depth. Consequently,
these market orders do not ‘walk through’ the limit order book and thus ask and bid
29
quotes are unaffected. The quote adjustments shown in Figure 1.11 are subsequent quote
responses to trade arrivals. Both bid and ask increase (decrease) sharply after the arrival
of a buy (sell) market order. Hence, the arrival of a buy (sell) market order induces
aggressive posting on the bid (ask) side resulting in further buy (sell) market orders and
limit orders posted inside of the spread. Similar to the findings for limit orders, we find
evidence for asymmetric adjustments of the two sides of the market. It turns out that buy
market orders shift ask quotes more quickly and strongly than bid quotes. The reverse
is true for sell market orders. This result indicates that trades temporarily increase
spreads which is in contrast to the effects induced by limit orders. Engle and Patton
(2004) report similar findings by analyzing quote data from the NYSE. They show that
trades have a positive impact on spreads. Because they directly impose the spread as
the underlying cointegration relation of quotes, the price impact of trades on spreads is
transitory in their model. Using impulse-response analysis based on a structural VEC
model, Escribano and Pascual (2006) also find that spreads permanently widen after
the arrival of trades. Note that these effects contradict implications of asymmetric-
information-based market microstructure models, such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
and Easley and O’Hara (1992), where trades should resolve the uncertainty regarding
existing information and should result in declining spreads.
The left plot of Figure 1.12 depicts quote reactions induced by an aggressive market
order ‘walking through’ the book (Scenario 4 in Section 1.3.2). It absorbs the best ask
level and shifts the best quote to the originally second best level which is assumed to be
10 basis points higher than the previous best ask. Similarly to the effects induced by
aggressive limit orders we observe that the initial shift of the best ask is reverted back by
approximately 35% inducing a long-run ask increase of 6.5 basis points. Simultaneously,
aggressive posting on the bid side shifts bid quotes upward. Hence, the initially widened
spread reverts back in an asymmetric way causing more quote movements on the bid
side than on the ask side. The responses mirror the corresponding effects induced by
aggressive buy limit orders (see Figure 1.10), where the spread is initially narrowed and
then asymmetrically re-widened causing also more movements on the bid side than on
the ask side.
The right plot of Figure 1.12 compares the market impacts on ask quotes induced
by a buy market order in situations of different depth behind the market. It is assumed
that the order just absorbs the first ask level and thus induces an instantaneous ask
price increase by 5 basis points. In line with the results discussed above, in all three
scenarios the initially shifted ask quote is reverted back. However, it turns out that
the magnitude of this quote reversion critically depends on the prevailing depth behind
the market. In fact, the existence of a huge level-two-depth reverts the ask quote back
by approximately 60%. We explain this fact by a strong sell pressure induced by huge
sell volume queued on the ask side. Conversely, in case of only little depth prevailing
behind the market, the existing sell pressure is weaker causing the incoming buy order
to (upward) shift the market more strongly. In the extreme case of a very thin market,
we even observe an additional quote increase.
A practical problem faced by many market participants is the fundamental choice
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Buy MO → Ask
Buy MO → Bid
Permanent Impact




























Buy MO → Ask (less liquidity behind market)
Buy MO → Ask (mid liquidity behind market)
Buy MO → Ask (huge liquidity behind market)
Permanent Impact
Figure 1.12: Left: Changes of bid and ask quotes induced by an aggressive buy market
order with a size exceeding the depth at the best ask by 20%. The second best ask is
assumed to be 5 basis points higher than the ask, where the depths behind the market
are 1.5 times of the depth at the market. Right: Changes of ask quotes induced by
an aggressive buy market order with a size equal to the depth at the ask when there
is different depth at the second best ask. Case 1: the depth at the second best ask is
10% of that at the ask; Case 2: the depth at the second best ask equals to that at the
ask; Case 3: the depth at the second best ask is 500% of that at the ask. The marked
number on the vertical axes indicate the magnitude of the permanent impact. Trading
of Fortis at Euronext, Amsterdam in August, 2008. MO: Market order.
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Buy MO → Ask
 Buy MO → Bid
Buy LO → Ask
Buy LO → Bid
Permanent Impact
Figure 1.13: Changes of ask and bid quotes induced by a buy market order and a buy
limit order of similar size placed at the market. The order size is half of the depth at the
best bid. The depths at the best bid and the best ask in the order book are assumed to
be equal. Trading of Fortis at Euronext, Amsterdam in August, 2008. LO: limit order;
MO: market order.
between posting a market order and a limit order. A direct comparison of the market
impacts induced by these two types of orders is shown in Figure 1.13. In both cases, the
posted order does not directly change quotes. We observe that the resulting long-run
effect of trades is significantly greater than that of an equal-size limit order. Actually,
the price shift induced by a market order is approximately four times larger than that
of a comparable limit order. This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction
by Rosu (2010). Moreover, market orders also cause quicker market reactions. Finally,
inferred from the ‘gap’ between ask and bid curves, market orders change the spread
more dramatically than limit orders. Hence, the willingness to cross the bid-ask spread
is a stronger signal for private information than that induced by a comparable limit
order.
Note that the comparison holds for ‘normal’ order types placed on the best quote, but
not necessarily for more aggressive orders. As discussed above, the long-term effects of
aggressive limit orders and market orders critically depend on their (relative) size and the
current state of the book. Therefore, an ultimate comparison of market impacts induced
by both types of orders under comparable conditions is rather difficult. Nevertheless, our
results show that limit orders do have a significant long-term effect and can significantly
‘scare’ the market.
32




























Buy LO → Ask in VAR(10)
Buy LO → Bid in VAR(10)
Buy LO → Ask in VAR(15)
Buy LO → Bid in VAR(15)
Permanent impact in VAR(10)
Permanent impact in VAR(15)



























Buy MO → Ask in VAR(10)
Buy MO → Bid in VAR(10)
Buy MO → Ask in VAR(15)
Buy MO → Bid in VAR(15)
Permanent impact in VAR(10)
Permanent impact in VAR(15)
Figure 1.14: Robustness of results. Market impacts of a bid limit order estimated
by a VAR(15) and a VAR(25) specification. Trading of Fortis, Euronext Amsterdam in
August, 2008.
1.5.4 Robustness of Results
Selecting the appropriate lag order in VAR models is cumbersome in practice when a
substantial cross-section of stocks is analyzed over a comparably long period. In order
to analyze the sensitivity of our results regarding the choice of the lag order in the
VAR model, Figure 1.14 compares the market impacts of a bid limit order and that
of a normal buy market order predicted by a VAR(15) model with those induced by a
VAR(10) specification using trading of Fortis in August, 2008. It turns out that despite
a misspecification of the lag length and remaining serial correlation in the residuals, the
impulse response estimates of a VAR(10) are quite close to that of a VAR(15). This is in
line with results reported by Jorda (2005) using a VAR(2) to estimate impulse-response
functions of an underlying VAR(12) model.
1.5.5 Cross-Sectional Evidence
The complete empirical analysis has been conducted for 29 other stocks
traded at Euronext Amsterdam using a VARX(15) specification. The corre-
sponding results are shown in the appendix on the companion web site at
http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~huangrui/project/impact_of_orders/. It turns
out that the results reported in the previous sections are qualitatively stable and repre-
sentative for a wide cross-section of stocks. Nevertheless, we observe that the magnitudes
of market impacts vary across the market and seem to be driven by underlying liquidity
characteristics. To gain insights into these relationships, we run a simple cross-sectional
regression of absolute average market impacts on the average stock-specific trading fre-
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quency, trading volume as well as the minimum tick size. I.e.,
Mi = γ0 + γ1Ni + γ2Si + γ3Vi + εi, (1.13)
where Mi denotes the absolute permanent impact of stock i induced by a buy/sell order,
Ni is the average number of trades per day, Si represents the normalized tick size, and
Vi denotes the normalized trade volume per day. Particularly,
S =
tick size× 100
average of closing prices
, V =
adjusted trading volume per day
number of outstanding shares
× 100.
The scenarios we consider below are similar to those studied in Section 1.3.2. The initial
order book for each stock equals its monthly average.
Scenario ‘normal limit order’ and ‘normal market order’ : These scenarios are
identical to that in Section 1.3.2.
Scenario ‘aggressive limit order’ : An incoming order of a size which is half to the
depth at the corresponding best price is posted inside of the spread and improving
the corresponding quote by one tick.
Scenario ‘aggressive market order’ : An incoming market order with a size equal
to the depth at the corresponding best price and thus absorbing the first level in
the book.
For every scenario, we consider average market impacts of both buy and sell orders for
30 stocks estimated over two months resulting in 120 observations for each regression.
Table 1.7 reports the corresponding estimation results for two versions of the model:
one with included trading volume and one without. The high R2 values, ranging between
67% and 80%, show that most of the cross-sectional variation of market impact can
indeed be explained by the three explanatory variables. It turns out that the trading
volume (though its parameter is significant) does not provide much explanatory power.
This result indicates that the trading frequency rather than the trade size drives the
strength of market responses to limit order arrivals. Furthermore, we observe that the
trading frequency has a negative influence on the market impact of limit orders. Hence,
in case of a slower trading, a single order conveys more information.
The tick size is positively related to the magnitude of permanent impacts in all
scenarios. For aggressive limit orders, this finding is not surprising as the implied price
improvement is (relatively) higher for stocks trading on larger tick sizes. Since in these
cases, also the spreads between best and second best quotes are higher, the immediate
price shift by the arrival of an aggressive market order is larger as well. In the scenarios
‘normal limit order’ and ‘normal market order’, a higher tick size and thus an increase
of the price discreteness makes it more likely that investors are forced to under-react
or over-react in response to incoming information inducing higher deviations between
quoted prices and the ‘true’ underlying efficient price. Our findings show that in these
situations, investors rather tend to over-react after the arrival of an order.
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Table 1.7
Cross-sectional analysis of market impacts over the market.
We consider market impacts of both buy and sell orders for 30 stocks estimated over
August and September, 2008. The regression is Mi = γ0 + γ1Ni + γ2Si + γ3Vi + εi,
where Mi denotes the absolute permanent impact of stock i induced by a buy/sell limit
order, Ni is the average number of trades per day, Si represents the normalized tick size,
and Vi denotes the normalized trade volume per day. The numbers in brackets denote
heteroskedasticity robust t−statistics according to White (1980).
Scenario γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 R
2
‘normal limit order’ 0.0033 −0.0013 0.0418 – 0.69
(19.02) (−7.30) (33.72)
0.0027 −0.0015 0.040 0.0011 0.73
(13.77) (−11.35) (34.85) (6.5)
‘aggressive 0.005 −0.0017 0.096 – 0.79
limit order’ (13.12) (−5.93) (23.04)
0.004 −0.002 0.095 0.001 0.80
(11.98) (−7.92) (22.80) (8.34)
‘normal market order’ 0.037 −0.016 0.17 −− 0.57
(21.94) (−9.26) (6.33)
0.030 −0.018 0.151 0.013 0.67
(14.59) (−16.74) (5.56) (7.49)
‘aggressive 0.049 −0.020 0.474 −− 0.68
market order’ (19.89) (−8.24) (14.46)
0.039 −0.023 0.449 0.018 0.75
(13.03) (−15.06) (14.07) (7.22)
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1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we quantify the market impact of incoming limit orders in a limit order
book market. Best bid and ask quotes as well as three levels of depth on both sides of
the market are modeled based on a cointegrated VAR system. Incoming limit orders are
represented in terms of shocks to the system. Limit order characteristics as well as the
corresponding state of the book are captured by the specific design of the shock vector.
This allows us to distinguish between limit orders of different aggressiveness (reflected
by their distance to the market) and different sizes as well as between different states
of the book. The market impacts on ask and bid prices are quantified by the estimated
impulse response function using appropriate statistical inference.
Employing this framework we analyze the limit order book processes of 30 stocks
traded on Euronext Amsterdam over two months in 2008. The model is estimated using
the highest possible frequency accounting for all order book changes during continuous
trading. Parameter estimates and diagnostics indicate that the proposed model captures
the high-frequency order book dynamics quite well.
Based on the empirical analysis we can summarize the following findings: First, we
find clear evidence for cointegration relations between ask and bid quotes and corre-
sponding depths. While some cointegration relations are similar to the bid-ask spread,
others show that depth has a distinct effect on quote dynamics and on the connection
between ask and bid quotes. Second, limit orders do have significant long-term effects
on quotes. This is even true for limit orders placed behind the market though these ef-
fects decline with the limit order’s distance to the market. While incoming limit orders
temporarily decrease the spread, market orders induce a temporary widening. Third,
the speed of spread convergence as well as the direction of price movements after the
arrival of aggressive limit orders undercutting (or overbidding, respectively) best ask and
bid prices strongly depends on the incoming limit order’s size. While small orders seem
to face adverse selection risks and are likely to be picked up quickly, for larger orders
information signaling effects seem to dominate pushing the market in the opposite di-
rection. Fourth, the decrease (increase) of spreads after the arrival of an aggressive limit
(market) order is reverted back asymmetrically inducing more quote movements on the
side where the order has been placed. Fifth, the long-run market impact of aggressive
market orders walking through the book rises with the queued depth behind the market.
Sixth, the effects are qualitatively remarkably stable over the cross-section of the market.
Variations in the magnitudes of market impacts are well explained by the underlying
stock-specific trading frequency and minimum tick size.
Our empirical results also show that the proposed framework is useful and appro-
priate to capture order book dynamics on high frequencies. By modeling quotes and
several levels of depth, the model implicitly captures also the multivariate dynamics
of mid-quotes, returns, spreads, spread changes as well as depth imbalances. In this
sense, the suggested high-frequency cointegrated VAR model can serve as a workhorse
for various applications in this area.
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Chapter 2
Limit Order Properties and
Optimal Order Sizes
This chapter is based on Hautsch and Huang (2012a).
2.1 Introduction
Electronic limit order book (LOB) systems are the dominant trading form of most fi-
nancial markets worldwide, including leading exchanges like NASDAQ, NYSE, BATS
and Euronext, various Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs) and Electronic Communica-
tion Networks (ECNs). The recent decade witnesses substantial technological progress
in trading systems as well as trade recording and an increasing importance of intra-
day trading. Transparency, low latency, high liquidity and low trading costs attract
an increasing number of intraday traders, long-horizon traders as well as institutional
investors. Though electronic limit order book trading already exists for many years, fur-
ther developments in trading systems and structures are ongoing and are faster than ever
before. The successive automatization of order management and execution by computer
algorithms, the growing importance of smart order routing as well as changes of market
structures and trading forms challenge empirical and theoretical market microstructure
research.
The objective of this chapter is to provide new empirical evidence on order activities
and market dynamics at NASDAQ – the largest electronic market for equities in the U.S.
By employing TotalView-ITCH data containing information directly stemming from the
NASDAQ data feed, our study sheds some light on recent order arrival rates, execution
rates, cancellation rates and the price impact of incoming quotes. Particularly the market
impact of a limit order is a key parameter for trading decisions and play a crucial role
for (algorithmic) trading strategies. Also theoretical studies, such as, e.g., Harris (1997),
Parlour and Seppi (2008), Boulatov and George (2008) or Rosu (2010), predict that the
revelation of a trading intention by limit order placements can indeed adversely affect
asset prices. Despite of its importance, empirical evidence on the influence of incoming
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limit orders is still limited. Only very recently, Hautsch and Huang (2012b), Eisler,
Bouchaud, and Kockelkoren (2011) and Cont, Kukanov, and Stoikov (2011) analyze the
price impact of limit orders and find significant effects. In this study, we employ Hautsch
and Huang’s (2012b) framework, which extends the approach by Engle and Patton (2004)
and provides deeper insights into the market impact of limit orders in recent NASDAQ
trading. Of particular interest is whether the magnitudes of price impacts identified in
other markets are also found in the extremely liquid NASDAQ market and which limit
order sizes can be ultimately posted without significantly moving the market.
TotalView-ITCH data contains all order messages and thus allows us to reconstruct
the NASDAQ limit order book in a very precise way, particularly accounting for all
high-frequency limit order activities including also so-called fleeting orders. The latter
are present for only few seconds and have the purpose of testing for hidden orders
placed in the bid-ask spread. A detailed analysis of the NASDAQ order flow in October
2010 provides the following major results: First, the number of limit order submissions
is twenty to forty higher than the number of trades. Secondly, limit order sizes are
typically small and clustered at round lot sizes of hundred shares. Third, more than
95% of all limit orders are cancelled without getting executed with most of them being
cancelled nearly instantaneously (less than one second) after their submission reflecting
the proliferation of algorithmic trading at NASDAQ. Fourth, volume-weighted execution
times are significantly greater than average execution times indicating that large orders
face more execution risk than small ones.
The market impact of limit orders is quantified by modeling ask and bid quotes and
several levels of depth in terms of a cointegrated vector-autoregressive (VAR) system
which is updated in event time. Short-run and long-run quote reactions are quanti-
fied by impulse-response functions. As proposed by Hautsch and Huang (2012b), this
framework allows us to estimate the impact of specific limit order activities including
limit order submissions, cancellations and executions (corresponding to trades) which
are represented as shocks to the system. Our empirical results show that the short-run
and long-run quote reaction patterns after the arrival of a limit order are indeed quite
similar to those, for example found for Euronext Amsterdam (see Hautsch and Huang,
2012b). Buy (sell) limit orders cause permanent quote increases (decreases) and a tem-
porary decline of the spread. Moreover, we find that the permanent impact of a limit
order posted at the best quote is in most cases approximately 25% of that of a trade
of similar size. However, this magnitude can be much smaller when hidden orders are
placed inside of the spread. As on other liquid markets, only aggressive limit orders
posted on the first or second order level induce significant price impacts whereas orders
posted with greater distance to the market have virtually no effect.
Finally, using the estimates of market impacts, we suggest a way to compute the
optimal size of a limit order given its expected price impact. The implied order size is
calculated by inverting the closed form of the permanent impact yielding a function of
the current limit order book and the given market impact control level. This provides
useful information to control risks in trading strategies.
The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following way. Section 2.2 briefly
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introduces the market environment and the data. Section 2.3 provides an explorative
analysis of the order flow. The econometric framework is reviewed in Section 2.4. Sec-
tion 2.5 gives empirical evidence of short-run and long-run quote reactions on order
activities. In Section 2.6, we propose a method to compute the optimal order size sub-
ject to its position in the book and the expected market impact. Finally, Section 2.7
concludes.
2.2 Market Environment and Data
The NASDAQ stock market is the largest electronic stock market (in terms of trading
volume) in the world. In 2006, its traditional market center, Brut and INET electronic
communication networks (ECNs) are integrated into a single system. This system offers
a single execution algorithm based on price and time order precedence for both market
makers and participants of ECNs. During the continuous trading period between 9:30
and 16:00 EST, limit orders are submitted to a centralized computer system where they
are matched to prevailing limit or hidden orders on the opposite side. If there is no match
or the standing volume in the system is insufficient to fully execute the incoming order,
the remaining order volume is placed in the order book. NASDAQ supports various order
types like pure market orders (immediate order execution without a price limit), stop
orders (automatic issuing of limit orders or market orders when a given price is reached),
immediate-or-cancel (IOC) orders, reserve orders and non-display orders, among others.
In this study, we use TotalView-ITCH data containing rich information on order
activities. The database includes limit order submissions, cancellations, executions and
hidden order executions for every trading day since 7:00am EST when the system starts
accepting incoming limit orders. The system is initialized by an empty order book where
all overnight limit orders are resubmitted automatically at the beginning of each day.
Therefore, we can exactly reconstruct the order book at any time by aggregating the
existing visible limit orders according to their limit prices. Furthermore, NASDAQ To-
talView, surpassing NASDAQ Level 2, is the standard NASDAQ data feed for displaying
the full order book depth for market participants. Hence, the reconstructed order book
exactly represents historical real-time-disseminated order book states. Trades are iden-
tified via the records of limit orders and hidden order executions. Since the trading
direction of limit orders and hidden orders is recorded, we can exactly identify whether
a trade is buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. Finally, TotalView-ITCH data records a
unique identification of any limit order which allows to track the order and to compute,
for instance, its life-time.1
Note that a market order, especially when its order size is comparably large, is
likely to be filled by several pending limit orders. This results in multiple limit order
executions corresponding to a sequence of same-type (sub-)trades within a short time
1The limit order book reconstruction and limit order tracking is performed by the




Summary Statistics of Selected Stocks
The variables are calculated for each stock using data from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database. The sample period covers October, 2010, including 21
trading days. MktCap is the market capitalization by October 1, 2010. AvgVol denotes
the average daily volume (in thousand shares). MedTurn is the median daily turnover.
AvgPrc denotes the average daily closing price. StdRet gives the standard deviation of
daily returns.
MktCap AvgVol MedTurn AvgPrc StdRet
(billion $) (1000 shrs) (in %) (in $) (in %)
GOOG 130.13 4059.6 1.24 575.94 2.56
ADBE 13.66 15132 2.04 27.512 3.11
VRTX 7.02 1909.7 0.90 35.947 1.64
WFMI 6.38 3018.5 1.54 37.636 1.80
WCRX 5.66 2941.1 0.94 23.535 2.27
DISH 3.93 2486.5 1.12 19.412 1.38
UTHR 3.18 747.95 0.97 55.884 1.89
LKQX 2.99 430.38 0.26 21.465 1.21
PTEN 2.63 5445.5 3.26 18.536 2.35
STRA 2.37 514.49 2.55 145.42 4.24
interval. We identify transactions as sub-trades if they occur in less than half a second
after the previous trade and have the same initiation types. All corresponding sub-trades
are consolidated to a single trade representing a market order. Furthermore, to avoid
erratic effects during the market opening and closure, our sample period covers only the
continuous trading periods between 9:45 and 15:45.
We select ten assets out of the 200 biggest stocks listed at NASDAQ according to
their market capitalization in Oct 1, 2010. To obtain a representative cross-section,
we first divide the 200 stocks into twenty blocks, and then randomly select one stock
from each category. Table 2.1 summarizes fundamental characteristics of these stocks
extracted from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.
2.3 Major Order Flow and Order Book Charac-
teristics
Electronic limit order book markets are characterized by high transparency and low
latency. They enable most market participants having a view on the current state of
the market via real-time updated order books. Traders’ instructions are transmitted to
the trading platform and executed with extremely short time delays (usually only a few
milliseconds).2 As a consequence, sophisticated trading strategies minimizing trading
2There are indeed numerous brokers providing their clients direct market access (DMA).
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Figure 2.1: Histogram of order sizes, execution sizes, cancellation times and execution
times of limit orders. The red line denotes kernel density estimates. Zero cancellation
times and execution times are discarded. Trading of WCRX on NASDAQ in October,
2010.
costs and exploiting high-frequency price movements are performed using computer al-
gorithms. Triggered by technological advances, systematic trading is highly sophisticated
nowadays. For instance, in order to make profit from high-frequency price fluctuations
and liquidity rebates, many high-frequency trading algorithms post a huge number of
limit orders which are again canceled almost immediately if not getting executed. As a
consequence, enormous limit order activities on extremely high frequencies are observed.
Table 2.2 summarizes the limit order activities of selected stocks and Figure 2.1 shows
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Table 2.2
Limit order activities at NASDAQ
Calculated for each stock using TotalView-ITCH messages. The sample period covers October, 2010, including 21 trading
days. NumLO is the average daily number of standing limit orders. AvgSZ denotes the average size of limit orders. NumALO
is the average daily number of limit orders placed inside the spread (”aggressive” limit orders). NumALO (in %) gives the
percentage of aggressive limit orders. NumExe is the number of limit orders getting (possibly partially) executed. MedETim
denotes the median execution time of limit orders. VWETim is the volume-weighted execution time. NumCanc (in %) is
the percentage of limit orders that are cancelled without (partial) execution. MedCTim denotes the median cancellation
time. NumACan (in %) is the cancellation rate of aggressive limit orders. MedACTim gives the median cancellation time of
aggressive limit orders.
NumLO AvgSZ NumALO NumALO NumExe MedETim VWETim NumCanc MedCTim NumACan MedACTim
(×103) (100 shrs) (×103) (in %) (×103) (sec.) (sec.) (in %) (sec.) (in %) (sec.)
GOOG 220.55 1.28 23.50 10.65 5.45 2.77 118.79 97.52 0.42 89.35 0.011
ADBE 206.05 2.48 2.38 1.15 15.28 3.07 107.68 92.57 4.38 50.87 0.351
VRTX 51.59 1.26 3.11 6.03 3.18 6.82 65.67 93.82 8.12 72.49 0.192
WFMI 109.46 1.53 8.06 7.36 5.19 5.92 87.04 95.25 5.88 86.43 0
WCRX 54.50 1.65 1.78 3.27 3.84 10.19 83.87 92.93 10 57.23 0.873
DISH 71.42 1.69 0.91 1.27 3.88 14.35 104.25 94.56 5.55 52.90 0.353
UTHR 27.44 1.20 3.31 12.06 1.22 6.04 52.35 95.54 9.87 81.40 0.352
LKQX 22.92 1.44 1.76 7.68 0.77 12.97 71.15 96.62 14.76 84.37 2.096
PTEN 91.57 1.98 1.81 1.98 7.66 5.71 77.56 91.62 4.84 53.80 0.545
STRA 13.05 1.12 4.02 30.83 0.57 4.89 89.11 95.57 5.17 90.96 1.502
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the histograms of constructed variables for one illustrating stock, Warner Chilcott plc
(ticker symbol WCRX).3 The following main findings can be summarized:
(i) Market participants submit a huge number of limit orders with small sizes. The
average limit order size is approximately 156 shares. The up-left plot in Fig-
ure 2.1 shows that a large proportion of limit orders have a size of 100 shares,
corresponding to a round lot on NASDAQ.
(ii) Most of the limit orders are posted at or behind the market. We observe that
only approximately 8.2% of the limit orders are placed within the spread and thus
update the best quotes.
(iii) Only few limit orders are executed. The median execution time across the ten
stocks is approximately 7 seconds. However, the volume-weighted average execu-
tion time is substantially greater than its median, reflecting the fact that large
limit orders face significantly higher execution risk than small orders.
(iv) More than 95% of limit orders are cancelled without (partial) execution. The me-
dian cancellation time of aggressive limit orders placed inside of the spread is less
than one second. Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) argue that such a high cancellation
rate of limit orders at NASDAQ mainly results from traders ’pinging’ for hidden
liquidity in the market.
Note that the quickly canceled limit orders change the order book but reverse it back
immediately. This nearly instantaneous change is virtually unobservable for humans but
can be captured only by trading algorithms run by high-speed computers connecting to
exchanges with very low latency.4 Though such limit order activities do not generally
provide any liquidity to the market, they are indispensable for analyzing order book
dynamics. Table 2.3 gives summary statistics of market order activities. The number
of market orders is substantially smaller than the number of (incoming) limit orders.
Interestingly, most market orders are filled by standing limit or hidden orders pending
at prices better than or equal to the best quote. Hence, we hardly find market orders
walking through the order book.
Table 2.4 gives descriptive statistics of the order book data used in this chapter.
We observe significantly more order book updates in the first three order levels than
transactions. Moreover, on average, second level market depth is higher than the first
level depth while it is lower than the depth on the third level.
3The corresponding histograms for other nine stocks are provided on the companion website
http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/huangrui/project/order_impact_nasdaq/. They confirm
that our findings are quite consistent across the market.
4As a matter of fact, ITCH-Totalview has already reserved time stamps in nano-second pre-




Calculated for each stock using TotalView-ITCH messages. The sample period covers
October, 2010, including 21 trading days. NumMO is the average daily number of market
orders. AvgSZ denotes the average size of market orders. NumIS (in %) is the percentage
of market orders completley filled by hidden orders placed in the spread. NumL1 (in
%) is the percentage of market orders filled at the best displayed quote. NumL2 (in
%) is the percentage of market orders walking through the book up to the second level.
NumL3 (in %) is the percentage of market orders walking through the book up to (or
deeper than) the third level.
NumMO AvgSZ NumIS NumL1 NumL2 NumL3
(100 shrs) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %)
GOOG 6226.4 1.66 43.3 53.8 2.10 0.42
ADBE 4169.1 6.93 4.8 94.9 0.24 0.01
VRTX 1730.0 2.68 13.0 86.4 0.43 0.02
WFMI 2285.7 3.27 7.2 92.2 0.38 0.04
WCRX 1977.0 3.15 8.5 91.0 0.44 0.01
DISH 1339.1 4.45 4.6 95.2 0.15 0
UTHR 857.1 2.16 26.3 72.9 0.67 0
LKQX 469.8 2.23 15.9 83.7 0.29 0.02
PTEN 2647.2 5.36 4.9 95.0 0.07 0
STRA 657.9 1.51 39.8 58.6 1.11 0.12
2.4 An Econometric Model for the Market Im-
pact of Limit Orders
To estimate the market impact of limit orders, we apply the framework proposed by
Hautsch and Huang (2012b). The major idea is to model the limit order book in terms
of a cointegrated VAR model for quotes and order book depth and to back out the price
impact of specific types of limit orders based on impulse response functions.
2.4.1 A Cointegrated VAR Model for the Limit Order
Book
Denote t as a (business) time index, indicating all order book activities, i.e., incoming
limit or market orders as well as limit order cancellations. Furthermore, pat and p
b
t denote
the best log ask and bid quotes instantaneously after the t-th order activity and va,jt and
vb,jt , j = 1, . . . , k, define the log depth on the j-th best observed quote level on the ask and
bid side, respectively. Moreover, to capture dynamic interactions between limit order and
market order activities, we define two dummy variables, BUYt and SELLt, indicating
the occurrence of buy and sell trades. Then, the resulting (4+2×k)-dimensional vector
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Table 2.4
Summary of order books
The variables are calculated for each stock using reconstructed order book data. The sample period covers October, 2010,
including 21 trading days. AvgObs(×103) is the average number of observations per day. AvgTrd is the average number
of daily trades. AvgAsk is the average of the best ask quote in order books. AvgBid is the average of the best bid quote.
AvgSpr (in $) is the average dollar spread in cents. AvgSpr (in %) is the average relative spread. L1 – L3 denotes the average
pending volume on the best quote up to the third best quote.
AvgObs AvgTrd AvgAsk AvgBid AvgSpr AvgSpr depth on ask (100 shrs) depth on bid (100 shrs)
(×103) (×103) (in $) (in $) (in cents) (in %) L1 L2 L3 L1 L2 L3
GOOG 96.97 3.66 572.45 572.17 28.74 0.051 2.05 1.70 1.56 2.01 1.70 1.58
ADBE 139.52 3.95 27.336 27.325 1.51 0.055 32.87 48.34 63.86 28.86 45.29 61.51
VRTX 39.79 1.51 35.913 35.895 2.25 0.063 4.48 5.19 7.764 4.12 5.13 7.80
WFMI 76.28 2.13 37.59 37.576 1.85 0.049 5.82 8.76 13.61 5.60 8.35 12.56
WCRX 43.32 1.81 23.57 23.558 1.81 0.076 9.22 11.71 15.95 8.31 10.95 15.40
DISH 62.70 1.26 19.396 19.385 1.52 0.078 15.36 18.85 27.88 16.18 18.68 26.54
PTEN 80.33 6.44 18.677 18.666 6.39 0.114 17.02 23.67 28.71 16.65 22.18 27.24
LKQX 19.17 4.01 21.464 21.441 2.70 0.126 3.39 3.96 5.02 3.36 4.18 5.44
UTHR 18.92 2.51 56.083 56.026 1.50 0.080 2.20 2.13 2.40 2.06 2.01 2.18
STRA 16.26 0.40 145.25 144.77 53.33 0.364 1.75 2.09 2.85 1.50 1.68 2.05
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1 , . . . , v
b,k
t , BUYt, SELLt]
′. (2.1)
The quote levels associated with va,jt and v
b,j
t are not observed on a fixed grid at and
behind the best quotes. Consequently, their price distance to pat and p
b
t is not necessarily
exactly j − 1 ticks but might be higher if there are no limit orders on all possible
intermediate price levels behind the market.
Note that market depth enters the vector yt in levels and thus is treated as a possibly
non-stationary variable. Since market depth is highly persistent and (on very high
frequencies) reveals features of a near-unit-root process, Hautsch and Huang (2012b)
recommend treating this variable as being possibly non-stationary. This guarantees
consistency of estimates, even if market depth is truly stationary.
Following Hautsch and Huang (2012b) we model the process in terms of a restricted
cointegrated VAR model of the order p (VAR(p)) with the Vector Error Correction
(VEC) form for ∆yt := yt − yt−1,




γi∆yt−i + ut, (2.2)
where ut is white noise with covariance matrix σu, µ is a constant, γi with i = 1, . . . , p−1,
is a k × k parameter matrix, and α and β denote the k × r loading and cointegrating
matrices with r < k. By treating the trading indicators BUYt and SELLt as stationary
variables, the two first columns of β are restricted to β1 = [0, . . . , 0, 1, 0]
′ and β2 =
[0, . . . , 0, 0, 1]′.




aiyt−i + ut, (2.3)
where a1 := Ik + αβ
′ + γ1 with Ik denoting a k × k identity matrix, ai := γi − γi−1
with 1 < i < p and ap := −γp−1. As illustrated by Hautsch and Huang (2012b), the
model (2.2) can be estimated by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) according
to Johansen (1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990).
Table 2.5 shows the estimated cointegrating vectors for a representative trading day,
where we omit the two known cointegrating vectors associated with the (stationary)
trading indicators and all corresponding elements in the remaining cointegration vectors.
The resulting vectors are ordered according to their corresponding eigenvalues reflecting
their likelihood contributions.
We observe that the first five and the last cointegration relations are mostly linear
combinations of spreads and depths. Specifically, the first one is quite similar to a linear
combination mimicking the bid-ask spread. The most interesting relationship is implied
by the vector β̂8, revealing relatively large (and different) coefficients associated with
the depth variables. This indicates that depth has a significant impact on the long-term
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Table 2.5
Representative estimates of cointegrating vectors
The vectors are sorted according to their corresponding eigenvalues in Johansen’s ML
approach. Overall there are nine cointegrating vectors. Two of them are known, i.e., β1 =
[0, . . . , 0, 1, 0] and β2 = [0, . . . , 0, 0, 1], representing the stationary trading indicators.
Accordingly, the elements corresponding to BUY and SELL, in β̂3 to β̂9 are set to zero
and are omitted as well. Trading of WRCX at NASDAQ on October 1, 2010.
Variable β̂3 β̂4 β̂5 β̂6 β̂7 β̂8 β̂9
pa 1.00 -1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 -0.64 -0.97
pb -0.98 0.99 -0.99 -0.99 -1.00 1.00 1.00
va,1 0.00 -0.25 -0.01 -0.12 -0.03 -0.03 0.02
va,2 -0.00 0.26 0.06 -0.11 0.00 -0.34 0.03
va,3 0.00 -0.18 -0.04 0.19 0.09 -0.54 0.02
vb,1 0.01 0.16 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.02
vb,2 -0.01 -0.17 0.05 0.15 -0.07 0.37 0.01
vb,3 0.01 0.11 -0.02 -0.10 0.13 0.73 -0.00
relationship between quotes. Intuitively, the connection between ask and bid quotes
becomes weaker (and thus deviates from the spread) if the depth is less balanced between
both sides of the market. Hence, depth has a significant impact on quote dynamics and
should be explicitly taken into account in a model for quotes. These results strongly
confirm corresponding findings by Hautsch and Huang (2012b) for trading at Euronext.
Finally, note that model (2.3) can be further rotated in order to represent dynamics
in spreads, relative spread changes, midquotes, midquote returns as well as (ask-bid)
depth imbalances. Hence, the model is sufficiently flexible to capture the high-frequency
dynamics of all relevant trading variables. In this sense, the approach complements
dynamic models for order book curves such as proposed by Härdle, Hautsch, and Mihoci
(2009) and Russell and Kim (2010).
2.4.2 Estimating Market Impact
The market impact of limit orders can be backed out by representing an incoming order
as a shock to the dynamic order book system as specified in equation (2.3). Whenever
an order enters the market, it (i) will change the depth in the book, (ii) may change the
best quotes depending on which position in the queue it is placed, and (iii) will change
the trading indicator dummy in case of a market order. Consequently, the direct effects








δp denotes a 2× 1 vector containing shocks in quotes, δv is a 2k × 1 vector representing























Figure 2.2 (Scenario 1a (normal limit order)): An incoming buy limit order with
price 1000 and size 0.5. It affects only the depth at the best bid without changing the
prevailing quotes or resulting in a trade. Figure from Hautsch and Huang (2012b).
dummy.
Following Hautsch and Huang (2012b), we design the impulse response vectors as-
sociated with four scenarios commonly faced by market participants. As graphically
illustrated by Figures 2.2 to 2.4, a three-level order book is initialized at the best ask
pat = 1002, best bid p
b
t = 1000, second best ask 1003, second best bid 999, and depth
levels on the bid side vb,1t = 1, v
b,2




t = 1.4. The following scenarios are
considered:5
Scenario 1a (normal limit order): arrival of a buy limit order with price 1000 and
size 0.5 to be placed at the market. As shown in Figure 2.2, this order will be
consolidated at the best bid without changing the prevailing quotes. Because the
initial depth on the first level is 1.0, the change of the log depth is ln(1.5) ≈ 0.4.
Correspondingly, the shock vectors are given by δv = [0, 0, 0, 0.4, 0, 0]
′, δp = δd =
[0, 0]′.
Scenario 1b (passive limit order): arrival of a buy limit order with price 999 and
size 0.5 to be posted behind the market. As in the scenario above, it does not
change the prevailing quotes and only affects the depth at the second best bid.
We have δv = [0, 0, 0, 0, ln(2)− ln(1.5) ≈ 0.29, 0]′, δp = δd = [0, 0]′.
Scenario 2 (aggressive limit order): arrival of a buy limit order with price 1001 and
size 0.5 to be posted inside of the current spread. Figure 2.3 shows that it improves

























Figure 2.3 (Scenario 2 (aggressive limit order)): An incoming buy limit order
with price 1001 and size 0.5 improving the best bid and changing all depth levels on the






















Figure 2.4 (Scenario 3 (normal market order)): An incoming buy market order
with price 1002 and size 0.5 which results in a buyer-initiated (buy) trade. Figure from
Hautsch and Huang (2012b).
49
Table 2.6
Shock vectors implied by the underlying four scenarios
Initial order book: best ask pat = 1002, best bid p
b
t = 1000, second best ask = 1003,
second best bid = 999. Volumes on the ask/bid side: v
a/b,1
t = 1 at the best bid,
v
a/b,2




t = 1.4 at the third and fourth best
bids, respectively. Notation: δv denotes changes in market depths; δp denotes changes of
the best bid and best ask; δd denotes changes of the trading indicator variables. Figure
from Hautsch and Huang (2012b)






‘normal limit order’ (Bid,1000, 0.5) [0, 0, 0, 0.4, 0, 0] [0, 0] [0, 0]
‘passive limit order’ (Bid,999, 0.5) [0, 0, 0, 0, 0.29, 0] [0, 0] [0, 0]
‘aggressive limit order’ (Bid,1001, 0.5) [0, 0, 0,−0.69,−0.4, 0.07] [0, 0.001] [0, 0]
‘normal market order’ (Bid,1002, 0.5) [−0.69, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] [0, 0] [1, 0]
the best bid by 0.1% and accordingly shifts all depth levels on the bid side. The
resulting shock vector is given by δv = [0, 0, 0, (ln(0.5) ≈ −0.69), (ln(1/1.5) ≈
−0.4), (ln(1.5/1.4) ≈ 0.07)]′, δp = [0, 0.001]′ and δd = [0, 0]′.
Scenario 3 (normal market order): arrival of a buy order with price 1002 and size
0.5. This order will be immediately executed against standing limit orders at the
best ask quote. Because it absorbs liquidity from the book, it shocks the corre-
sponding depth levels negatively. Figure 2.4 depicts the corresponding changes of
the order book as represented by δv = [ln(0.5) ≈ −0.69, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]′, δp = [0, 0]′
and δd = [1, 0]
′.
Table 2.6 summarizes the shock vectors implied by the illustrating scenarios.
The market reactions induced by incoming limit orders are captured by the impulse
response function,
f(h; δy) = E[yt+h|yt + δy, yt−1, · · · ]− E[yt+h|yt, yt−1, · · · ], (2.4)








and h is the number of periods (measured in ‘order event time’).
Note that the impulse responses need not to be orthogonalized as contemporane-
ous relationships between quotes and depths are captured by construction of the shock
vector. Moreover, our data is based on the arrival time of orders avoiding time aggre-
gation as another source of mutual dependence in high-frequency order book data. The
impulse-response function according to equation (2.4) can be written as


















Given the consistent estimator â for a := vec(A1, . . . , Ap) in (2.3) we have
√
T (â− a) d→ N (0,Σâ).
Lütkepohl (1990) shows that the asymptotic distribution of the impulse-response func-
tion is given by √
T (f̂ − f) d→ N (0, GhΣâG′h), (2.6)









The permanent impact of limit order can be deduced from Ganger’s representation
of the cointegrated VAR as
f̄(δy) := lim
h→∞














2.5 Market Impact at NASDAQ
We model the best quotes and market depths up to the third level. Computa-
tional burden is reduced by separately estimating the model fore each of the 21
trading days. The market impact is then computed as the monthly average of
individual (daily) impulse response. Likewise, confidence intervals are computed
based on daily averages. For sake of brevity we refrain from presenting all in-
dividual results for the ten stocks. We rather illustrate representative evidence
based on Warner Chilcott plc (ticker symbol WCRX) using a cointegrated VAR(10)
model. The results for the remaining stocks are provided in a web appendix on
http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~huangrui/project/order_impact_nasdaq/. In-
deed, we find the same pattern as in Hautsch and Huang (2012b).
Figure 2.5 depicts the market impact of buy and sell limit orders posted at the best
quotes as shown in Scenario 1 in Section 2.4.2. The impact starts at zero since such
a limit order does not directly change quotes. As expected, both ask and bid quotes
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Buy LO → Ask
Buy LO → Bid
Sell LO → Ask
Sell LO → Bid
95% confidence interval
Permanent Impact
Figure 2.5: Changes of ask and bid quotes induced by buy/sell limit orders placed at
the market (level one) with a size equal to the half of the depth on the first level. The
marked number on the vertical axes indicates the magnitude of the permanent impact.
The blue dotted lines indicate the corresponding 95%-confidence intervals. Trading of
WCRX at NASDAQ in October 2010. LO: limit order.
significantly rise (decline) after the arrival of a buy (sell) limit order. In the long-run,
both quotes converge to a permanent level at which the information content of the
incoming limit order is completely incorporated. We observe that the long-run price
change is approximately 0.3 basis points. In the short-run, ask and bid quotes adjust
in an asymmetric way where bid (ask) quotes tend to react more quickly than ask (bid)
quotes after the arrival of a buy (sell) limit order. This adjustment induces an one-sided
and temporary decrease of the bid-ask spread.
To explore the role of the order’s position in the book, Figure 2.6 depicts the impact
on the bid quote induced by a buy limit order placed at the market (level one) and
behind the market (level two and three). We observe that the magnitude and speed of
the quote reaction are negatively correlated with the order’s distance from the spread.
Specifically, for orders posted deeper than the third level in the order book, virtually no
market impacts can be identified.
Limit orders placed inside the spread perturb the order book dynamics in a more
complex way as show in Scenario 2 in Section 2.4.2. They directly improve the ask or
bid resulting in an immediate narrowing of the spread and a shift of one side of the
order book. Hence, the system seeks the new equilibrium on a path recovering from
an immediate quote change and a simultaneous re-balancing of liquidity. Figure 2.7
shows the reactions of bid and ask quotes induced by an aggressive buy limit order.
Given our setting, a buy limit order induces a 4.3 basis point increase of the bid quote
(corresponding to approximately one cent). However, the long-run price change is just
2.11 basis points. The immediate quote reversal is induced either by sell trades picking
up the volume or by cancellations on the bid side. Likewise the ask quote shifts upward.
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L1 buy LO → Bid
L2 buy LO → Bid
L3 buy LO → bid
Permanent Impact
Figure 2.6: Changes of bid quotes induced by buy limit orders placed at the market
(level one) and behind the market (level two and three). The order size equals half of
that at the best bid. The initial order book equals the corresponding monthly average
shown in Table 2.4. The marked number on the vertical axes indicates the magnitude
of the permanent impact. Trading of WCRX at NASDAQ in October, 2010. L1: level
one. L2: level two. L3: level three. LO: limit order.
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Buy LO → Ask
Buy LO → Bid
Permanent Impact



























Small buy LO → Bid
 Mid buy LO → Bid
Big buy LO → Bid
Permanent Impact
Figure 2.7: Left: Changes of quotes induced by buy limit orders placed inside of the
spread with a size equal to the depth at the bid. Right: Changes of bid quote induced
by buy limit orders placed inside of the spread with different sizes. The initial order
book equals the corresponding monthly average shown in Table 2.4. Small size: depth
at the bid. Mid size: 7 times of the depth at the bid. Big size: 15 times of the depth at
the bid. Trading of WCRX at NASDAQ in October, 2010. LO: limit order.
We hence observe an asymmetric re-balancing of quotes and a corresponding re-widening
of the spread.
The right plot of Figure 2.7 shows how the size of incoming aggressive limit orders
affects quote reactions. In case of a comparably small order, the posted volume is
likely to be quickly picked up or cancelled, shifting back the bid quote. In contrast,
large volumes over-bid the prevailing quote causing a significant long-run impact. This
confirms findings by Hautsch and Huang (2012b) for Euronext Amsterdam and shows
that aggressive limit orders with large order sizes carry information and serve as pricing
signals.
Figure 2.8 compares the market impact induced by a buy market order and a similar
buy limit order posted at the bid. We observe that both bid and ask quotes sharply
increase after the arrival of a buy market order. The permanent shift of quotes induced
by a market order is approximately 4 times greater than that by an incoming limit
order. This finding supports theoretical predictions by Rosu (2010). Moreover, in case
of a market order, the ask reacts more quickly than the bid. Hence, we observe an
asymmetric adjustment of the two sides of the market resulting in a temporary widening
of spreads.
Since the market impact of limit orders depends not only on the market microstruc-
ture but also on the characteristics of the individual stock, an ultimate comparison of
estimated market impacts on NASDAQ with those on Euronext (see Hautsch and Huang
(2012b)) is rather difficult. Nevertheless, we do find a significant difference when com-
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Buy MO → Ask
 Buy MO → Bid
Buy LO → Ask
Buy LO → Bid
Permanent Impact
Figure 2.8: Changes of ask and bid quotes induced by a buy market order and a buy
limit order of similar size placed at the market. The order size is half of the depth at
the best bid. The initial order book equals the corresponding monthly average shown
in Table 2.4. Trading of WCRX at NASDAQ in October, 2010. LO: limit order; MO:
market order.
paring the market impact of trades to that of limit orders. While on Euronext Hautsch
and Huang (2012b) find robust evidence for the market impact of trades trading at best
quotes being approximately four times of the market impact of a limit order of similar
size, this does not necessarily hold for all stocks at NASDAQ, such as, e.g., GOOG,
STRA and UTHR. We explain this finding by the existence of hidden liquidity inside of
bid-ask spreads as shown in Table 2.3. When the market participant expects a better
price than the best quote to be available inside of the spread, she would naturally inter-
pret a market order placed at the best quotes as being comparably more aggressive as it
walks through the (hidden) price levels. As a consequence, the reaction to an incoming
market order becomes stronger. Similarly, an incoming limit order is interpreted as being
comparably more passive. Consequently, the market impact of limit orders decreases.
2.6 Optimal Order Size
The expected price impact induced by a limit order placement is a key parameter in
trading decisions. Therefore, in trading strategies, it might be of particular interest
to explicitly control the expected market impact. The estimates of the price impact
provided in the previous section can be used to back out the size of an order (given its
position in the queue) which is necessary to cause a given expected price impact.
In fact, due to the discreteness of prices, the magnitude of a price impact can be
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interpreted in a probabilistic context. Given a minimum tick size at equity markets
like NASDAQ, a practitioner who prefers not to shift the price with probability ξ must
design the order such that the expected price shift, i.e., the magnitude of the impact, is
less than 1−ξ ticks. This is straightforwardly seen by noticing that when the probability
is exactly ξ, the minimum level of the market impact is
permanent market impact = E[long-run price shift]
= ξ × (0 ticks) + (1− ξ)× (1 ticks)
= 1− ξ (ticks).
(2.10)
In the following we shall illustrate how to explicitly compute the optimal order size
subject to the given control level ξ. For ease of illustration, consider a bid limit order
with size m placed at the second best bid. In our setting based on a 3-level order book,
it is represented as a 10-dimensional shock vector with only one non-zero element at the





















where c29 is the ninth element in the second row of matrix C in (2.9). Plugging (2.11)










× (depth at second best bid). (2.12)
Figure 2.9 depicts the permanent impact on bid prices against order sizes for the ten
selected stocks. Each curve in the sub-plots presents the permanent impact induced by
the particular type of bid limit order, i.e., “limit orders placed at the second best bid”,
“limit orders placed at the best bid” and “limit orders placed inside of the spread”.
The order book is initialized at its average. For the sake of clarity, we change the
unit of impacts (on the y−axis) from basis points of bid prices to the number of ticks.
Furthermore, the control level ξ is set to 0.9 (corresponding to a permanent market
impact of 0.1 ticks) represented by the horizontal dashed line. The intersections S1 and
S2 correspond to optimal sizes of limit orders placed on the best bid and second best
bid, respectively. For instance, for WCRX and subject to the condition that the market
impact is less than 0.1 cent, the optimal size for a limit order placed at the best bid is
around 600 shares. Likewise, the optimal size for a limit order placed at the second bid
is around 1400 shares.
For the stocks GOOG, UTHR and STRA, we observe that the market impact is
so large that the intersection S1 corresponds to an order size of less than 100 shares.
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Figure 2.9: Permanent impacts against order sizes. The impacts are induced by bid
orders. The initial order book is set to its monthly average. The order sizes at the
x−axis range from 100 shares to 5 times of the depth at the best bid in the initial order
book . The aggressive (in-the-spread) limit orders improve the bid price by 1 cent. The
horizontal dashed line presents a subject control level corresponding to a permanent
market impact of 0.1 cents. Trading of ten selected stocks at NASDAQ in October,
2010.
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We explain this phenomenon by three reasons. First, the depth at the best bid is
comparably small. Therefore, a 100-shares-order is a relatively large order given the
available liquidity at the market. Second, as shown in Table 2.1, prices of these stocks
are relatively high. Consequently, the relative minimum tick size is comparably small
implying lower costs of front-running strategies. Hence, the high market impact reflects a
high probability of being affected by front-running. Third, the average absolute spread
in ticks is large. Consequently, there is more room for other market participants to
improve their quotes.
Finally, for some stocks, we observe zero or even negative permanent impacts of
small orders placed inside of the spread, as, e.g., GOOG, ADBE, DISH, PTEN and
STRA. This is caused by the effect that small limit orders placed inside of the spread
are mainly submitted by trading algorithms and tend to be canceled very quickly if not
getting executed. In other situations, they might be quickly picked up and trigger other
algorithms issuing market orders and/or canceling existing limit orders on their own
side.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide new empirical evidence on limit order submissions and market
impacts in NASDAQ trading. Employing TotalView-ITCH data, we can summarize the
following major findings. First, we observe huge numbers of order submissions per
day with order sizes clustering around round lots. Second, most of the limit orders are
cancelled before getting executed. Cancellation times are hardly greater than one second.
Third, the volume-weighted execution time of limit orders is substantially greater than
its median indicating that big limit orders face clearly more execution risk. Finally, we
observe that only very few market orders tend to ’walk through the book’.
We find the short-run and long-run price reactions induced by limit order placements
to be consistent with those found by Hautsch and Huang (2012b) for data stemming from
the Euronext Amsterdam. This implies that these effects are quite stable across markets,
despite of differences in market settings. In particular, we find that incoming limit order
have significant short-run and long-run effects on ask and bid quotes. Buy (sell) limit
orders increase (decrease) both ask and bid quotes while temporarily decreasing bid-
ask spreads. Similar but stronger effects are found after arrivals of market orders with
temporary increases of bid-ask spreads. For aggressive limit orders posted in the spread
we find different effects depending on the order size. While the new quote level caused
by a large aggressive order also holds in the long run, this is not true for small orders.
Their direct effect on quotes tend to be reversed after a while as the order is picked
up. Moreover, it turns out that only limit orders posted up to the second order level
have significant market impacts. Orders which are placed even deeper in the book have
virtually no effect on the market. Interestingly, we find that small orders placed inside
of the spread cause zero or even negative long-run impacts. We explain this finding by
the existence of trading algorithms which cancel such orders very quickly if they do not
get executed.
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Finally, we illustrate how to use the setup to compute optimal sizes of limit orders





Identifying and Analyzing Hidden
Order Placements
This chapter is based on Hautsch and Huang (2012c).
3.1 Introduction
Since the introduction and the growing dominance of electronic trading during the
nineties, equity markets have trended toward higher transparency and more disclosure
of trading information. However, displayed limit orders reveal trading intentions and
may induce adverse selection effects, picking-off risks and “parasitic trading” (see e.g.,
Harris, 1997). Consequently, the question of how much transparency should be optimally
provided on a market is of ongoing importance. In particular, current developments in
equity markets away from full transparency and back toward more opaque market struc-
tures made this question again very topical in recent market microstructure research.
In modern trading, traders seek to conceal trading strategies and to avoid adverse
price effects by hiding order sizes. Consequently, reserve (“iceberg”) orders which require
to display only a small fraction of the order size are increasingly popular and can be used
on virtually all major exchanges and trading platforms worldwide. An even more extreme
form of reducing pre-trade transparency is to trade in form of non-display (“hidden”)
orders which can be entirely hidden. Such orders do not even reveal the posted limit
price and thus act as completely hidden liquidity supply in the order book. While there
are a few empirical studies analyzing iceberg orders (see, e.g., Bessembinder, Panayides,
and Venkataraman, 2009; Frey and Sand̊as, 2009), there is no empirical evidence on
non-display orders. Due to the possibility to also hide the underlying limit price, they
induce trading and order placement effects which are quite different from those caused
by iceberg orders and which have not been not well understood yet. For instance, the
most interesting aspect behind hidden orders is that they can be placed inside of the
bid-ask spread without affecting visible best ask and bid quotes. In fact, this mechanism
creates enormous order activities in markets as market participants try to “ping” for
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hidden liquidity inside of the spread by posting corresponding “fleeting orders” which
are canceled a few instants later if they do not get executed.
This chapter aims at shedding light on the use of undisclosed orders in an opaque
limit order market. To our best knowledge, this study is the first one providing empirical
evidence on (entirely) hidden order placements in continuous trading of one of the largest
equity markets worldwide. Specifically, using data from the NASDAQ TotalView mes-
sage stream allows us to retrieve information on hidden depth. Employing an ordered
response approach with censoring mechanism yields conditional probabilities of hidden
order locations given the state of the market and provides insights on the distribution
of hidden orders across different price levels. Hence, we perform statistical inference on
the aggressiveness of hidden order placements (e.g., within the spread) and analyze how
hidden liquidity submitters balance their risk of non-execution and compete for liquid-
ity supply. Our findings based on a wide cross-section of NASDAQ stocks show that
“dark” liquidity supply is significantly driven by market conditions and thus predictable
in terms of the state of the (displayed) order book. We show that under certain market
conditions, there is significant competition for hidden liquidity supply inducing a clear
narrowing of the “hidden” (and thus effective) bid-ask spread. Conversely, in situations
where the risk of being picked off becomes high, we observe a significant reduction in
hidden order submitters’ aggressiveness. Moreover, we provide novel insights into com-
petition for hidden liquidity provision and hidden order placements in the presence of
high-frequency trading.
The current tendency of trading platforms toward more opaqueness is observable on
all major markets. We can differentiate between three major categories. The first group
of markets, including various non-U.S. markets, such as the London Stock Exchange,
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (XETRA), Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), Euronext, the
Madrid Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange, among others, offer the pos-
sibility of posting only iceberg orders (or so-called reserve orders) where the trader is
obliged to show only a small proportion (called “peak”) of the posted order size. The sec-
ond category of trading platforms allows to use both reserve and hidden orders and thus
offers the option to entirely hide an order. Prominent examples are NASDAQ, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), BATS (Best Alternative Trading System) – currently the
third largest equity market in the U.S. – and the largest U.S. Electronic Communication
Network (ECN) Direct Edge. According to the report by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (2010), these markets cover approximately 75% of share volume in National
Market System (NMS) stocks. The third group of modern trading systems are so-called
dark pools where liquidity supply is hidden and no information on order matching and
trading actions is provided to other market participants.
Recent empirical evidence shows that “dark trading” is not negligible and is in-
creasingly popular. For instance, Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009)
report that 44% of order volume is hidden and 18% of incoming orders are reserve or-
ders on Euronext Paris. Frey and Sand̊as (2009) show that reserve orders represent 9%
of non-marketable orders with sizes of 12 − 20 times the average in German XETRA













stocks sorted by the average spread
Figure 3.1: Percentage of trading volumes executed against hidden depth for 99 NAS-
DAQ stocks representing a wide cross-section of the market. The stocks are sorted
according to their average bid-ask spreads during the investigation period.
in the U.S. contribute approximately 8% of trading volume in NMS stocks. Figure 3.1
shows percentages of trading volume executed against hidden liquidity for 99 NASDAQ
stocks used in our empirical analysis. Averaged across a wide range of the market, ap-
proximately 14% of the share volume originates from hidden depth. However, for some
stocks, especially those revealing high spreads, it can be even greater than 40%.
The major motivation for hiding orders is to camouflage trading intention. The latter
increases execution risk as the display of (large) orders may cause impatient traders to
retreat (Moinas, 2010) and may lead to higher liquidity competition (Buti and Rindi,
2011). Moreover, posting limit orders induces front-running strategies (Harris, 1997),
and the risk of adverse selection (“picking off risk”; see Harris, 1996). By hiding an order,
execution risks can be reduced, while, on the other hand, the risk of non-execution rises
as trading counter parties are not obviously attracted. Moreover, typically, hidden orders
lose time priority to displayed orders. Hence, for a hidden order submitter it is crucial
to balance the risk of non-execution vs. the risk of adverse selection.
Our empirical methodology is designed to provide insights into these motivations. To
identify the locations of hidden orders, we employ two approaches. Firstly, we measure
hidden order aggressiveness in terms of the distance between the order price and the
best (visible) quote on the own side of the limit order book (LOB). The larger this
distance the deeper a hidden order is placed within the spread and the higher is the order
aggressiveness. The second approach employs the distance to the best visible quote on
the opposite side of the market. The lower this distance, the lower the transaction costs
for a market order submitter on the opposite side. We show that both distance measures
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are necessary to fully capture the determinants of hidden order placements. Using this
setup, we analyze whether hidden order placements can be predicted using the observable
state of the limit order book and can be explained by hidden order suppliers’ motivation
to balance execution risk and adverse selection risk. In particular, we address the major
research questions: (i) Does hidden supply compete with observable order flow? (ii)
Is there competition between hidden liquidity? (iii) How does hidden supply react to
aggressive “pinging”?
Analyzing hidden order placements for 99 stocks covering a wide cross-section of the
NASDAQ market in 2010, we can summarize the following results: First, hidden order
placements follow trade directions in order to increase execution probabilities and to
reduce adverse selection. In particular, market participants submit hidden orders less
aggressively when the price moves in their favorable direction. Second, the “hidden”
spread is positively correlated with the observed spread. This is particularly true for
stocks with comparably high (average) spreads. Third, there is significant competition
for the provision of liquidity. This is true for hidden liquidity as traders use more aggres-
sive hidden orders after observing competing hidden depth on the own side. Moreover,
it is also true for the competition between hidden and disclosed liquidity. The latter
is empirically supported by a strong (positive) correlation between undisclosed orders
and the visible depth on the same side of the market. Fourth, hidden order submit-
ters become more defensive when high-frequency traders actively “ping” for undisclosed
volume in the spread. Overall, our findings clearly show that hidden orders are placed
strategically to balance non-execution and adverse selection risks.
The remainder of this chapter is organized in the following way: In Section 3.2, we
review the theoretical and empirical studies related to undisclosed orders, and formulate
our economic hypotheses. Section 3.3 briefly introduces the market environment, but
discusses in details on the data construction and descriptive statistics. In Section 3.4,
we introduce our econometric model for undisclosed orders. Section 3.5 documents our
empirical findings. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Economic Reasoning of Optimal Order Dis-
play
3.2.1 Theories on Undisclosed Orders
Amajor motivation for posting a limit order is to minimize transaction costs by appropri-
ately choosing the limit price and to signal trading intention to other market participants
in order to attract counterparties which might be not in the market yet (according to
Harris (1996), so-called “passive traders”). Attracting a counterparty is important to
increase the execution probability and to decrease the execution time of the position.
However, signaling trading intention may induce adverse price effects. For instance, ac-
cording to Moinas (2010), displaying large orders may cause “defensive” market order
traders to retreat from the market as soon as they interpret the signal as inside infor-
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mation. Moreover, “parasitic” traders (Harris, 1997) may exploit the information value
of a big order by using front-running strategies. Finally, posting a limit order induces
the risk of being picked off and thus adverse selection (Harris, 1996) if price changes are
stronger than expected and the order is sold (bought) too cheap (expensive).
Based on these economic reasoning, several theories on the usage of undisclosed
orders have been developed. Esser and Mönch (2007) propose a static framework in
which the trader optimizes the peak size and limit price of reserve orders by continuously
monitoring and balancing exposure risk against execution risk. Moinas (2010) presents
a theoretical model where informed traders, as well as large liquidity traders, use reserve
orders to mitigate the information leakage. Cebiroglu and Horst (2011) propose a model
where traders decide on the peak size of the iceberg order by accounting for the exposure-
induced market impact. Buti and Rindi (2011) present a dynamic framework where the
trader chooses her optimal strategy by simultaneously deciding on trading direction,
aggressiveness, size and peak proportion of the order. To our best knowledge, it is
the only theoretical model that explicitly incorporates the possibility of hidden order
placements into traders’ trading options.
3.2.2 Empirical Evidences on Undisclosed Orders
The empirical literature on reserve orders has been growing remarkably during the last
decade, partially due to its proliferation in limit order markets and the increasing avail-
ability of data. Studying trading on Euronext Paris, Bessembinder, Panayides, and
Venkataraman (2009) document that reserve orders induce lower implementation short
fall costs but longer times to fill. De Winne and D’Hondt (2007) examine similar data
and find that the detection of hidden depth increases order aggressiveness on the op-
posite side. Fleming and Mizrach (2009) examine data from BrockerTec, the leading
interdealer ECN for U.S. Treasuries and documenting that the use of reserve orders
varies considerably with the quantity of hidden depth increasing with price volatility.
All studies show that the decision on using reserve orders is strongly related to prevail-
ing market conditions, as characterized by the bid-ask spread, order book depth and
prevailing volatility.
Studying data from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), Aitken, Berkman, and
Mak (2001) find that reserve orders do not have a different price impact than visible
limit orders. According to their results, the use of reserve orders increases with volatility
and the average order value, while it decreases in tick size and trading activity. Frey
and Sand̊as (2009) analyze the Deutsche Börse’s trading platform XETRA and show
that the price impact of reserve orders depends on the executed fraction of its size with
profitability increasing in the hidden proportion. Based on data from the Spanish Stock
Exchange Pardo Tornero and Pascual (2007) find no significant price impact associated
with the execution of hidden parts of reserve orders. These findings support the hypoth-
esis that liquidity suppliers use reserve orders to compete for liquidity provision while
preventing picking-off risks.
Tuttle (2006) shows that overall market depth increased significantly after NASDAQ
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introduced undisclosed orders. Moreover, they provide evidence for hidden sizes being
predictive for future market price movements while the visible size conveys only little in-
formation. Anand and Weaver (2004) examine the abolition in 1996 and re-introduction
in 2002 of reserve orders on the Toronto Stock Exchange and show that the spread and
visible depth remain widely unchanged after both events. However, total depth, in-
cluding both visible and hidden volume, significantly increases after the re-introduction.
Both studies show that market quality is improved after the introduction of reserve
orders and that informed traders tend to use them primarily to reduce the price impact.
3.2.3 Testable Hypotheses
Market microstructure theory (see e.g., Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara, 1997) suggests that
large bid-ask spreads reflect a high uncertainty of liquidity suppliers on the state of the
market and the fundamental value of the asset. If hidden liquidity suppliers are dom-
inantly liquidity-motivated, they will be reluctant to submit aggressive hidden orders
inside of the spread as a high uncertainty also implies a high picking-off risk. Conse-
quently, hidden depth inside of the spread will decrease if spreads widen. Conversely,
for informed market participants who want to camouflage their informational advantage,
wider spreads open more room for aggressive hidden order placements. Hence, in such a
situation we would expect opposite effects with rising hidden liquidity placed inside the
spread. Hence:
Hypothesis 1.A The probability of hidden depth inside the spread decreases with the
size of the spread. (Liquidity traders use hidden orders)
Hypothesis 1.B The probability of hidden depth inside the spread increases with the
size of the spread. (Informed traders use hidden orders)
Traders can use undisclosed orders to compete for the provision of liquidity while
preventing others from undercutting their orders. Buti and Rindi (2011) demonstrate
that undisclosed orders are part of equilibrium strategies of liquidity suppliers. In partic-
ular, when the depth on the own side of the market is high, traders prefer to place more
aggressive hidden orders inside of the spread to increase the execution probability. Like-
wise, in case of a high depth on the opposite side of the market, hidden order submitters
may place their orders deeply inside the spread in order to “win” the (own-side) compe-
tition for liquidity provision and to maximize the execution probability if an impatient
trader from the opposite side posts a market order and crosses the spread. However, this
strategy implies a high adverse selection risk as a high depth on the opposite side may
reflect significant price pressure. Consequently, aggressive hidden orders placed deeply
inside the spread are likely to be picked up if the price pressure piling up on the oppo-
site side materializes. Accordingly, we might expect a(n) reduction (increase) of hidden
order aggressiveness if hidden order submitters’ exposure to adverse selection risk (risk
of non-execution) dominates. Expecting a higher importance of non-execution risk, we
formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.A The probability of hidden bid (ask) depth inside spreads increases
when the bid (ask) visible depth is thick.
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Hypothesis 2.B The probability of hidden bid (ask) depth inside spreads increases
when the ask (bid) visible depth is thick.
Traders’ order submission strategies depend not only on the current state of the
limit order book but also on recent price movements and trading signals. The dynamic
equilibrium model on visible order flow proposed by Parlour (1998) shows a “crowding
out” effect among market orders: the probability of incoming sell (buy) market orders is
lower after observing a buy (sell) market order which is in line with the well-known strong
persistence in trade directions. This effect implies that visible bid (ask) limit orders
have a higher execution probability after a sell (buy) market order. This hypothesis
is supported by Hall and Hautsch (2005) showing that price movements are positively
(negatively) correlated with the aggressiveness of visible buy (sell) limit orders. We
expect that liquidity suppliers take advantage of these trading signals by posting hidden
orders deeper inside the spread and thus increase execution probabilities. However,
as argued above, in situations where liquidity suppliers aim at benefiting from price
pressure built up on the opposite side of the market, their exposure to adverse selection
risk increases, which – in the extreme case – might dominate. A similar scenario arises
in situations of prevailing price changes. Also here, it might be advantageous to place
an aggressive hidden ask (bid) order after observing a price increase (decrease) and thus
to serve as a counter party if further buy (sell) market orders are expected. Again,
a counter-effect arises by an increased picking-off risk. Assuming that traders tend to
minimize picking-off risk rather than non-execution risk, we expect hidden bid (ask)
depth to decrease (increase) in case of sell (buy) pressure.
Moreover, recent trading and price signals may not only generate activity on the
opposite side of the market but may also trigger liquidity competition on the own side. If
liquidity suppliers expect momentum in prevailing price movements and, according to the
crowding out hypothesis, persistence in trade directions, (hidden) liquidity competition
on the same side should become stronger because liquidity suppliers face a higher risk of
non-execution. Hence, for order activities on the own side, we expect protection against
non-execution risk to dominate leading to two testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3.A The probability of hidden bid depth inside of the spread decreases
(increases) when the prevailing trade is seller (buyer)-initiated. The converse effect
applies for hidden ask depth.
Hypothesis 3.B The aggressiveness of hidden bid depth increases (decreases) when
the price moves up (down).
Traders’ decision on using undisclosed orders might also depend on the asset’s volatil-
ity. Foucault (1999) shows that volatility is an important parameter in order submission
strategies. Indeed, higher volatility implies higher uncertainty on the value of the asset
and thus increases the picking off risk. This mechanism is true for visible orders but
should similarly also apply to hidden orders:
Hypothesis 4 The aggressiveness of hidden depth is negatively correlated with pre-
vailing asset price volatility.
Hidden depth is a priori unobservable but is ex post identifiable as soon as it gets
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executed. This is most clearly seen if a limit order posted inside of the spread gets
immediate execution. Such information gives hidden liquidity providers hints on the
prevailing competition for hidden liquidity supply which in turn affects their submission
strategies. As a result of higher (hidden) liquidity competition, they would post more ag-
gressive orders to increase their execution probability. Moreover, Buti and Rindi (2011)
show that detections of hidden depth encourage more undisclosed order submissions as
long as picking-off risks (and thus adverse selection risks) do not become too high. The
reasoning is that market participants interpret the detection of hidden volume as a signal
of high liquidity demand and compete for supplying it. Accordingly, we postulate the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 The aggressiveness of hidden bid (ask) depth increases after some
hidden bid (ask) depth has been executed.
In modern trading, high-frequency trading (HFT) plays an increasingly important
role (see e.g., Angel, Harris, and Spatt, 2010; Securities and Exchange Commission,
2010) and might also influence the supply for hidden liquidity. In fact, HFT algorithms
typically employ directional strategies, such as quote-matching and fast-trading (“scalp-
ing”), i.e., the idea to post a limit order in front of some other limit order which is
expected to reveal information and to pick up the mis-priced limit orders quickly when
information flows in. To avoid such effects, traders prefer using undisclosed orders. How-
ever, some HFT trading algorithms also embed strategies for detecting hidden depth,
such as “pinging”, where visible limit orders are posted in the spread in order to test
whether they might get executed. Our empirical results show that such effects create
enormous order activities on NASDAQ. Pinging strategies, combined with scalping, in-
duce severe picking-off risks for undisclosed orders and may make them quite inefficient.
Indeed, Buti and Rindi (2011) theoretically show that when hidden depth can be per-
fectly detected there is no ground for traders using undisclosed orders to reduce exposure
risks. Accordingly, we expect that hidden liquidity suppliers become less aggressive if
high-frequency traders become very active in the market:
Hypothesis 6 The aggressiveness of hidden depth decreases as HFT activities on the
opposite side of the market increase.
In Moinas’s (2010) theoretical framework, informed traders use undisclosed orders
to mitigate information leakage. Typically, information asymmetry is highest during the
opening period as overnight information has to be processed. Accordingly, we expect
a higher hidden order aggressiveness in this period compared to the rest of the trading
day. Moreover, Esser and Mönch (2007) show that traders tend to display more of
order sizes when they approach trading closure. This is driven by the typical desire to
close a position before the end of the trading session. Accordingly, trading intentions
are revealed such that order execution probabilities are increased due to a higher time
priority of visible orders. Buti and Rindi (2011) also argue that reserve orders are
preferable to hidden orders in their framework when the time horizon becomes shorter.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7.A The aggressiveness of hidden depth is higher during the opening
hour.
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Hypothesis 7.B The aggressiveness of hidden depth is lower during the closure hour.
3.3 Measuring Hidden Order Locations
3.3.1 Institutional Background
As one of the largest electronic limit order markets in the world, the NASDAQ Single-
Book platform provides an unified procedure for passing limit orders from ECNs (Brut
and INET) and the traditional dealer-quote system. In particular, it treats a market
maker’s quote as a pair of limit orders on both sides of the market and aggregates them
into a centralized order book. During continuous trading between 9:30 and 16:00 Eastern
Time, the system matches incoming orders against the best (in term of price) prevailing
(possibly undisclosed) orders in the LOB. If there is insufficient volume to fully execute
the incoming order, the remaining part will be consolidated into the LOB. Besides limit
orders and market orders, NASDAQ provides both reserve orders and hidden orders.1 As
a reward for traders disclosing their orders, the hidden part of undisclosed orders loses
time priority compared to visible limit orders or peaks of reserve orders on the same
price level. Market makers at NASDAQ may also provide hidden depth. The NASDAQ
Stock Market trading rule (NASDAQ, 2008) requires the market maker to display at
least one round lot size. In this case, the market maker’s quotation corresponds to a
pair of reserve orders.
3.3.2 Data
We conduct our study based on 99 stocks traded on NASDAQ over the period of October
2010 corresponding to 21 trading days. To represent a wide cross-section across the
market, we select stocks according to market capitalization. We first rank the 500 biggest
stocks according to their market capitalizations recorded in the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database on 30th September 2010. Then, we restrict the sample
by selecting a stock out of every percentile resulting in 99 stocks which are divided into
three equal-size groups according to their average spreads and trade frequencies.
We retrieve historical NASDAQ market conditions from TotalView-ITCH data.
NASDAQ TotalViewSM data, surpassing NASDAQ Level 2, is the current standard
NASDAQ data feed for displaying the real-time full order book depth for market partic-
ipants. Historical data files record rich information on order activities, including limit
1NASDAQ also provides so-called “discretionary orders” with a displayed price and size as
well as a non-displayed discretionary price range. When the discretionary price range is hit by
a matching order, the discretionary order converts into an IOC (Immediate or Cancel) market
order. This order type also allows to hide trading intention. However, we do not consider
discretionary orders as undisclosed orders because (i) they take liquidity rather than providing
it, and (ii) it is very difficult to identify them using TotalView-ITCH data as HFT algorithms
generate an enormous number of IOC orders.
69
Table 3.1
Cross-Sectional Summary Statistics on the Characteristics of the Selected Stocks.
The sample consists of 99 NASDAQ stocks during the period of October 2010 with
21 trading days. We divide them into three equal-size groups according to the average
spread (AvgSpr) and the number of trades (AvgTrd). For each group, we report sum-
mary statistics of the following variables: MktCap is the market capitalization recorded
in CRSP at the end of trading on 30th September, 2010. AvgSpr (in ¢) is the average
spread in dollar cent. AvgTrd is the average number of daily trades. AvgHit is the aver-
age number of daily trades (partially or totally) traded against hidden depth. AvgHit (in
%) is the average percentage of daily trades (partially or totally) traded against hidden
volume. AvgVol is the average daily trading volume (in thousand shares). AvgHVol is
the average daily trading volume traded against hidden depth. AvgHVol (in %) is the
average daily percentage of executed hidden volume relative to overall trading volume.
MktCap AvgSpr AvgTrd AvgHit AvgHit AvgVol AvgHVol AvgHVol
(in bil. $) (in ¢) (in %) (×103Shr) (×103Shr) (in %)
Entire Mean 7.83 5.38 1861 429 20.1 3.93 0.59 14.6
Sample Median 2.16 3.77 1083 178 18.7 2.05 0.21 13.5
Std. 28.19 6.01 2616 959 7.9 5.87 1.59 8.1
Min. 0.89 1.07 98 12 9.1 0.12 0.01 3.9
Max. 259.90 34.91 20583 8446 46.0 41.37 14.37 42.8
AvgSpr Small 9.00 1.36 2199 316 14.0 5.84 0.37 6.9
Groups Medium 3.81 3.68 1776 414 20.0 3.08 0.54 15.0
(means) Large 10.69 11.10 1608 558 26.2 2.88 0.86 21.8
AvgTrd Low 1.50 8.85 461 91 20.4 0.70 0.10 16.3
Group Medium 2.91 4.05 1121 202 18.2 2.10 0.24 12.7
(means) High 19.09 3.23 4002 994 21.6 9.00 1.42 14.7
order submissions, cancellations, executions of visible and hidden orders as well as a
unique identification number for every (visible) limit order and peak of reserve orders.
We reconstruct the historical LOB using the algorithm proposed by Huang and
Polak (2011). Their algorithm continuously updates the LOB according to all reported
messages and represents the exact state of the LOB as shown to TotalView subscribers
in real time. Furthermore, we identify the attribute of a limit order (cancelled or filled)
and compute its lifetime by tracking it through its order ID.2 Finally, we aggregate
sequences of executions of buy (sell) limit or hidden orders occurring in less than 0.5
seconds into one sell (buy) market order. If a limit order is recorded immediately after
such a sequence, it is also aggregated with the entire sequence being considered as a
marketable limit order. Finally, to avoid erratic effects during the market opening and
closure, our sample period covers only the periods between 9:45 and 15:45.
Table 3.1 summarizes major characteristics of the selected stocks. They cover a wide
universe of stocks with market capitalization ranging from 900 million to 260 billion US
dollar. We find clear evidences for a high popularity of undisclosed orders in NASDAQ
2Limit order book reconstruction and limit order tracking is performed by the software ”LOB-
STER” which can be accessed at http://lobster.wiwi.hu-berlin.de.
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Table 3.2
Cross-Sectional Summary Statistics on Limit Order Executions and Cancellations
The sample consists of 99 NASDAQ stocks during the period of October 2010, with
21 trading days. We divide them into three equal-size groups according to the average
spread (AvgSpr) and the number of trades (AvgTrd). For each group, we report cross-
sectional summary statistics for the following variables: NumLO is the average daily
number of limit orders (including peaks of reserve orders). NumCanc is the average
daily number of limit order cancellations before getting (partially) executed. MedCTim
is the median of the lifetime of canceled visible limit orders. MedETim is the median
of the lifetime of executed limit orders. VWETim is the volume-weighted execution
time of limit orders. NumALO is the average daily number of limit orders placed inside
the spread (aggressive limit orders). NumACan (in %) is the average daily percentage
of cancelled aggressive limit orders placed inside the spread. AvgATim is the average
lifetime of cancelled aggressive limit orders.
NumLO NumCanc MedCTim MedETim VWETim NumALO NumACan AvgATim
(×103) (in %) (sec.) (sec.) (sec.) (×103) (in %) (sec.)
Entire Mean 57.92 94.7 9.7 12.9 142.0 3.84 76.3 3.11
Sample Median 29.41 94.8 9.2 10.7 103.7 2.52 79.7 2.12
Std. 84.50 1.9 6.3 9.5 152.2 5.81 14.9 4.79
Min. 5.01 90.9 0.0 0.8 39.9 0.07 29.4 0.02
Max. 650.66 99.2 33.2 60.3 981.2 49.9 98.7 41.0
AvgSpr Small 79.93 93.7 10.0 15.8 154.8 1.85 61.1 1.27
Groups Medium 47.14 94.5 11.2 10.6 114.2 4.06 79.6 3.23
(means) Large 46.69 95.9 7.8 12.4 156.9 5.62 88.1 4.84
AvgTrd Low 14.67 96.0 12.5 19.9 216.2 2.42 85.1 2.1
Group Medium 33.50 94.3 9.3 12.2 109.5 2.50 75.5 2.04
(means) High 125.6 93.9 7.2 6.7 100.1 6.61 68.2 5.12
trading. On average, approximately 15% of the trading volume and 20% of all trades
are executed against hidden depth. The average size of executed hidden depth is slightly
smaller than that of visible depth. This is partially due to active HFTs who use high-
speed hidden depth detecting algorithms to compete for trading against hidden volume.
Moreover, note that only a small proportion of existing hidden depth gets executed (see
e.g., Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman, 2009; Frey and Sand̊as, 2009). Hence,
the share of (undetected) hidden depth is much greater than the magnitudes reported
in the table. Furthermore, we show that the proportion of trading volume executed
against hidden depth increases as the (average) spread becomes wider. Hence, trades of
high-spread stocks are more likely to get price improvements.
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics on limit order executions and cancellations.
We find that on average approximately 95% of all limit orders are cancelled without
getting (partially) executed. This strikingly high number is robust across the sample
with the cross-sectional standard deviation being very low. In fact, the stock with the
smallest proportion of cancellations still reveals a percentage of 91%. Conversely, we
observe the most extreme situation of a stock revealing 99% cancellations. Moreover,
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the median lifetime of cancelled orders is less than 10 seconds. For limit orders placed
inside the spread, the average time until cancellation is even just around 3 seconds. This
effect is obviously driven by a strong influence of HFT-induced pinging strategies aiming
at detecting hidden orders inside the spread. Interestingly, large visible limit orders
have much longer execution times than small orders. This is indicated by the volume-
weighted execution time of 142 seconds being substantially higher than the median
lifetime of executed limit orders (12.9 seconds). This evidence is in line with extant
empirical studies of the market impact of limit orders (see e.g., Eisler, Bouchaud, and
Kockelkoren, 2011; Hautsch and Huang, 2012b), showing supportive evidence of large
traders’ economic motivation for using undisclosed orders. Finally, cancellation rates of
aggressive limit orders turn out to be lower as they have higher execution probabilities.
3.3.3 Identifying Undisclosed Orders
It is in the nature of things, that information on hidden order placements is not provided
by an exchange. Therefore, from classical transaction data sets, as, e.g., the Trade
and Quote (TAQ) database released by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), it is
impossible to infer on hidden orders. This difficulty is the major reason for the lacking
empirical evidence on hidden order placements. Message data, as provided by TotalView,
however, contain information on any activities affecting the visible part of the LOB. In
particular, it specifically reports executions against hidden orders which allow to identify
the exact position of hidden depth in the LOB. As illustrated below, these details can
indeed be utilized to conduct statistical inference on undisclosed order submissions.
In general, we can distinguish between trading scenarios where we can distinctly (ex
post) identify the location of hidden volume and situations where we can isolate at least
partial information on the existence of undisclosed volume. Figure 3.2 illustrates an
example of the first scenario where the best (visible) quotes in the LOB are 24.86 (bid)
and 24.91 (ask) before a buy limit order with limit price 24.91 is posted. As there is a
hidden ask order at price 24.90 inside of the spread, the incoming order is firstly partially
filled by this order resulting in a type “P” trade message (denoting executions against
hidden depth in the NASDAQ ITCH 4.0 format). Next, the remaining part of the buy
order is executed against the visible depth at the best ask resulting in an “E” message.
Finally, hidden depth at the best (visible) ask gets executed resulting in a further “P”
message. The remaining (non-executed) part of the incoming order enters the book as
a new buy limit order submission (type “A” message) at 24.91.3
This example shows that due to the existence of hidden depth, the market order
submitter faces a better execution price than expected from the visible LOB. If the trader
is able to predict the existence of hidden depth within the spread, she can incorporate
these transaction cost savings in her trading strategy. Moreover, it is illustrated that the
visible depth has execution priority over the hidden depth at the same price, no matter
when the order has been placed. Hence, if further depth on the best ask level cumulates,
3As in general, visible and hidden volumes are provided by more than one order at the same
price, we typically observe a sequence of simultaneous “P” and “E” messages.
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Figure 3.2: Left: Stylized trading scenario in a limit order book where a buy market
order is executed against hidden volume on the ask side and is uniquely identified.
Bid orders are marked by green, whereas ask orders are marked by red. All orders
above the horizontal axis are visible, whereas orders below the axis are hidden. The
numbered arrows indicate the matching process. Right: Sequence of generated messages
(in NASDAQ ITCH 4.0 format) resulting from this transaction.
the time-to-fill of any hidden order becomes longer. Finally, since the execution of the
hidden part is uniquely identified, we can exactly locate the undisclosed order in this
example.
Figure 3.3 shows a scenario which allows to extract at least incomplete information
on hidden order placements. Suppose a buy limit order is submitted inside of the spread
with price 24.88. The fact that the limit order does not get executed (otherwise we would
have been observed a ”P” message), reflects that there cannot be any hidden ask volume
posted on a price level lower than 24.89. Hence, this observation reveals information
about non-existence of hidden depth. We refer to such an observation as censored as it
only provides a lower (upper) bound for the location of hidden ask (bid) volume.
Finally, as illustrated by Figure 3.4, there might be a scenario where a marketable
order is executed against two (or several) levels of visible depth. The fact that not even a
part of the order is executed against hidden volume indicates the non-existence of hidden
ask depth on any level up to (including) price level 24.90. Hence, also this observation
is censored in the sense that it only yields a location bound.
Summarizing, we infer price information on undisclosed orders based on the following
three scenarios:
1. Submission of a marketable order when the spread is larger than 1 tick. If the
order gets executed at a price better than the corresponding best (visible) quote,
we can exactly identify the hidden order location and thus obtain an “uncensored”
observation.
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Figure 3.3: Left: Stylized trading scenario in a limit order book where a limit order
placed into the spread reveals (partial) information about the hidden depth. Bid orders
are marked by green, whereas ask orders are marked by red. All orders above the
horizontal axis are visible, whereas orders below the axis are hidden. Right: Sequence
of generated messages (in NASDAQ ITCH 4.0 format) resulting from this submission.
Figure 3.4: Left: Stylized trading scenario in a limit order book where a buy market
order is executed against visible volume only and thus reveals (partial) information about
the hidden depth. Bid orders are marked by green, whereas ask orders are marked by
red. All orders above the horizontal axis are visible, whereas orders below the axis
are hidden. Right: Sequence of generated messages (in NASDAQ ITCH 4.0 format)
resulting from this submission.
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Figure 3.5: Graphical illustration of the hidden order aggressiveness measure s and
corresponding classifications for the case of large-spread stocks (4 categories).
2. Submission of a limit order inside of the spread. If it is not executed, we certainly
know that there is undisclosed order with better limit price. This results into a
“censored” observation.
3. Submission of a marketable order with size greater than the depth at the corre-
sponding best (visible) quote. As this order may be split across several levels,
we can infer on hidden depth at- or behind-the-market. The observation can be
uncensored or censored depending on whether it is partially filled by hidden depth
or not.
3.3.4 Measuring the Aggressiveness of Undisclosed Orders
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) classify the aggressiveness of a limit order by measuring
its (price) distance to the prevailing best quotes. This scheme has been widely employed
in the empirical literature on limit orders (e.g. Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull, and White,
2000) and reserve orders (e.g., Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman, 2009).
Accordingly, we measure the aggressiveness of undisclosed orders in a similar way. In
particular, we measure distances of hidden order placements relative to best quotes on
the own and opposite side of the market.
Let pa and pb denote the best ask and bid quote and po represents the limit price
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of the undisclosed order. According to our first scheme, we measure the distance of the
undisclosed order to the best quote on the order’s own side,
s =
{
po − pb for undisclosed buy orders,
pa − po for undisclosed sell orders.
Hence, the larger s, the deeper the order is placed in the spread. Conversely, if s ≤ 0, the
undisclosed order is placed in the book and can be either a reserve order or a hidden order.
Accordingly, s measures aggressiveness from the liquidity supplier’s perspective. Due to
the fact that most observations only reveal incomplete, i.e. “censored”, information, it is
most natural to measure hidden order aggressiveness in terms of categories. As discussed
in the following sections, this allows for straightforward and computationally tractable
econometric modelling avoiding severe assumptions on the functional form. Depending
on the underlying (average) size of the spread, we choose different categorization schemes.
In particular, we divide the set of hidden order locations into 2, 3 and 4 categories for
small-spread, medium-spread and large-spread stocks, respectively. Table 3.3 gives the
chosen categories depending on s. The choice of the groups is motivated by the need to
have a sufficient number of observations in each category and to use a preferably fine
categorization within the spread. Figure 3.5 illustrates the resulting scheme for the case
of large-spread stocks.
As bid-ask spreads are not constant over time, the distance measure s is not sufficient
to fully capture hidden order locations. It is rather necessary to measure orders’ aggres-
siveness also in terms of the distance to the opposite side of the market. Accordingly,
d =
{
pa − po for undisclosed buy orders,
po − pb for undisclosed sell orders.
Hence, d represents undisclosed orders’ aggressiveness from the liquidity demander’s
perspective, see Figure 3.6. The smaller d, the lower the actual transaction costs for a
market order submitter who gets executed against this undisclosed order. Note that d
cannot become negative as any placement behind the opposite side of the market would
immediately result into an execution. As shown by Table 3.3, we categorize d in a similar
way to s. However, as d highlights the implied transaction costs induced by execution
against undisclosed orders, we choose a categorization which is particularly fine close to
the opposite side.
Note that the categorizations underlying the two measures can be partially over-
lapping. For instance, category 2 in Figure 3.5 overlaps with the categories 1 and 2 in
Figure 3.6, while category 3 in Figure 3.6 overlaps with categories 3 and 4 in Figure 3.5.
As shown in the empirical part of this chapter, this overlapping structure is particu-
larly advantageous as it enables us to capture manifold changes of the hidden depth
distribution by means of relatively simple and robust models.
Table 3.3 summarizes information on undisclosed orders. Firstly, the number of
order submissions revealing hidden depth information is huge, especially for large-spread
stocks. For these stocks, we observe on average approximately 113, 000 submissions.
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Figure 3.6: Graphical illustration of the hidden order aggressiveness measure d and
corresponding classifications for the case of large-spread stocks (4 categories).
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Table 3.3
Cross-sectional summary statistics on observations on undisclosed orders
The sample consists of 99 NASDAQ stocks during the period of October 2010 with
21 trading days. We divide them into three equal-size groups according to the average
spread. The aggressiveness of undisclosed orders is measured by s and d as described
in Section 3.3.4. We employ two, three and four categories for small-spread, medium-
spread and large-spread stocks, respectively. Censored observations are defined as in
Section 3.3.3. For each group we show cross-sectional statistics on total numbers (over
all trading days).
Cate- Distance # Observation (×103) Censored Obs. (%) % Buy Orders (%)
gory (ticks) max. mean min. max. mean min. max. mean min.
Aggressiveness measured by the distance to the own side quote (s)
Spread group: small
“1” st > 0 147.65 29.32 1.71 96.5 83.3 26.2 52.7 49.8 45.5
“2” st ≤ 0 15.33 3.42 0.46 50.6 19.9 5.5 62.7 50.2 43.3
Spread group: medium
“1” st > 1 357.27 50.02 7.20 98.8 96.0 92.6 57.0 50.0 44.1
“2” st = 1 91.33 21.22 3.91 97.0 87.1 65.1 56.9 49.9 44.2
“3” st ≤ 0 63.17 7.895 1.12 83.3 65.0 41.2 58.4 48.5 43.6
Spread group: large
“1” st > 3 623.82 76.58 12.13 99.8 97.8 90.6 56.1 50.5 44.7
“2” st = 2, 3 193.84 17.04 0.40 98.6 86.4 38.2 56.8 51.2 47.7
“3” st = 1 107.46 9.48 0.33 90.2 64.7 23.0 56.0 49.0 43.6
“4” st ≤ 0 121.38 10.03 0.77 94.9 81.3 60.0 57.3 49.3 42.1
Aggressiveness measured by the distance to the opposite side quote (d)
Spread group: small
“1” dt = 1 156.96 31.12 2.07 94.1 75.2 22.4 54.4 49.8 45.1
“2” dt > 1 15.19 1.62 0.10 98.0 87.5 69.6 71.5 51.3 37.2
Spread group: medium
“1” dt = 1 327.35 57.75 9.89 97.5 93.2 86.3 55.6 50.0 45.0
“2” dt = 2 80.48 11.27 1.97 95.8 88.1 77.9 54.9 48.9 40.9
“3” dt > 2 99.99 10.11 0.94 93.7 81.3 52.5 61.0 50.4 39.2
Spread group: large
“1” dt = 1 561.97 61.63 12.96 99.8 97.2 92.1 55.4 50.4 42.5
“2” dt = 2 174.53 17.44 2.89 99.7 93.9 82.7 55.8 50.0 39.6
“3” dt = 3, 4 162.94 16.73 1.51 99.3 89.6 68.4 56.3 49.9 41.1
“4” dt > 4 147.06 17.34 0.64 98.0 82.0 46.4 77.4 52.0 41.7
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Table 3.4
Definitions of LOB control variables hidden orders on the buy side
“Aggressive limit orders” are defined as limit orders undercutting the prevailing best
quote. “Fleeting orders” are defined as limit orders that are canceled within one second
after the submission.
SPR ≡ log(best ask/best bid)
DPO ≡ log(depth at best bid)
DPG ≡ log(depth at best ask)
TY P ≡ 1 if the prevailing trade is seller-initiated; −1 otherwise
RET ≡ log return over the prevailing 5 minutes
V OL ≡ market price range (maximum - minimum) over the prevailing 5 minutes
HV O ≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden bid depth during the prevailing 1
minute)
HV O5≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden bid depth during the prevailing 5
minutes)
HRO ≡ HV O −HV O5
HVG ≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden ask depth during the prevailing 1
minute)
HVG5≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden ask depth during the prevailing 5
minutes)
HRG ≡ HVG−HVG5
ALO ≡ log(1+ number of aggressive buy limit orders that are not canceled during
the prevailing 3 minutes)
ALG ≡ log(1+ number of aggressive sell limit orders that are not canceled during
the prevailing 3 minutes)
HFO ≡ log(1+ number of fleeting buy orders during the prevailing 3 minutes)
HFG ≡ log(1+ number of fleeting sell orders during the prevailing 3 minutes)
OPN ≡ 1 trading before 10 : 30; 0, otherwise.
CLS ≡ 1 trading after 15 : 00; 0, otherwise.
Secondly, more than 90% of all observations are censored in the sense of reflecting only
the upper bound of aggressiveness of hidden depth. Thirdly, the number of observations
on the buy and sell side are very similar.
Finally, note that we label the underlying categories in a consistent way with the
least aggressive categories being associated with the highest label and the most aggressive
category being associated with the lowest label.
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3.3.5 Capturing Market Conditions
To test our postulated hypotheses and to relate the usage of undisclosed orders to pre-
vailing market conditions, we construct different variables representing various states of
the market. Table 3.4 gives the exact definitions of constructed variables used for hidden
order submissions on the buy side.
For statistical inference on the sell side, we modify some of the variables as follows:
DPO ≡ log(depth at best ask)
DPG ≡ log(depth at best bid)
TY P ≡ 1 if the prevailing trade is buyer-initiated; −1 otherwise
RET ≡ negative log return over the prevailing 5 minutes
HV O ≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden ask depth during the prevailing 1 minute)
HV O5≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden ask depth during the prevailing 5
minutes)
HVG ≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden bid depth during the prevailing 1 minute)
HVG5≡ log(1+volume of executed hidden bid depth during the prevailing 5
minutes)
ALO ≡ log(1+ number of aggressive sell limit orders that are not canceled during
the prevailing 3 minutes)
ALG ≡ log(1+ number of aggressive buy limit orders that are not canceled during
the prevailing 3 minutes)
HFO ≡ log(1+ number of fleeting sell orders during the prevailing 3 minutes)
HFG ≡ log(1+ number of fleeting buy orders during the prevailing 3 minutes)
The prevailing LOB state is represented by the visible bid-ask spread (SPR), reflect-
ing the transaction costs of immediate trading, the visible depth on the best level on the
own side (DPO) and the visible depth on the best level on the opposite side (DPG).
To capture the impact of prevailing trade signals, we include a dummy variable (TY P )
representing the most recent trading direction and the prevailing five-minute mid-quote
return (RET ) capturing short-term price movements. Moreover, local price volatility
(V OL) is included in terms of the (max/min) range of trade prices during the last 5
minutes. Information on hidden depth is incorporated by the short-run executed hidden
depth on the own side and the opposite side (HV O, HVG), representing how successfully
traders have detected pending hidden depth. Moreover, to assess the relative intensity
of temporary hidden order executions, we compute the executed hidden depth during
the last minute relative to that executed during the last five minutes (HRO, HRG).
Moreover, HFT activities are captured by two variables, HFO and HFG, which are the
number of fleeting orders on the own side and the opposite side, respectively. Defined as
in Hasbrouck and Saar (2009), a “fleeting order” is a limit order that is canceled within
one second after the submission and thus is posted to “test” for the existence of hidden
volume. Using the intensity of fleeting orders as a proxy for HFT activities is inspired by
Hendershortt, Jones, and Menkveld (2010). To differentiate between fleeting orders and
“normal” limit orders, we also include the number of aggressive limit orders that have
not been canceled (ALO, ALG) and thus represent the frequency of quote updating by
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low frequency traders. Finally, OPN and CLS are dummy variables representing the
opening and closure period. To be able to aggregate estimates across the market, all
variables (expect for dummies, i.e., TY P , OPN and CLS) are normalized to have zero
mean and unit standard deviation.
3.4 Econometric Modelling
The chosen categorizations straightforwardly motivate modeling hidden order locations
based on an ordered response model. This has several advantages: Firstly, censored ob-
servations are straightforwardly taken into account. Secondly, relating market condition
variables (as constructed in the previous section) to order categories rather than to plain
distances s and d, requires imposing less assumptions on functional form (e.g., linearity)
and allows reducing the impact of extreme observations (e.g., executions against hidden
depth deep in the book). Thirdly, given the high number of observations (combined
with a significant cross-sectional dimension), a reduction of the computational burden
is crucial to make the approach tractable. In fact, exploiting the Gaussianity and global
concavity of objective functions in an ordered probit model allows to significantly re-
duce computation time in contrast to, for instance, a (censored) count data model (e.g.,
negative binomial model) for the variables s or d.
Therefore, we propose modelling hidden order placements using a censored ordered
probit model. In order to test our hypotheses, it is sufficient to utilize only order messages
which provide information (censored or non-censored) on the location of undisclosed
volume. Consequently, the model is not estimated based on the continuous time series
of all order book messages but only based on the observations revealing hidden order
information. In this sense, we do not require a dynamic (e.g., autoregressive) approach
as all information on the current and prevailing state of the market is captured by
corresponding regressors.
3.4.1 An Ordered Probit Model with Censoring
Let yt denote the discrete ordered label representing the underlying categories of undis-
closed order placements as described in Section 3.3.4. It is driven by a continuous latent





1, if y∗t ≤ γ1




J − 1, if γJ−2 < y∗t ≤ γJ−1




where J is the number of categories and γj , j = 1, . . . , J−1 denote unknown thresholds.
Furthermore, y∗t is given by
y∗t = β
′xt + εt (3.2)
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with xt being a (K × 1) vector of regressors as defined in Section 3.3.5, β is a vector of
unknown parameters and εt denotes an i.i.d. standard normally distributed variable. If






Φ(γ1 − β′xt) if yt = 1,
Φ(γj − β′xt)− Φ(γj−1 − β′xt) if yt ∈ {2, . . . , j, . . . , J − 1},
1− Φ(γJ−1 − β′xt) if yt = J ,
(3.3)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.
In cases, where yt is not directly observable but only a censored outcome ỹt related to
yt (according to the scenarios described in Figure 3.3 and 3.4) by
ỹt = j, if yt ∈ {j + 1, . . . , J}, (3.4)
the likelihood function is given by
LCt =
{
1− Φ(γj − β′x) if ỹt = j and j = 1, . . . , J − 2,
1− Φ(γJ−1 − β′x) if ỹt ≥ J − 1.
(3.5)








where ζU and ζC denote the index sets of uncensored and censored observations, respec-
tively.













= φ(γJ−1 − β′x)β,
(3.7)
which are commonly evaluated at the sample mean x̄.
In case of the dummy variables xd, we compute the marginal effects as
∆Fj = P(y = j|x(xd=1),γ,β)− P(y = j|x(xd=0),γ,β), (3.8)
where x(xd=i) is a vector with the dummy variable xd set to i and all other elements
being equal to x. Appendix B.1 gives the asymptotic distribution of q̂j and ∆F̂j , the
maximum likelihood estimator for qj and ∆Fj , respectively.
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3.4.2 Cross-Sectional Aggregation
We estimate the econometric model on a stock-by-stock basis. For the sake of brevity and
compactness of presentation, we aggregate the corresponding estimates across stocks. To
explicitly account for differences in estimation precision, we assess the cross-sectional sta-
tistical significance relying on a Bayesian framework attributable to DuMouchel (1994)
and further implemented by Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009). As-
sume that a parameter estimate associated with stock i, β̂i, is normally distributed with
β̂i ∼ i.i.d.N(βi, s2i )
and
βi ∼ i.i.d.N(β, σ2),
where s2i is the estimated variance of parameter i and variances σ
2 are estimated by
maximum likelihood. Then, the aggregated estimate β is obtained by summing up the
























We estimate separate models for both ask and bid hidden orders for categorizations based
on both distance measures s and d. Hence, covering 99 stocks over the cross-section of the
market, we estimate 396 models in total. Table 3.5 presents the ordered probit estimates
aggregated across all stocks. Recall that lower category labels are associated with a
higher hidden order aggressiveness, thus negative coefficients reflect that undisclosed
orders are set (marginally) deeper in the spread. To assess the explanatory power, we








t − ȳ∗)2 + T
(3.10)
where ŷ∗t is the fitted value of the latent variable y
∗







Moreover, to provide also insights into the cross-sectional variation of estimates we
show histograms of the significant estimates (5% significance level) in Figures B.1 to




Ordered probit estimates of hidden order locations on the bid and ask side depending
on categorized distance measures s and d as discussed in Section 3.3.4. The order ag-
gressiveness is declining with the category label, thus negative coefficients are associated
with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99 NASDAQ stocks during the period of Oc-
tober 2010 with 21 trading days, reported estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) are
cross-sectional aggregates across all stocks using the Bayesian framework of DuMouchel
(1994). The reported R2 is McKelvey and Zaviona’s (1975) pseudo R2.
Undisclosed bid limit orders Undisclosed ask limit orders
Neg. distance s Distance d Neg. distance s Distance d
SPR 0.04 (1.1) 1.37 (29.0) 0.06 (1.7) 1.34 (32.2)
DPO −0.13 (−7.2) 0.01 (2.0) −0.12 (−7.0) 0.02 (2.5)
DPG 0.00 (0.1) −0.06 (−6.5) −0.01 (−0.9) −0.06 (−6.6)
TY P 0.06 (4.7) 0.10 (7.1) 0.07 (4.9) 0.11 (7.9)
RET −0.09 (−11.0) −0.10 (−11.0) −0.08 (−12.9) 0.10 (−12.2)
V OL 0.01 (1.7) 0.01 (1.9) 0.03 (2.6) 0.02 (2.4)
HV O −0.40 (−28.3) −0.36 (−32.9) −0.43 (−27.4) −0.39 (−35.7)
HRO 0.17 (14.7) 0.14 (15.7) 0.18 (17.4) 0.16 (16.4)
HVG −0.01 (−0.9) −0.02 (−3.2) −0.00 (−0.3) −0.01 (−1.1)
HRG 0.03 (4.8) 0.03 (6.6) 0.03 (4.4) 0.03 (4.5)
ALO 0.04 (6.1) 0.01 (2.4) 0.04 (8.4) 0.02 (3.0)
ALG 0.03 (5.2) 0.02 (3.7) 0.04 (7.3) 0.03 (5.0)
HFO 0.07 (6.7) 0.03 (2.6) 0.08 (6.6) 0.03 (2.7)
HFG 0.15 (10.6) 0.11 (11.1) 0.18 (14.2) 0.15 (14.5)
OPN −0.01 (−0.3) 0.11 (2.8) −0.04 (−1.0) 0.07 (1.8)
CLS 0.14 (5.7) 0.17 (5.9) 0.13 (5.2) 0.14 (4.7)
Pseudo-R2 0.29 0.67 0.31 0.68
Section 3.4.2, are generally close to the averages of significant estimates as these esti-
mates are more precise and have more weight in eq. (3.9). Finally, (Bayesian averaged)
estimates of marginal effects for the individual groups of low-, medium- and large-spread
stocks are given in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.
In the following, we will discuss the individual results in light of the testable hypothe-
ses formulated in Section 3.2.3. As estimates of parameters and marginal effects are not
always straightforward to interpret, we partly illustrate the resulting effects graphically.
For the sake of brevity, we will discuss the findings for undisclosed orders on the buy
(bid) side only. The corresponding effects on the ask side are strongly symmetric.
3.5.1 Hidden Order Placements in Dependence of Spread
Sizes
We find that the size of the bid-ask spread (SPR) has a significant impact on the prob-
ability of hidden order placements inside of the spread. The marginal effects associated
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Table 3.6
Marginal effects: Aggressiveness of undisclosed orders according to their distance to the
own side (distance measure s as shown in Section 3.3.4)
The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label, thus negative coefficients
are associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99 NASDAQ stocks during
the period of October 2010 with 21 trading days, reported estimates are cross-sectional
aggregates using the Bayesian framework of DuMouchel (1994) for the underlying groups
of small-, medium- and large-spread stocks. The marginal effects are evaluated at the
sample mean. Significant estimates (5% level) are highlighted in the bold font. All values
are given in percentages.
Small spread Medium spread Large spread
P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 3] P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 3] P[y = 4]
Panel A: Undisclosed buy limit orders
SPR -6.68 6.76 0.22 0.44 -0.69 0.21 4.76 2.06 -7.30
DPO 5.54 -5.68 0.32 0.65 -1.02 0.10 1.39 0.50 -2.30
DPG -0.23 0.46 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.54 -0.20 0.87
TY P -2.10 2.24 -0.15 -0.38 0.60 0.06 1.01 0.15 -1.40
RET 0.66 -0.78 0.37 0.76 -1.17 0.11 1.82 0.64 -2.86
V OL 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.19 0.32 -0.01 -0.32 -0.02 0.37
HV O 5.41 -5.64 2.02 4.04 -6.28 0.39 5.97 2.96 -9.63
HRO -1.04 1.10 -0.82 -1.76 2.75 -0.15 -2.47 -1.41 4.35
HVG -0.52 0.80 0.06 0.21 -0.32 0.04 1.11 0.26 -1.50
HRG -0.13 0.13 -0.09 -0.20 0.34 -0.07 -1.00 -0.27 1.54
ALO -0.17 0.18 -0.14 -0.32 0.51 -0.04 -0.52 -0.05 0.94
ALG -0.64 0.69 -0.14 -0.29 0.45 -0.01 -0.14 -0.05 0.24
HFO -0.67 0.69 -0.22 -0.61 1.01 -0.04 -0.74 -0.16 1.15
HFG -0.74 0.83 -0.73 -1.55 2.39 -0.20 -3.09 -1.37 5.09
OPN 0.51 -0.63 0.01 0.11 -0.21 0.02 0.17 -1.43 1.44
CLS 0.13 -0.19 -0.86 -1.79 2.79 -0.09 -2.22 -1.89 4.91
Panel B: Undisclosed sell limit orders
SPR -6.01 6.05 0.09 0.40 -0.49 0.25 4.28 1.07 -5.76
DPO 5.34 -5.45 0.35 0.75 -1.20 0.10 1.45 0.54 -2.26
DPG -0.74 0.76 0.06 0.20 -0.31 -0.04 -0.61 -0.14 0.87
TY P -2.63 2.92 -0.23 -0.52 0.95 0.10 1.28 0.20 -1.66
RET 0.50 -0.52 0.39 0.82 -1.25 0.11 1.58 0.47 -2.39
V OL -0.22 0.24 -0.13 -0.31 0.49 -0.00 -0.11 0.07 0.04
HV O 5.68 -5.86 2.49 4.78 -7.47 0.44 6.61 2.92 -10.26
HRO -1.19 1.21 -0.98 -1.95 3.13 -0.17 -2.84 -1.52 4.72
HVG -0.28 0.30 0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.91 0.15 -1.25
HRG -0.11 0.11 -0.14 -0.31 0.46 -0.05 -0.79 -0.15 1.14
ALO -0.17 0.17 -0.25 -0.49 0.81 -0.01 -0.66 -0.26 1.13
ALG -0.59 0.65 -0.05 -0.21 0.30 -0.00 -0.49 -0.15 0.77
HFO -0.66 0.68 -0.20 -0.52 0.81 -0.04 -1.31 -0.54 2.29
HFG -1.04 1.09 -0.97 -2.01 3.11 -0.24 -3.49 -1.49 5.57
OPN 0.82 -0.86 -0.52 -0.84 1.02 0.10 1.87 0.60 -2.93
CLS 0.34 -0.41 -1.01 -2.13 3.35 -0.13 -2.24 -0.95 3.76
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Table 3.7
Marginal effects: Aggressiveness of undisclosed orders according to their distance to the
opposite side (distance measure d as shown in Section 3.3.4)
The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label, thus negative coefficients
are associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99 NASDAQ stocks during
the period of October 2010 with 21 trading days, reported estimates are cross-sectional
aggregates using the Bayesian framework of DuMouchel (1994) for the underlying groups
of small-, medium- and large-spread stocks. The marginal effects are evaluated at the
sample mean. Significant estimates (5% level) are highlighted in boldfat. All values are
given in percentages.
Small spread Medium spread Large spread
P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 3] P[y = 1] P[y = 2] P[y = 3] P[y = 4]
Panel A: Undisclosed buy limit orders
SPR -27.33 28.35 -4.10 -8.93 13.46 -0.20 -5.06 -5.55 11.42
DPO -0.11 0.11 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
DPG 1.08 -1.22 0.10 0.20 -0.33 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.04
TY P -1.47 4.34 -0.25 -0.54 0.85 -0.01 0.02 0.12 -0.12
RET 0.05 -0.07 0.29 0.64 -0.98 0.06 0.59 0.68 -1.35
V OL 0.09 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
HV O 6.88 -6.89 1.26 2.58 -3.92 0.08 1.26 1.45 -2.92
HRO -0.38 0.51 -0.44 -0.92 1.46 -0.00 -0.38 -0.46 1.04
HVG 0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.16 -0.24 0.02 0.15 0.21 -0.42
HRG -0.06 0.06 -0.07 -0.16 0.25 -0.01 -0.08 -0.14 0.28
ALO -0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02
ALG -0.26 0.33 -0.03 -0.12 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.10
HFO -0.18 0.19 -0.04 -0.15 0.22 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.27
HFG -0.28 0.31 -0.38 -0.85 1.32 -0.06 -0.27 -0.39 0.84
OPN 0.33 -0.37 0.05 0.42 -0.73 -0.08 -1.79 -1.78 3.91
CLS 0.09 -0.10 -0.26 -0.60 0.98 -0.02 -1.22 -1.36 2.82
Panel B: Undisclosed sell limit orders
SPR -25.00 27.46 -4.44 -8.56 13.55 -0.31 -5.67 -6.28 13.07
DPO -0.27 0.27 -0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.04
DPG 1.02 -1.11 0.15 0.25 -0.41 -0.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.05
TY P -1.78 2.34 -0.27 -0.62 1.07 0.00 0.06 0.06 -0.08
RET 0.29 -0.31 0.25 0.60 -0.92 0.01 0.57 0.62 -1.30
V OL -0.03 0.08 -0.01 -0.07 0.09 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
HV O 6.38 -6.71 1.61 2.81 -4.61 0.03 1.64 1.68 -3.74
HRO -0.81 0.85 -0.49 -1.02 1.66 -0.00 -0.45 -0.55 1.26
HVG -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.00 0.09 0.13 -0.22
HRG -0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.16 0.23 -0.02 -0.11 -0.16 0.30
ALO -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.11 -0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.15
ALG -0.24 0.28 -0.01 -0.10 0.14 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.05
HFO -0.31 0.33 -0.05 -0.15 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.03 -0.13
HFG -0.58 0.64 -0.60 -1.11 1.82 -0.00 -0.60 -0.64 1.50
OPN 0.49 -0.66 0.27 0.58 -1.05 -0.02 -0.63 -0.82 1.47
CLS 0.27 -0.30 -0.21 -0.44 0.74 -0.02 -1.02 -1.19 2.55
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with the hidden order distance to the own side shown in Table 3.6 indicate that the
effect is negative for small-spread stocks but is positive for large-spread stocks.4 In par-
ticular, for small spread stocks, one standard deviation increase of the spread implies
a decrease of the probability of hidden depth inside of the spread (category y = 1) by
approximately 6.7%. This finding supports the notion of liquidity-induced order place-
ment which tends to be reduced if the spread widens and thus uncertainty rises (Hy-
pothesis (1.A)). However, we find converse evidence for large-spread stocks where the
probability of hidden depth inside of the spread increases by approximately 7.3% if the
spread widens by one standard deviation. This in line with Hypothesis (1.B) suggesting
that hidden order placements in (wider) spreads tends to be rather information-driven
than liquidity-driven.
Hence, we show that hidden order strategies tend to be different in low-spread stocks
compared to those in large-spread stocks. This might be explained by different motiva-
tions and types of market participants driving trading in small-spread vs. large-spread
stocks. In particular, we conclude from our findings that liquidity traders are more
likely to use aggressive hidden orders in small-spread stocks, but informed traders in
high-spread stocks. We explain this by two reasonings. Firstly, small-spread stocks are
generally more liquid. This makes it harder to hold informational advantage over a longer
time period. Consequently, informed traders prefer visible orders or reserve orders which
have time priority compared to hidden orders. In large-spread stocks, however, there
is more room to exploit and camouflage informational advantage which make hidden
orders more attractive than visible orders. Secondly, in small-spread stocks, the grid of
available tick points available for improving the quote is typically too limited. Therefore,
even the most passive hidden order inside of the spread can be still too aggressive for an
informed traders.
Measuring the aggressiveness of hidden depth in terms of the distance to the opposite
side of the market (measure d), we find an overall negative effect. Hence, as shown by
the estimates in Tables 3.5 and 3.7, an undisclosed order is placed further away from
the opposite side when the spread widens. This effect is consistent with the findings for
small-spread stocks based on measure s, but it seems to be a contradiction of the results
for large-spread stocks. However, as the categorizations of the two distance measures are
partially overlapping, this seeming contradiction is explained by an increasing clustering
of aggressive hidden orders in regions close to the own side. The underlying mechanism
is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.7 showing how the hidden depth concentrates more
significantly on the own side if the spread widens. Intuitively, (informed) traders use
hidden orders to compete for the provision of liquidity with own-side liquidity suppli-
ers (and thus increase execution probabilities) while still balancing picking-off risks by
remaining sufficiently “passive”. As a consequence of symmetric effects for sell orders,
we can conclude that the “hidden” spread is positively correlated with the observable
spread.
4As the estimates reported in Table 3.5 are aggregates across all stocks, they turn out to be
insignificant.
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Figure 3.7: Stylized illustration of the effect of a widening of bid-ask spreads on hidden
order placements for large-spread stocks. Left: scenario of a narrow spread; right:
scenario of a wide spread. This illustration shows the effect of an increasing hidden
order aggressiveness in terms of the distance to the own-side quote, coming along with
a decreasing hidden order aggressiveness in terms of the distance to the opposite-side
quote.
3.5.2 (How) Does Hidden Liquidity Compete with Visible
Liquidity Provision?
Analyzing the effects of visible on-side depth on the best quotes (DPO), we find a clear
confirmation of Hypothesis (2.A). Hence, the probability of hidden depth inside of the
spread is positively related to the own side visible depth. Table 3.6 reports that the
probability of using aggressive hidden bid limit orders increases by approximately 5.5%
(2.3%) as the visible depth at the best bid increases by one standard deviation. Hence,
traders increase the aggressiveness of hidden orders in order to compete for the provision
of liquidity and thus to increase execution probabilities. We again observe contradicting
effects for the two underlying distance measures in the case of small-spread stocks leading
to the same effects as illustrated in Figure 3.7. Hence, in case of small-spread stocks
offering not much room for (hidden) quote improvements, a higher (visible) own-side
depth leads to a stronger clustering of hidden orders close to the own-side quote.
While Hypothesis (2.A) is clearly confirmed, we do not find supporting evidence for
Hypothesis (2.B). Indeed, Table 3.6 reports that the distribution of hidden depth tends
to move to the own side as the visible depth on the opposite side (DPG) increases in
large-spread stocks, while no significant change takes place in small-spread stocks. This
evidence is in line with the notion that hidden liquidity suppliers tend to reduce adverse
selection risk if the price pressure on the opposite side becomes too high. This effect
obviously overcompensates traders’ motivation to increase execution risk by becoming
more aggressive.
Measuring the aggressiveness of hidden depth in terms of the distance to the opposite-
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Figure 3.8: Stylized illustration of the effect of an increase of visible ask depth on
undisclosed buy order placements for medium-spread stocks. Left: scenario of a less
visible depth ; right: scenario of a huge visible depth. This illustration shows the effect
of an increasing hidden order aggressiveness in terms of the distance to the opposite-side
quote, coming along with no significant effects on the hidden order aggressiveness in
terms of the distance to the own-side quote.
Figure 3.9: Stylized illustration of the effect of an increase of visible ask depth on
undisclosed buy order placements for large-spread stocks. Left: scenario of a less visible
depth ; right: scenario of a huge visible depth. This illustration shows the effect of
an decreasing hidden order aggressiveness in terms of the distance to the opposite-side
quote, coming along with no significant effects on the hidden order aggressiveness in
terms of the distance to the opposite-side quote.
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side quote (measure d), we find positive effects in small- and medium-spread stocks. As
shown by the estimates in Tables 3.5 and 3.7, an undisclosed order is placed closer to
the opposite side when the opposite side visible depth increases. The seeming contradic-
tion to estimates in Table 3.6 implying no significant effects could be explained by the
increasing use of reserve orders and the partially overlapping categories. We graphically
illustrate the underlying mechanism in Figure 3.8 showing how traders update the own-
side quote by the reserve order. A similar explanation can be reasoned for the seeming
contradiction of estimates in large-spread stocks as well (Figure 3.9). The finding sup-
ports Buti and Rindi (2011)’s theoretical prediction that the use of reserve orders, rather
than hidden orders, increases with the opposite-side visible depth. Pardo Tornero and
Pascual (2007) and De Winne and D’Hondt (2007) find similar evidence for the Spanish
Stock Exchange and Euronext Paris where only reserve orders but not hidden orders
can be used.
3.5.3 Hidden Order Placements After Price Movements
and Trading Signals
We show that the aggressiveness of hidden bid depth decreases when the prevailing
trade is seller-initiated (TYP). In particular, the hidden bid depth shifts away from the
ask side. This reduces liquidity suppliers’ risk of being picked off by (eventually better
informed) sellers but increases their risk of non-execution. Conversely, in case of a buy
market order, hidden liquidity supply on the bid side increases and moves toward the ask
side. Hence, liquidity suppliers follow trading directions in the sense that they post more
aggressively and thus increase execution probabilities without facing too high adverse
selection risk (as long as buy pressure dominates).
In this sense, Hypothesis (3.A) is confirmed. Besides economic reasoning, a pure
mechanical effect may further drive the results. In particular, as a sell trade itself
absorbs pending aggressive undisclosed buy limit orders, the aggressiveness of hidden
bid depth temporarily decreases. This effect, however, is only true in case of trades
arriving instantaneously before the observation of interest. But as our estimates utilize
all order messages revealing information on hidden orders (occurring on average 30 times
more frequently than trades), these mechanical effects apply only infrequently.
Analyzing the effects of recent price movements (RET ) on hidden order placements,
we find similar effects and supportive evidence in favor of Hypothesis (3.B). Accordingly,
the aggressiveness of undisclosed bid orders increases as prices have been moved upwards.
Specifically, the probability of hidden orders inside of the spread increases approximately
2.9% when the return increases by one standard deviation. Moreover, the estimates in
Table 3.5 show that hidden bid depth moves closer to the ask side. Again, this supports
liquidity suppliers’ motivation to reduce the risk of non-execution. Conversely, in case of
prevailing negative price movements, hidden liquidity placements on the bid side become
less aggressive with the hidden depth distribution shifting away from the ask side. As
postulated in Section 3.2.3, this is explained by protection against picking-off risks in
case prices continue moving downwards.
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Interestingly, no clear confirmation of Hypothesis (4) is found. We do not find
significant impacts of prevailing return volatility. According to our estimates, hidden
order aggressiveness even tends to increase in volatile market periods. However, in most
cases, these effects are insignificant.
3.5.4 Competition for Hidden Liquidity Provision
Our estimates show clear evidence for hidden liquidity competition. According to the
estimates associated with the effects of own-side hidden liquidity supply (HV O), we
support Hypothesis (5). In particular, Table 3.6 reports that the probability of hidden
bid depth inside of the spread increases by approximately 10% as the execution of hidden
bid volume during the last minute increases by one standard deviation. This effect is
supported by the estimates in Table 3.7 indicating that hidden liquidity shifts closer to
the opposite side of the market. Hence, according to the reasoning motivating Hypothe-
sis (5), liquidity suppliers provide further hidden volume if they realize liquidity demand
from the opposite side and competition on their own side.
Our estimates show that these effects prevail as long as adverse selection risk does
not become too high. Indeed, when the prevailing one minute hidden depth execution
becomes too high compared to the corresponding activities during the last five minutes
(HRO), hidden order aggressiveness tends to decline. In this situation, price pressure
from the opposite side becomes too strong and makes adverse selection risk too high.
Studying the effect of hidden order detections on the opposite side of the market, we
find slight evidence for the effect that trading against hidden sell orders also increases
the hidden order aggressiveness on the bid side. This might be explained by the fact
that buy market orders make buy hidden orders (relatively) less aggressive and move
away hidden ask quotes. This, in turn, gives hidden liquidity suppliers on the bid side
more room for quote improvements and thus the reduction of non-execution risks.
3.5.5 Hidden Order Placements and HFT
Analyzing the effects of HFT (approximated by the intensity of fleeting orders) on hidden
order submissions, we find strong empirical support for Hypothesis (6). Indeed, the more
opposite-side traders try to detect hidden liquidity by “pinging activities” (HFG), the
lower the hidden order aggressiveness. Especially for large-spread stocks, an one standard
deviation increase of HFT activities on the ask side implies a decrease of the probability
of hidden bid depth placements inside of the spread by more than 5%. Consequently,
the distribution of hidden depth moves away from the opposite quote. Hence, traders
interpret the rapid cancellations of limit orders as signals for hidden liquidity detection
strategies rather than true liquidity supply. These results are in line with empirical
evidence reported by Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) and the predictions by Buti and Rindi
(2011) showing that hidden order placements become non-attractive if hidden depth is
easily detected.
Note that the effects on the distribution of the entire hidden depth (as reported in
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Table 3.7) are substantially smaller than those on hidden depth inside of the spread (as
revealed by Table 3.6). This finding also supports the theoretical prediction by Buti and
Rindi (2011) that reserve orders, rather than hidden orders, are dominantly used when
parasitic traders utilize front running strategies.
3.5.6 Intraday Patterns
We find no clear confirmation of Hypothesis (7.A) postulating a higher hidden order
aggressiveness during or after the opening period. Actually, our findings for small-spread
stocks support the hypothesis, while it is rejected for large-spread stocks. However, clear
evidence for Hypothesis (7.B) is shown. Indeed, for large-spread stocks, we find that
the probability for hidden bid depth placements within the spread in the hour before
market closure is approximately 5% lower than during the rest of the day. This supports
the economic reasoning that displayed orders are preferred if the time horizon becomes
shorter and the importance of time priority rises.
3.6 Conclusion
Many stock exchanges around the world choose to reduce market transparency by al-
lowing traders to hide a portion of their order size. As a consequence trading under
limited pre-trade transparency becomes increasingly popular in financial markets. Pre-
vious studies in the literature examine opaque markets with only partially undisclosed
orders. This study sheds light on traders’ use of completely undisclosed orders in elec-
tronic trading, based on a sample of 99 stocks traded on NASDAQ during October
2010.
Employing NASDAQ TotalView message data, we retrieve information on hidden
depths from the visible order activities and propose an ordered response approach with
censoring mechanism for modelling the hidden order locations conditional on the state of
market. Our finding shows that the hidden liquidity supply has significantly correlation
to the market conditions and thus is predictable in terms of the state of the prevailing
(visible) LOB and order flow. The evidence suggests that traders make their undisclosed
order submission strategies by balancing the non-execution risk and picking-off risk.
Our findings are of interest to academics and institutional trading desks. A better
understanding of traders’ decisions on using undisclosed orders could help theorists in
developing comprehensive models on trader behaviour in opaque markets with both hid-
den order types. Moreover, these results provide useful insights for institutional traders
who are obligated to acquire a big position. They may benefit by either improving their
undisclosed order submission strategies or searching for hidden depths on the opposite
side of the market more efficiently.
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Chapter 4
Extracting Information from the
Message Stream
This chapter is based on Huang and Polak (2011).
4.1 Introduction
An electronic limit order market is an order-driven market which automatically collects
orders from traders in a centralized limit order book (LOB) and matches corresponding
buy and sell orders based on specific priority rules, very often the price-time priority
rule. Currently, most equity exchanges around the world are either pure electronic limit
order markets, e.g. NYSE Arca, BATS, Euronext, Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and
Direct Edge, or at least allow for customer limit orders in addition to on-exchange market
making, e.g. NASDAQ, NYSE and the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The traditional
monopolistic power of market makers in the area of liquidity provision through quoting
on both sides of the market has been strongly restricted, if not completely eliminated.
Instead, the important task of providing liquidity is now assigned to the complex trading
interactions enabled by the emergence and disclosure of the LOB. Hence, the state of
the LOB is extremely important for practitioners, because it allows them to optimize
their trading strategies, but also for researchers who analyze trading activity in these
markets and try to interpret the underlying economic motivation.
One of the most prominent market structure developments in recent years is high
frequency (“HF”) trading. HF traders in general employ extremely quick and sophisti-
cated computer programs for generating, routing and executing orders. They establish
and liquidate positions in very short time-frames by submitting numerous orders and
cancelling non-executed orders shortly after submission. As a consequence, the trading
volume grows, orders shrink in size and the pace of LOB updating is beyond human
perception, requiring nanosecond precisions. The volume of information about orders
recorded by market organizers therefore dramatically increases.
More than ever before researchers today face the challenge of working with real
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datasets on micro-structure level of financial markets. They are in general not difficult
to obtain, but very difficult to process. One way of going about it is acquiring snapshots
of historical LOB data. But this is very impractical, because such datasets are usually
very large and contain only incomplete information1. The second option is to acquire
much better compressed raw message stream data, like TotalView-ITCH and Multicast
PITCH data. Because message data record all visible order activities, i.e. limit order
submissions, cancellations and executions, they can be used to reconstruct the historical
LOB up to any required precision (level). However, this creates a different type of
challenge; it is necessary to reconstruct the LOB using the same rules that were used
by the matching algorithm applied by the exchange. Although simple in principle, such
algorithms need to take into account market-specific issues and, considering the large
volume of data, work extremely efficiently.
In this chapter, we present you the LOBSTER, a program framework for reconstruct-
ing LOBs as well as extracting order flow information from historical message stream
data. Note that the fundamental limit order activities are quite similar across different
limit order markets, though the specific trading rules can be very different. We mod-
ularize LOBSTER to processes limit order activities translated from messages instead
of messages themselves, so that it can be easily adapted to data from new limit order
markets with just a few modifications. The underlying data structure in these modules is
highly optimized and their programs are exhaustively tested to guarantee the reliability
of the output data and the efficiency of the entire system.
Currently we implement a translation module for NASDAQ TotalView-ITCH mes-
sage and a web-based interface. Researchers around the world can easily access our
program through http://lobster.wiwi.hu-berlin.de and download NASDAQ LOB
data reconstructed on the fly. Moreover, a related forum facilitates general discussion
on empirical analysis of LOB, as well as bundles of small programs and useful tools in
both R and Matlab.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we take the
NASDAQ TotalView-ITCH as an example to illustrate the structure of order-related
messages in message stream data. Section 4.3 gives the overview of the design of the
LOBSTER. We discuss in detail on two implemented modules, the LOB Constructor and
the Order Tracer, in Section 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Message Stream Data
As we already discussed above, unlike historical snapshots of the LOB, message-type data
allow reconstructing the full LOB and observing its dynamics with maximum precision.
This is indeed extremely valuable for academic research, giving the possibility to study
all aspects of trading in full detail. In this section, we will take the NASDAQ TotalView-
1Snapshots are made at regular time intervals, e.g. every second, which means that multiple
changes within this time intervals may be omitted. Should snapshots capture all changes in the




TotalView-ITCH includes messages representing submissions, executions and cancel-
lations of limit orders, as well as executions of hidden orders. A submission type limit
order message may or may not contain information identifying the market participant,
who submitted the order - Market Participant Identification (MPID). A type “P” mes-
sage reports the execution price and immediately traded quantity, i.e. only that part of
the hidden order, which is currently being executed against an incoming order. Thus no
information about the remaining unexecuted part of the hidden order is revealed.
Instruction Type Limit/Hidden Order Canc./Exe.
ID Price Size MPID size
Limit order submission A X X X
Limit order submission with MPID F X X X X
Limit order execution E X X
Limit order cancellation (partially) X X X
Limit order cancellation (totally) D X
Hidden order execution P X X X
ITCH 4.0 as an example to illustrate the structure of messages.
The original NASDAQ TotalView-ITCH is a direct data feed that contains market
messages for all submissions, cancellations and executions of limit orders, as well as
executions of hidden orders. TotalView-ITCH 4.0 data is the binary version of the
TotalView-ITCH data introduced in November 2008, following the ITCH 3.0 format.
This format is ready for nanosecond time stamps2 and contains longer order and trade
identification numbers allowing to mark up to 18 quadrillion messages per day.
Considering the enormous number of messages generated by the activities in mar-
kets every day, the TotalView message stream is designed to present information in a
parsimonious way, reducing redundancy in the records. Table 4.1 illustrates the mes-
sage types related to the instructions carried by orders. Whenever a market participant
submits a new order, its details, such as order ID, limit price and size, are recorded in
a submission message. If the market participant chooses to reveal her identity to other
market participants the submission message contains also her Market Participant Iden-
tification (MPID). All subsequent changes to the submitted limit order are also recorded
in the form of messages; messages reporting partial cancellations or executions (partial
or total) contain the same order ID as the original submission messages and the cancelled
or executed quantity. If the limit order is totally cancelled (deleted), TotalView records
only the corresponding order ID. Finally, messages reporting executions of hidden orders
contain only the price and the executed quantity, but not the total size of the originally
submitted hidden orders.
2The time resolution of trading in NASDAQ is still in milliseconds. Therefore, the time
stamps in the current data set have still millisecond precision rather than nanosecond.
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Figure 4.1: A sequence of messages related to the same limit order. The first part
of each message contains information about the length of the message. The second
part is the message type. Time stamp messages “T” record the number of seconds after
midnight. The third part of messages (except for time stamp messages) contains the time
in nanoseconds since the last time stamp message. The fourth part is the order ID. For
type “A” messages, the remaining fields contain: trade direction (buy/sell) indicator,
order size, stock ticker, limit price. Type “E” messages further contain information
about the executed size and a unique matching number.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of TAQ and one-level LOB generated by LOBSTER. The time
stamp is the number of milliseconds after midnight.
However, this parsimony raises challenges for researchers who intend to use To-
talView message data. Most messages contain only incomplete information for the cor-
responding order. Figure 4.1 illustrates a sequence of messages related to the same limit
order. Only the “A” message, which carries information about limit order submission,
contains information about limit price, size and trade direction of the limit order. There-
fore, before type “E” or “D” messages can be used by the algorithm to update the LOB,
we need to “trace back” the corresponding “A” message to retrieve the information.
Note also that ITCH records time stamps in two parts. The first part of a time stamp
is carried by a type “T” message, which records the number of seconds after midnight.
The second part is the number of nanoseconds since the last recorded second, recorded
in the third position of each message.
Compared to the Trades and Quotes Database (TAQ) released by NYSE, which con-
tains the best quotes and the corresponding depths, message data has richer information.
It records order activities, which pooled together comprise the quote prices and depths.
97
Figure 4.3: The overview of LOBSTER system. Three types of modules are used in
general. Readers (green) read the source data into the system; data Processors (purple)
retrieve the information; Writers (blue) write the output into the file system. For the
sake of flexibility Readers and Writers are normally implemented as interfaces.
Thanks to this superiority of information content message data can be used to recon-
struct the LOB up to any quote level. But even when looking only at the best quote
and depth, message data is richer than the usual data obtained from the TAQ database.
Message data contain information about limit orders which are cancelled shortly after
the submission. These limit orders are typically submitted in order to detect hidden liq-
uidity inside the spread rather than to provide liquidity (see e.g., Hasbrouck and Saar,
2009). Therefore, it is not surprising that TAQ ignores them as shown in Figure 4.2.
However, these orders are crucial for some studies, e.g the analysis of high frequency
trading strategies and hidden order submission strategies.
The currently implemented LOBSTER is connected to a storage facility containing
over 5 TB of historical TotalView-ITCH data, in ITCH 3.0 format from the period Jan
2007 to Apr 2009 and ITCH 4.0 format from the period May 2009 to Dec 2010. This
dataset contains only limit order messages. Other messages such as imbalance data
events and administrative messages have been cleaned out.
4.3 Overview of LOBSTER
The main goal of LOBSTER is to provide a reliable, efficient and flexible platform for
researchers to retrieve information from parsimonious message data. Relying on the
object-oriented concept, we designed LOBSTER as a modular system with three types
of modules: Readers(green), data Processors(purple) and Writers(blue) as shown in
Figure 4.3.
Reader translates data from an external source to a stream of order events, which is
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then processed by data Processors. Based on a unified abstract interface, different
readers can be created for reading different input formats, e.g. from different stock
exchanges. But also an order-flow simulator can act as a “Reader”, provided that
the generated data have the required format. Currently the system contains an
ITCH message Reader for reading binary ITCH files from the storage facility and
a test version PITCH Reader for BATS.
Data Processor is the core of the system responsible for extracting the information
required by users from the order flow generated by Reader. Connected to Reader
by an abstract interface, the data Processors treat historical order flow, simulated
order flow or hybrid order flow identically. This creates great potential for very
effective testing of trading strategies.3
We implemented a LOB Constructor that matches the limit orders coming from
the Reader and updates the LOB. The accuracy and efficiency of this algorithm
determine to a large extent the overall performance of the system. For this reason it
was thoroughly tested and optimized. We shall discuss the currently implemented
LOB Constructor in Section 4.4.
Moreover, we have also developed Order Tracer, whose beta version is currently
being tested. Order Tracer traces relevant events for individual limit orders, such
as the time of submission, partial/full execution and cancellation. It has been used
for computing the lifetime of limit orders for some research projects (e.g. Hautsch
and Huang, 2012a,c). We expect that in the near future more and more utilities
for special research purposes will be added to the current framework.
Writer receives the reconstructed data and saves them to the file system. Currently
the system contains four Writers; the Message Writer, which saves the event type
and the corresponding order information into the file system, the Book Writer,
which receives the current state of the reconstructed LOB for every order event
and saves it, the Order Writer, which saves the characteristics (order ID, limit
price, size, etc.) of limit orders, and finally the Trace Writer, which saves event-
specific information, such as the event time, submission time and the type of order
event, as generated by the Order Tracer.
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Figure 4.4: LOB reconstruction procedure. The algorithm employs an order pool to
collect the limit order information. When an “A” (or “F”) message comes in, it creates
a limit order item in the order pool. When subsequently a message comes in indicating
limit order cancellation (“X” and “D”) or a limit order execution (“E”), the information
about the price and size of the original limit order is retrieved from the order pool using
common order ID.
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4.4 Limit Order Book Reconstruction
4.4.1 Overview of the Reconstruction Procedure
Figure 4.4 summarizes the procedure of the LOB reconstruction. For arriving messages
identified as limit order submissions, the system records in the order pool all relevant
information including order ID, limit price, quantity, trade direction and MPID, if avail-
able. Once a cancellation or execution message arrives, the system first finds in the pool
the corresponding previously recorded limit order submission by comparing the order
IDs. After matching the two orders - incoming order and order stored in the order pool
- the system records the remaining non-executed size of the limit order or deletes the
order from the order pool altogether if the remaining size is zero. Finally, the system
updates the LOB: the side in the LOB (bid or ask) to be updated is determined by trade
direction (buy or sell) of the corresponding order; the level in the LOB is identified by
the limit price; the new depth at this level is calculated by deducting the size of the
effective quantity.
The remaining issue is the construction of the initial-state of the LOB before the
aforementioned procedure can be applied. Note that in the TotalView-ITCH message
data, the order ID of any limit order cancellation and execution message can always be
found in a limit order submission message, which was recorded at an earlier time on the
same trading day. This implies that all limit orders valid overnight, such as some good-
to-kill orders, have been resubmitted by the system in the early morning. The NASDAQ
trading system is in general open for new order instructions at 7:00 EST, even though
continuous trading does not start until 9:30 EST. Because the TotalView-ITCH data set
contains all messages, including messages submitted during the pre-trading period, our
algorithm initializes the reconstruction with an empty LOB at the beginning of every
day.
4.4.2 Implementation of LOB Constructor
As we discuss in Section 4.2, all TotalView-ITCH messages, except for messages con-
taining limit order submissions, contain only partial information about the underlying
limit orders. In order to update the order book, we need to “complete” the limit order
information. Figure 4.5 shows in details how this is done in case of messages containing
limit order executions. After reading an execution message, the system searches for the
corresponding limit order inside the order pool using the order ID. If the search is suc-
cessful, the information on the remaining size of the limit order is updated. The system
then updates the LOB by changing the depth and quote on the corresponding level.
3For instance, it is well-known that the back-testing of trading strategies on historical data
has a very serious drawback - there is no market feedback to the tested strategy and so it is very
hard to estimate the market impact of the strategy. In this context, testing with a simulator
allows implementing realistic feedback mechanisms to simulate market impact and thus provide
credible assessment of the tested trading strategy.
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Figure 4.5: Sequential diagram for messages of limit order executions. The procedure begins with reading the message and
creating a corresponding Message object. The object then communicates with the order pool and updates information about
the underlying limit order. Simultaneously, it retrieves from the limit order any missing information, such as price. Using
the complete information about the limit order, the Message object updates the order book state (the OrderBook object).
Finally, the constructor writes the updated order book state and the corresponding message into the file system using the
OrderBookWriter and MessageWriter objects.
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Figure 4.6: Class diagram of LOB construction. A BookConstructor object contains
unique OrderBook and OrderPool objects, which are updated using incoming messages
corresponding to Message objects. Moreover, there must be at least one MessageReader
object for reading the input, an OrderBookWriter object and a MessageWriter object,
which write the output into the file system.
Finally, the new order book and the corresponding message item are stored in the file
system as output.
Figure 4.6 represents the final class diagram for our LOB Constructor. The system
includes a unique OrderBook and OrderPool instance, which are controlled via a unique
BookConstructor instance. After MessageReader objects reads a message from an
external source, it creates a Message object and then uses it to update the limit orders
inside the OrderPool object as well as quote and depth information in the OrderBook
object according to the order event type. If the process is successful, it saves the output
using a MessageWriter and an OrderBookWriter object. Note that the Reader and
Writer are intent to be defined as abstract interfaces, rather than concrete classes, for
increasing the flexibility of the format of output data.
4.4.3 Output of LOB Constructor
The LOB Constructor generates two output data files; one file contains the LOB data
and the other one contains the corresponding order events. Table 4.2 shows a segment of
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Table 4.2
LOB data generated by the LOB Constructor.
The sample contains a five second segment of three-level LOB data for ticker GOOG on July 1st 2009. The time variable
is in milliseconds after the midnight. Price is in 0.01 of a cent and size in number of shares. The corresponding order events
that update the state of the LOB are shown in Table 4.3.
Time Ask Ask Bid Bid Ask Ask Bid Bid Ask Ask Bid Bid
price 1 size 1 price 1 size 1 price 2 size 2 price 2 size 2 price 3 size 3 price 3 size 3
36000043 4231100 100 4227300 300 4231200 100 4223000 100 4231300 300 4222900 100
36000044 4231100 100 4227300 300 4231200 300 4223000 100 4231300 300 4222900 100
36000207 4229100 100 4227300 300 4231100 100 4223000 100 4231200 300 4222900 100
36000208 4229100 100 4227300 300 4231100 100 4223000 100 4231200 100 4222900 100
36000208 4229100 100 4227300 300 4231100 100 4223000 100 4231300 100 4222900 100
36003222 4229100 100 4227300 300 4231100 100 4223000 100 4231200 100 4222900 100
36003471 4229100 100 4227300 300 4231100 100 4222900 100 4231200 100 4221200 100
36004005 4229100 200 4227300 300 4231100 100 4222900 100 4231200 100 4221200 100
36004009 4229100 200 4227300 200 4231100 100 4222900 100 4231200 100 4221200 100
36004009 4229100 200 4222900 100 4231100 100 4221200 100 4231200 100 4219100 400
36004009 4229100 200 4222900 100 4231100 100 4221200 100 4231200 100 4219100 400
36004010 4229100 200 4222900 200 4231100 100 4221200 100 4231200 100 4219100 400
36004010 4229100 200 4227300 200 4231100 100 4222900 200 4231200 100 4221200 100
36004011 4229100 100 4227300 200 4231100 100 4222900 200 4231200 100 4221200 100
36004015 4229100 100 4227300 200 4231100 100 4223300 100 4231200 100 4222900 200
36004016 4229100 100 4227300 200 4231100 100 4222900 200 4231200 100 4221200 100
36004017 4229100 100 4222900 200 4231100 100 4221200 100 4231200 100 4219100 400
36004018 4229100 100 4222900 200 4231100 100 4222800 200 4231200 100 4221200 100
36004018 4229100 200 4222900 200 4231100 100 4222800 200 4231200 100 4221200 100
36004018 4229100 200 4227300 200 4231100 100 4222900 200 4231200 100 4222800 200
36004020 4229100 200 4227300 200 4231100 100 4222900 200 4231200 100 4221200 100
36004020 4229100 100 4227300 200 4231100 100 4222900 200 4231200 100 4221200 100
36004021 4229100 100 4227300 200 4231100 100 4223300 100 4231200 100 4222900 200
36004025 4229100 100 4223300 100 4231100 100 4222900 200 4231200 100 4221200 100




Order event data generated by the LOB Constructor.
The sample contains a five second segment of order event (affecting the three-level
LOB) data for ticker GOOG on July 1st 2009. The time variable is in milliseconds af-
ter the midnight. The type variable indicates the event type: submission, cancellation,
execution of a limit order or execution of a hidden orders. Order ID is the ID of the
corresponding limit or hidden order. Size is the effective size, i.e. order size for submis-
sion events and cancelled (executed) quantity for cancellation (execution) events. The
three-level LOB instances immediately after these order events are shown in Table 4.2.
Time Type Order ID Size Price Trade Direction
36000043 1 35859474 100 4231100 -1
36000044 1 35859503 200 4231200 -1
36000207 1 35862501 100 4229100 -1
36000208 3 35859503 200 4231200 -1
36000208 3 35603811 100 4231200 -1
36003222 1 35926475 100 4231200 -1
36003471 3 35293758 100 4223000 1
36004005 1 35948533 100 4229100 -1
36004009 4 35332615 100 4227300 1
36004009 4 35643198 200 4227300 1
36004009 5 35643169 200 4227300 1
36004010 1 35948820 100 4222900 1
36004010 1 35948851 200 4227300 1
36004011 3 35948533 100 4229100 -1
36004015 1 35949144 100 4223300 1
36004016 3 35949144 100 4223300 1
36004017 4 35948851 200 4227300 1
36004018 1 35949411 200 4222800 1
36004018 1 35949425 100 4229100 -1
36004018 1 35949469 200 4227300 1
36004020 3 35949411 200 4222800 1
36004020 3 35949425 100 4229100 -1
36004021 1 35949745 100 4223300 1
36004025 4 35949469 200 4227300 1
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reconstructed three-level LOB data for Google Inc. (with ticker GOOG in NASDAQ). It
includes quotes and the corresponding depths up to the third best ask and bid, together
with time stamps. The other file contains the corresponding order event. As shown in
Table 4.3, it has five fields:
• time: time stamp; milliseconds after mid-night.
• type: event type; 1 for limit order submission, 2 for partial cancellation, 3 for
total deletion, 4 for limit order execution, 5 for hidden order execution.
• order ID: a unique number assigned by the exchange for identification of orders.
• size: change of order size (in shares); for limit order submission it is the order
size, for order execution it is the trading volume and for limit order cancellation
it is the cancelled volume.
• price: the price of the limit order or the corresponding executed hidden order (in
0.01 of a cent).
• trade direction: the trade direction of the corresponding limit (hidden) order;
1 for buy limit order and −1 for sell limit order. Note that in case of order
execution, 1 corresponds to seller-initiated trade (i.e. execution against buy limit
order) while −1 corresponds to buyer-initiated trade (i.e. execution against sell
limit order).
Both files can be easily loaded and used by analytical software, such as Matlab and
R. Because the number of output order events is identical to the number rows in the
LOB (i.e. both files have the same number of rows), the two output files can be easily
merged. The following is an example of R code for loading and merging the data set.
An Example of R Code Loading LOB Data
######### load data ########################
# load order book data
dataOB <− read . csv ( ”GOOG 20090701 orderbook 3 . csv ” )
# load message data
dataM <− read . csv ( ”GOOG 20090701 message 3 . csv ” )
# merge two da ta s e t s
data <− cbind (dataM , dataOB [ , −1 ] )
####### load completed ###################
# compute the number o f order book l e v e l s
n l e v e l s <− (dim(dataOB ) [ 2 ] − 1)/4
# name the columns
colnms <− c ( ”Time” , ”Type” , ”OrderID” , ” S i z e ” , ” Pr i ce ” , ”TradeDirect ion ” )
for ( i in 1 : n l e v e l s )
{ colnms <− c ( colnms , paste ( ”ASKp” , i , sep=”” ) , paste ( ”ASKv” , i , sep=”” ) ,
paste ( ”BIDp” , i , sep=”” ) , paste ( ”BIDv” , i , sep=”” ) ) }
colnames ( data ) <− colnms
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# clean up
rm( ’dataOB ’ , ’dataM ’ )
4.4.4 Application: Visualization of LOB and Order Flow
The purpose of the LOB and order flow visualization is to help researchers intuitively
understand the basic principles of order-driven trading by showing a sequence of changes
in the LOB associated with the incoming order events. The upper left box in Figure 4.7
contains basic information about the displayed ticker and current time, as well as a
comment field, which interprets the situation at the given point in time, thus helping to
understand the principles better. The box labeled “Order Flow” shows several orders
around the current order (violet color), as recorded in the corresponding output file. The
box Limit Order Book (Table) box contains rows from the LOB that correspond to the
orders displayed in the Order Flow box. The Limit Order Book (Table) box contains
prices and depth (number of shares) at three levels of bid and ask. The box with the title
“Limit Order Book (Graph)” contains the same information (for one row) visualized;
depth (number of shares) at the three levels of displayed order book. Note that this
graph contains only the current state of the LOB corresponding to the violet row in the
previous two boxes. Finally, the large graph on the right displays the incoming orders
and the continuity of BID and ASK price levels against the time axis. Note that this
graph does not contain information about the size of incoming orders nor the cumulated
depth. But in combination, both graphs contain all information from the tables and thus
provide current snapshots, as well as the dynamics of the LOB in the sample period.
4.5 Order Tracer
We also implement a module called Order Tracer to extract information, i.e. cancella-
tion, execution and deletion, for single limit orders. The procedure is similar to the LOB
Constructor.
4.5.1 Implementation of Order Tracer
Reusing the classes designed for the LOB Constructor, we implement another appli-
cation by adding one additional controlling class - the TraceRecorder. It passes the
message data and completes information from the underlying limit orders exactly in
the same way as the LOB Constructor. However, rather than using the information to
update the LOB, it simply records the types of events and limit orders temporarily in a
block of memory called tracePool. The constructed data are then saved by instances
of LimitOrderWriter and TraceWriter. Figure 4.8 contains our final class diagram.
107
 The Order with type Hidden Execution and trade direction Sell 
  at price 143.74$ has arrived.
Description     















































































































Limit Order Book (Table)
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Limit Order Book (Graph)
BID ASK
Figure 4.7: The visualization of LOB and order flow. The time X-axis in the right graph does not correspond to the real
time, but rather to “tick time”, i.e. events in this graph are equidistant with respect to the X-axis regardless of their actual
distance in time. The Y-axis “Price” is scaled realistically to represent the actual quotes in the LOB. The current order
event and LOB instance are highlighted by violet color in the left graph and by orange color in the right graph.
10
8
Figure 4.8: Class diagram of trace construction. A TraceRecorder object contains
unique OrderPool objects, which are updated by incoming messages corresponding to
the Message objects. Also, it must include at least one MessageReader object for reading
the input, a LimitOrderWriter object and a TraceWriter objects for writing the output
into the file system.
4.5.2 Output of Order Tracer
Similar to the LOB Constructor, the Order Tracer generates two files with the same
number of rows. The first output file classifies events as cancellations or executions and
contains the following six columns (see a sample in Table 4.4).
• submission time: the time when the corresponding limit order was submitted;
milliseconds after midnight.
• time: time stamp of the event; milliseconds after midnight.
• size: change of limit order size; number of shares.
• execution: a dummy variable indicating whether the event corresponds to a limit
order execution (1) or cancellation (0).
• earlier exe.: a dummy variable indicating whether the event corresponds to a
limit order that has been partially executed earlier (1) or not (0).
The second output file contains information about the corresponding limit orders.
Table 4.5 contains a segment of this file. There are seven variables:
• order ID: a unique number generated by the exchange identifying the limit order.
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Table 4.4
Order event data generated by the Order Tracer.
The sample contains a segment of data for GOOG from October 1st 2010. The
time variable is in milliseconds after midnight. Size is the effective size, i.e. cancelled
(executed) quantity of cancellation (execution) events. Variable Execution indicates
the type of event (execution or cancellation). Variable Earlier exe. indicates the first
execution by zero. The underlying limit order information is shown in Table 4.5.
Submission Time Time Size Execution Earlier exe.
36502739 36502742 100 0 0
36502743 36502743 100 0 0
36502554 36502744 100 0 0
36502744 36502745 100 0 0
36502726 36502745 100 0 0
36502734 36502751 100 0 0
36502745 36502755 100 1 0
36502742 36502755 123 1 0
36502755 36502755 100 1 0
36502745 36502756 100 0 0
36502730 36502756 100 0 0
36502742 36502757 177 1 1
36502750 36502757 100 1 0
36502741 36502757 23 1 0
36502741 36502757 77 1 1
36502737 36502757 100 1 0
36502047 36502757 100 0 0
36502761 36502761 100 1 0
36502757 36502761 300 0 0
36502761 36502761 100 0 0
• order size: original order size at submission.
• remaining size: remaining size of the order after an order event.
• price: price of the limit order.
• trade direction: 1 for buy limit orders, -1 for sell limit orders.
• hidden: a dummy variable indicating whether the order is hidden (1) or not (0).
• MPID: Market Participant ID of the trader who submitted the order, null if un-
known.
Since we organize the constructed data in such a way that the two output files contain
identical number of observations, we can easily load and merge them using statistical
software, such as Matlab and R. Here is an example of Matlab code.
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Table 4.5
Limit order data generated by Order Tracer.
The sample contains a segment of data for GOOG from October 1st 2010. Variable
Rem. Size is the remaining share quantity of the limit order after an event. The Price
variable is in 0.01 cent. Some limit orders may contain additional MPID information
identifying the submitters. Events recorded for individual limit orders are shown on
Table 4.4.
Order ID Order Size Rem. Size Price Trade Dir. Hidden MPID
57916505 100 0 5273000 1 0 null
57916618 100 0 5273100 1 0 null
57913456 100 0 5261200 1 0 HDSN
57916642 100 0 5273300 1 0 null
57916188 100 0 5271700 1 0 null
57916358 100 0 5271700 1 0 null
57916698 100 0 5273400 1 0 null
57916588 300 177 5273300 1 0 null
57916928 100 0 5273400 1 0 null
57916679 100 0 5273000 1 0 null
57916279 100 0 5221600 1 0 NMRA
57916588 300 0 5273300 1 0 null
57916814 100 0 5273300 1 0 null
57916545 100 77 5273100 1 0 null
57916545 100 0 5273100 1 0 null
57916448 100 0 5273000 1 0 null
57899910 100 0 5275100 -1 0 null
57917068 100 0 5273300 1 0 null
57917003 300 0 5265700 1 0 null
57917079 100 0 5275000 -1 0 null
An Example of Matlab Code Loading Order Trace Data
% load event data
t r a c e data=load ( ’GOOG 20101001 t r a c e . csv ’ ] ) ;
% load order data
f i d=fopen ( [ ’GOOG 20101001 order . csv ’ ] ) ;
o rde r s=text scan ( f id , ’%f ,%f ,%f ,%f ,%f ,%f ,%s ’ ) ;
fc lose ( f i d ) ;
order data=[ o rde r s {1} orde r s {2} orde r s {3} orde r s {4} orde r s {5} orde r s { 6 } ] ;
% merge the da ta s e t s
mydata=[ traceData orderData ] ;
% clean up
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Figure 4.9: Histogram of size, execution quantity, cancellation time and execution time
for limit orders. The red line represents kernel density estimates. Zero cancellation time
and execution are discarded. Trading data for Microsoft Corp. on NASDAQ in October,
2010
clear t r a c e data order data orde r s ;
4.5.3 Application: Main Characteristics of Limit Orders
Figure 4.9 shows a simple analysis of the characteristics of limit orders using the output
of the Order Tracer. Calculation of the order sizes, execution quantities and life time
of limit orders are trivial tasks when using the data illustrated in Table 4.4 and 4.5.
Nevertheless, we can make a few interesting empirical observations: 1) Market partici-
pants submit a huge number of limit orders with small sizes. Indeed, we find that most
limit orders are of size 100, which is the size of a round lot in NASDAQ. 2) Only a small
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proportion of limit orders are executed and the execution quantity is small. 3) Most of
limit orders are cancelled shortly after the submission. 4) Execution time is typically
longer than cancellation time. More detailed analysis of order flow properties and limit
order characteristics can be found in Hautsch and Huang (2012a).
4.6 Conclusion
System LOBSTER is designed to meet the three basic requirements for constructing
datasets for empirical studies on limit order markets. First, it is sufficiently efficient and
fast, requiring only seconds or minutes to fulfill standard requests. The system is web-
based and very intuitive with a user-friendly interface allowing researchers to fully focus
on research rather than spend time preparing data. Third, the system was programmed
using object-oriented programming language and intentionally designed to allow for easy
extensions, which makes it very versatile. New modules of the LOB Constructor and
Order Tracer have been already added to the system.
Of course, any meaningful extension must be based on a sound research
idea. To facilitate communication with other researchers, we created a forum
(http://lobster.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/forum/) focused on modelling order book and
order flow. It is a slowly but steadily growing source of information, not only about
LOBSTER, but about everything related to order-driven markets. We expect that it
will become a rich and comprehensive pool of references for academic researchers, which
will help them to accelerate the initial stages of their research projects and help us fur-
ther develop the system. The feedback we are receiving from students and researchers
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Härdle, W., N. Hautsch, and A. Mihoci, 2009, Modelling and forecasting liquidity sup-
ply using semiparametric factor dynamics, Discussion Paper 2009-018 Collaborative
Research Center 649 “Economic Risk”, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
Harris, L., 1996, Does a large minimum price variation encourage order exposure, Work-
ing paper Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California.
, 1997, Order exposure and parasitic traders, Working paper Marshall School of
Business, University of Southern California.
Hasbrouck, J., 1991, Measuring the information content of stock trades, Journal of
Finance 46, 179 – 207.
, and G. Saar, 2009, Technology and liquidity provision: The blurring of tradi-
tional definitions, Journal of Financial Markets 12, 143 – 172.
Haug, A., 2002, Testing linear restrictions on cointegrating vectors: sizes and powers of
Wald and likelihood ratio tests in finite samples, Econometric Theory 18, 505 – 524.
Hautsch, N., and R. Huang, 2012a, Limit order flow, market impact, and optimal order
sizes: Evidence from NASDAQ TotalView-ITCH data, in F. Abergel, J.-P. Bouchaud,
T. Foucault, C. Lehal, and M. Rosenbaum, ed.: Market Microstructure: Confronting
Many Viewpoints – Conference Proceedings pp. 137 – 161. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
, 2012b, The market impact of a limit order, Journal of Economic Dynamics &
Control 36, 501 – 5022.
, 2012c, On the dark side of the market: Identifying and analyzing hidden or-
der placement, Discussion Paper 2012-14, CRC 649 Humboldt Universität zu Berlin,
Germany.
Hendershortt, T., C. Jones, and A. Menkveld, 2010, Does algorithmic trading improve
liquidity, Working paper Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley.
Huang, R., and T. Polak, 2011, LOBSTER: The limit order book reconstructor, Dis-
cussion paper School of Business and Economics, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
http://lobster.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/Lobster/LobsterReport.pdf.
Johansen, S., 1991, Estimation and hypothesis testing of cointegration vectors in Gaus-
sian vector autoregressive models, Econometrica 59, 1551 – 80.
117
, 1995, Likelihood-Based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models
(Oxford University Press).
, and K. Juselius, 1990, Maximum likelihood estimation and inference on coin-
tegration - with applications to the demand for money, Oxford Bulletin of Economics
and Statistics 52, 169 – 210.
Johansen, S., and M. Nielsen, 2010, Likelihood inference for a fractionally cointegrated
vector autoregressive model, Research Paper 2010-24 CREATES.
Jorda, O., 2005, Estimation and inference of impulse response by local projections,
American Economic Review 95, 161 – 182.
Kwiatkowski, D., P. Phillips, P. Schmidt, and Y. Shin, 1992, Testing the null hypothesis
of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root, Journal of Econometrics 54, 159
– 178.
Lee, C., and M. Ready, 1991, Inferring trade direction from intraday data, Jounal of
Finance 46, 733 – 746.
Ljung, G., and G. Box, 1978, On a measure of lack of fit in time series models, Biometrika
65, 297 – 303.
Lo, I., and S. Sapp, 2006, A structural error-correction model of best prices and depths
in the foreign exchange limit order market, Working Paper 06-8 Bank of Canada.
Lütkepohl, H., 1990, Asymptotic distributions of impulse response functions and forecast
error variance decompositions of vector autoregressive models, Review of Economics
and Statistics 72, 116 – 125.
, and H. Reimers, 1992, Impulse response analysis of cointegrated systems, Jour-
nal of Economic Dynamics & Control 16, 53 – 78.
McKelvey, R., and W. Zaviona, 1975, A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal level
dependent variables, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 4, 103–120.
Mike, S., and J. Farmer, 2008, An empirical behavioral model of liquidity and volatility,
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 32, 200 – 234.
Moinas, S., 2010, Hidden limit orders and liquidity in order driven markets, working
paper 10-147 Toulouse School of Economics.
NASDAQ, 2008, NASDAQ stock market rules, http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/.
Pardo Tornero, A., and R. Pascual, 2007, On the hidden side of liqudity, Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=459000 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.459000.
118
Parlour, C., 1998, Price dynamics and limit order markets, Review of Finance Studies
11, 789 – 816.
, and D. Seppi, 2008, Limit order markets: A survey, in A. Thakor, and A. Boot,
ed.: Handbook of Financial Intermediation & Banking pp. 63 – 96.
Potters, M., and J. Bouchaud, 2003, More statistical properties of order books and price
impact, Physica A 324, 133 – 140.
Rosu, I., 2010, Liquidity and information in order driven markets, Working paper HEC
Paris Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1286193.
Russell, J., and T. Kim, 2010, A new model for limit order book dynamics, in T. Boller-
slev, J. Russell, and M. Watson, ed.: Volatility and Time Series Econometrics, Essays
in Honor of Robert Engle (Oxford Univerty Press).
Said, E., and D. Dickey, 1984, Testing for unit roots in autoregressive moving average
models of unknown order, Biometrika 71, 599 – 607.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010, Concept release on equity market structure,
Federal Register 75, 3594 – 3614.
Tuttle, L., 2006, Hidden orders, trading costs, and information, Unpublished working
paper University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS.
White, H., 1980, A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct
test for heteroscedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817 – 838.
Yamamoto, R., 2011, Order aggressiveness, pre-trade transparency, and long memory in




A.1 Adaptive time window matching algorithm
In our database, trade data and order book data are recorded in separate files stemming
from different recording systems. As a result, the time stamps in the two data sets have
different time distances to exchange time. In accordance with the institutional settings
of Euronext, we design an adaptive time window matching algorithm which contains
three main steps.
Step 1 Exact matching. The algorithm picks up a time stamp of a trade and opens
a specified time window, e.g. [−10, 10] seconds around this time stamp. Then,
a procedure picks every order book record in this time window and performs the
following analysis: If (i) the trade price equals to the best bid (ask) price and
the difference of the best bid (ask) size between this order book record and the
previous one equals to the trade size or (ii) the trade price equals to the previous
best bid (ask) price, the best bid (ask) size equals to the trade size and the best
bid (ask) price decreases (increases), it matches this order book record with the
corresponding trade and records the delay time between the trade and the order
book. If no match is achieved for all order book records in the time window, the
trade remains to be unmatched.
Step 2 Inexact matching. The algorithm picks up an unmatched trade record’s time
stamp and opens a time window of size which is twice the average delay time
computed in Step 1. If (i) the trade price equals the best bid (ask) price and
the best bid (ask) size is less than the previous one or (ii) the best bid (ask)
price decreases (increases), it matches the trade with the current order book. If
no match is achieved for all order book records in the time window, the trade
remains to be unmatched.
Step 3 Round time matching. The algorithm picks up an unmatched trade and matches
it with an order book record that is closed to the trade’s time stamp plus the
average delay time.
Figure A.1 gives the histogram of the delay time between trades and their corresponding
order book records. The delay time is computed in Step 1 by which 1609 (sub-)trades
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Figure A.1: Histogram of the delay time between the trade and its corresponding order
book record. Trading of Fortis, Euronext Amsterdam on August 1st, 2008.
have been exactly matched with their corresponding order books inside a [−5, 5] second
time windows. The average delay time is −0.185 seconds, i.e., trades are on average
recorded 185 milliseconds before the corresponding order book.
A.2 FIML estimator for cointegrating vectors
Model (1.1) is estimated by the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimator
proposed by Johansen (1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). Let z0t := ∆yt, and
z1t := yt−1. Further let z2t be the vector of stacked variables,
z2t := (∆yt−1, · · · ,∆yt−p+1, xt−1, · · · , xt−s, 1)′








jt, i, j = 0, 1, 2,
where T is the number of observations. Moreover, let
Sij := Mij −Mi2M−122 M2j .
We then solve the generalized eigenvalue problem
∣∣λS11 − S10S−100 S01
∣∣ = 0
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for the eigenvalues 1 > λ̂1 > · · · > λ̂K > 0 and corresponding eigenvector V̂ =
(v̂1, · · · , v̂K) which is normalized by V̂ S11V̂ = IK . Johansen’s (1991) trace test or
maximum eigenvalue test can be used to determine the underlying cointegration rank r.
Under the hypothesis that there exist r cointegration relations, the K × r cointegrating
matrix β is estimated by
β̂ = (v̂1, . . . , v̂r)











The magnitude of λ̂i can be interpreted as a measure of the stationarity of the product
β̂′iyt. The larger λ̂i, the closer the stochastic properties of the underlying relationship
to that of a stationary process. The parameters α and Γ are estimated by OLS after
inserting β̂ into equation (1.1) and computing Σ̂u as Σ̂u = S00 − α̂α̂′.
When some of the cointegration relations are known, we can partition the cointe-
grating matrix as
β = (b, ϕ)
where b contains known cointegrating vectors and ϕ contains the unknown ones. Denote
Sij.b = Sij − Si1(b′S11b)−1S1j .
Then, ϕ can be estimated similarly by solving the generalized eigenvalue problem
∣∣λb′⊥S11.bb⊥ − b′⊥S10.bS−100.bS01.bb⊥
∣∣ = 0
A.3 Transform estimates from VECM to VAR
Following Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992), the parameters of equation (1.1) can be easily
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[A1, · · · , Ap, µ] = [αβ′,Γ]D + J∗, (A.3.2)
where J∗ := [IK : 0 : · · · : 0] is a K × (Kp + 1) matrix. The theorem below provides a
consistent estimator of A and B:
Theorem 1 (Lütkepohl and Reimers, 1992). Let α̂, β̂, Γ̂ and Σ̂u denote the FIML
estimates of the parameters of model (1.1). Moreover, Â1, · · · , Âp, µ̂ are computed by




vec(Â1, · · · , Âp, µ̂)− vec(A1, · · · , Ap, µ)
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B.1 Asymptotic Distribution of Marginal Effects
The asymptotic covariance of marginal dummy effects is straightforwardly computed
using the delta method. Let θ = [β′, γ1, . . . , γJ−1]
′ be the vector of (K+J−1) unknown
parameters, θ̂ denotes the maximum likelihood estimator with V ≡ Asy.Var[θ̂] being
its (K + J − 1) × (K + J − 1) asymptotic covariance matrix. Then, the asymptotic












































with IK denoting a K × K identity matrix, 0 is a (K × 1) zero vector and zj and φj
given by zj ≡ γj − β̂
′






















































′, 0, 0, · · · , −φJ−1
]
.
B.2 Histogram of Significant Ordered Probit Es-
timates
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Undisclosed buy limit orders Undisclosed sell limit orders
Neg. Distance s Distance d Neg. Distance s Distance d
Bid-ask spread (SPR):









































































Visible Depth on the own side of market (DPO):









































































Visible Depth on the opposite side of market (DPG):







































































Adjusted type of the prevailing trade (TY P ):












































































Figure B.1: The histogram of significant estimates. Ordered probit estimates of hidden
order locations on the bid and ask side depending on categorized measures s and d as
discussed in Section 3.3.4. The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label,
thus negative coefficients are associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99
NASDAQ stocks during the period of October 2010 with 21 trading days, the histogram
shows estimates significantly different from zero at 5% α-level. TY P is adjusted such
that it equals 1 when the prevailing trade consumes the own-side liquidity, −1 otherwise.
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Undisclosed buy limit orders Undisclosed sell limit orders
Neg. Distance s Distance d Neg. Distance s Distance d
Adjusted mid-quote return (RET ):


























































































































































Executed hidden volume on the own side of market (HV O):








































































Ratio of 1 min. executed HO volume on the own side to 5 min. (HRO):






































































Figure B.2: The histogram of significant estimates. Ordered probit estimates of hidden
order locations on the bid and ask side depending on categorized measures s and d as
discussed in Section 3.3.4. The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label,
thus negative coefficients are associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99
NASDAQ stocks during the period of October 2010 with 21 trading days, the histogram
shows estimates significantly different from zero at 5% α-level. RET is adjusted such
that it equals to positive value when mid-quotes move away the own side market.
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Undisclosed buy limit orders Undisclosed sell limit orders
Neg. Distance s Distance d Neg. Distance s Distance d
Executed hidden volume on the opposite side of market (HVG)




















































































Ratio of 1 min. executed HO volume on the opposite side to 5 min. (HRG):
















































































Number of “low frequency” limit order updating the own-side quote (ALO)




































































Number of “low frequency” limit order updating the opposite-side quote (ALG):












































































Figure B.3: The histogram of significant estimates. Ordered probit estimates of hidden
order locations on the bid and ask side depending on categorized measures s and d as
discussed in Section 3.3.4. The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label,
thus negative coefficients are associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99
NASDAQ stocks during the period of October 2010 with 21 trading days, the histogram
shows estimates significantly different from zero at 5% α-level. “Low frequency” limit
orders are defined as those submitted in the prevailing 3 minutes and not cancelled.
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Undisclosed buy limit orders Undisclosed sell limit orders
Neg. Distance s Distance d Neg. Distance s Distance d
Number of fleeting orders on the own side of market (HFO):











































































Number of fleeting orders on the opposite side of market (HFG):










































































































































































































































Figure B.4: The histogram of significant estimates. Ordered probit estimates of hidden
order locations on the bid and ask side depending on categorized measures s and d as
discussed in Section 3.3.4. The order aggressiveness is declining with the category label,
thus negative coefficients are associated with increasing aggressiveness. Based on 99
NASDAQ stocks during the period of October 2010 with 21 trading days, the histogram
shows estimates significantly different from zero at 5% α-level. The fleeting order is
defined as the limit order cancelled in one second after the submission.
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